Introduction

If we examine the emergence of new international orders, we can observe that they usually take shape during periods of turbulence, disorder, and shifts in the balance of power, rather than during moments of stability. International history shows that major transformations rarely occur suddenly; they are typically preceded by phases in which the existing order gradually loses its ability to regulate developments in the international arena, manage interactions among states, and contain growing struggles over influence. At the same time, new powers emerge seeking either to modify the rules of the game or to redefine their role within it.

The world today is experiencing a phase characterized by a high degree of what may be described as “strategic fluidity.” During this period, the ability of many international institutions to enforce their rules is declining, while the selective application of international law is becoming increasingly evident. At the same time, hard power has once again assumed a prominent role in the management of relations among states. Against the backdrop of the declining effectiveness of institutions responsible for maintaining international peace and security, together with intensifying competition among major powers, the international arena appears to be moving from a relatively well-defined order toward an uncertain phase in which the contours of a new balance have yet to fully emerge.

Nevertheless, international disorder does not necessarily mean the complete absence of order. Rather, it may represent a transitional phase between two international systems—a period in which the rules of the old order weaken before the rules of a new one become established. Despite the risks and conflicts associated with such periods, they may also become a strategic opportunity for states capable of understanding ongoing transformations and investing in them. States do not establish their international standing only after a new order has stabilized; in many cases, their position is determined during the period preceding its emergence.

Historical experience demonstrates that moments of disorder and transition have often constituted decisive turning points in shaping the future of states. Following the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the major powers redrew the political map of Europe and established a political order that endured for decades.

Similarly, the transformations resulting from the Second World War were not limited to the end of the conflict itself. The post-war period witnessed the establishment of new institutions, rules, and arrangements that shaped the international system for decades. Likewise, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991 undoubtedly contributed to the transition of the international system toward a period of American predominance, before signs of renewed competition over the shape of the future international order began to emerge in recent years.

From this perspective, international disorder should not be viewed merely as a crisis that states must wait to see end. Rather, it can be understood as a period of “strategic investment,” during which states have an opportunity to redefine their interests, build their capabilities, reshape their alliances, and determine their position within an international order that has not yet fully emerged. States that recognize the nature of this transitional phase and act strategically within it may become participants in shaping the rules of the new order, while those that choose to wait until the transformations are complete may find themselves confronting an international reality that was shaped without their participation.

The significance of this phase is particularly important for Arab states, as the major transformations currently taking place within the international system create space to reconsider the region’s position within emerging global equations. This requires moving beyond merely responding to existing crises toward developing long-term strategic visions based on diversifying partnerships, strengthening sources of national power, and reassessing national priorities and regional interests. Transitional periods do not necessarily reward those who simply wait for their outcomes; rather, they create opportunities for those who prepare themselves to help shape those outcomes.

The central argument of this paper is that disorder is not necessarily the end of the international system; rather, it may represent the final opportunity for states to determine their position before the window for shaping the new international order begins to close. Once the rules of the emerging order become established, the space for strategic maneuvering becomes narrower, and states may shift from being participants in shaping the rules to becoming recipients of rules developed by others.

Therefore, the most important question is not: When will the current international order come to an end? Rather, it is: Which states are preparing today to become influential actors in the international order that will follow?

First: When the International System Loses Its Capacity to Regulate: Does Disorder Begin, or Does a New Order Start to Take Shape?

The stability of the international system does not depend solely on the existence of institutions and laws, but also on a relative degree of consensus among the major powers regarding the rules governing competition and the limits on the use of force. When this consensus begins to erode, a transitional phase emerges in which the rules of the old order become less effective before new rules, enjoying broader international acceptance, begin to take shape.

Since the establishment of the post-Second World War international system in 1945, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, represented an attempt to build an international order based on managing conflict through multilateral rules and institutions rather than relying entirely on the logic of power. However, recent decades have revealed a decline in the ability of these institutions to manage international crises due to intensifying competition among major powers, the use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council, and inconsistencies in the application of international law. In February 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the suspension of U.S. funding to UNRWA, along with the suspension or review of support provided to a number of United Nations organizations, which had a significant impact on the role and effectiveness of international institutions.¹

The weakening of the existing system does not necessarily mean its immediate collapse. Rather, it may signal the beginning of a transitional phase in which international powers compete to redefine the rules of the system.

As realist theorists in international relations argue, the international system remains closely linked to the balance of power among states, particularly in the absence—as is the case today—of a central global authority capable of imposing binding rules on all actors.

Historical experience demonstrates that major transformations are often preceded by periods of instability. Following the defeat of Napoleon and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna was convened to reorganize the European balance of power and establish a political order that maintained a degree of stability until the mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, after the Second World War in 1945, the end of the conflict represented not merely the conclusion of a military confrontation, but the beginning of a new international order based on new institutions and different balances of power. The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, meanwhile, enabled the United States to assume the position of the dominant global power during a period commonly described as unipolarity.

From this perspective, international disorder does not begin only when an international order collapses. It may begin when the existing system loses its ability to absorb and manage emerging transformations. During such periods, states start reassessing their positions, restructuring their alliances, and seeking to capitalize on opportunities created by shifting balances of power.

Current developments suggest that the international system is undergoing a broader process of restructuring that extends beyond isolated crises and reflects a wider struggle over influence, power, and the rules governing international relations. From the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, to the Russia–Ukraine war since 2022, and the growing number of regional crises, the international environment increasingly reflects competing visions of the emerging global order.

The 7 October 2023 attack and the war that followed in the Gaza Strip represented another test of the international system’s ability to apply the rules of international law and manage armed conflicts. At the same time, persistent differences among major powers regarding questions of security and human rights have exposed the depth of the challenges facing international institutions.

Likewise, the military escalation involving the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other from the period after 2024 to the present has added a new dimension to regional competition. This escalation has affected the balance of power in the Middle East and has also influenced Lebanon’s position, as the country has increasingly become an arena in which regional conflicts and competing calculations of influence among different powers intersect.

We can also observe that international competition is no longer confined to traditional military and political domains; it has expanded into areas of emerging geopolitical importance. This is evident in the growing international attention to the Arctic region and the competition for influence surrounding Greenland, due to its strategic location and potential natural resources. It is also reflected in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing over semiconductor technology and Taiwan’s TSMC. This provides a striking example of how control over advanced technology may determine which powers are best positioned to lead the emerging international order.

These developments demonstrate that the transformations currently underway are not merely about managing existing crises. Rather, they reflect a broader process of redefining spheres of influence and reshaping the balance of power within the emerging international system.

Second: International Disorder as a Phase of Strategic Repositioning: How Do States Shape Their Place in the Emerging Order?

The significance of this phase lies in the fact that the international system is not shaped only after disorder comes to an end; rather, its fundamental features are often drawn during the period of transition itself. For this reason, states that are capable of accurately reading ongoing transformations seek to capitalize on this moment.

However, this opportunity is not equally available to all states. International disorder tends to favor countries that possess a long-term strategic vision and the ability to move from a reactive foreign policy toward a more proactive and initiative-driven approach.

By contrast, states that wait for the new international order to stabilize before taking action may find themselves operating within rules and arrangements that they had no role in shaping. Strategic repositioning can be pursued through three main pathways:

First: Redefining National Interests

During periods of international transformation, states need to reassess their priorities and identify the areas through which they can strengthen their influence, rather than merely preserving traditional policies that may no longer fit the emerging international environment. In this context, the structural transformation in the Syrian landscape under the leadership of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s administration stands out as an exceptional example of how political groups or entities can redefine themselves. The new administration has sought to move from the approach of a “confrontational armed faction” toward an approach based on “statehood and political pragmatism.” This has included providing reassurances to regional and international powers and presenting itself as a partner in combating terrorism and safeguarding regional stability, thereby opening a window for international recognition and engagement that had not previously been available.

Second: Building More Flexible Alliances

International transformations provide states with an opportunity to reshape their partnerships in accordance with future interests. Diversifying foreign relations enhances states’ room for maneuver and gives them greater strategic autonomy. The Turkish model provides an example of this flexibility: Turkey is a member of NATO, while at the same time coordinating strategically with Russia through the Astana Process and expanding its trade relations with China. This diversified approach gives Turkey considerable flexibility in positioning itself within changing international dynamics.

Third: Strengthening the Elements of Comprehensive National Power

A state’s international standing is no longer determined solely by military power. It has become increasingly linked to economic strength, technological capacity, knowledge, and the ability to transform resources into political and strategic influence. In this context, Taiwan provides a striking example of a highly consequential international actor, not primarily because of its military capabilities, but because of its central role in the global production of advanced semiconductors through TSMC. This technological importance has turned Taiwan’s position in global supply chains into a major strategic factor shaping the calculations of leading powers.

Accordingly, international disorder should not be viewed only as a threat; it also represents a test of states’ ability to convert global transformations into strategic opportunities. States that act during periods of systemic restructuring are more likely to participate in shaping the emerging international order, whereas those that move too late may find themselves merely adapting to rules and outcomes established by others.

Third: Arab States and the International Transformation: A Historic Opportunity or a Costly Wait?

The Arab region has long been one of the areas most affected by transformations in the international system, given its geopolitical importance, strategic resources, and geographic location, which throughout history have made it an arena of competition among major powers. However, the current international transformations place Arab states at a different kind of crossroads. The global order that has governed international relations over recent decades is undergoing rapid change, while some of the rules associated with the previous phase are weakening before the features of the emerging order have fully taken shape.

In such transitional moments, the challenge facing Arab states is not limited to how they respond to existing crises, but also to how they can use this period of transformation to redefine their strategic position. International disorder may become a threat if states limit themselves to managing its consequences, but it can also become an opportunity if it is approached as a phase for rebuilding power and developing new instruments of influence.

Historical experience suggests that states do not automatically secure a stronger position in a new international order simply because they possess natural resources or strategic geography. Rather, their influence depends on their ability to convert these assets into political, economic, and strategic leverage. Natural wealth, markets, and geographic location do not automatically generate power unless they are linked to a clear vision for how they can be utilized within broader international transformations.

From this perspective, the current phase requires Arab states to move from a logic of reacting to events toward a logic of shaping strategic choices. Waiting until the features of the emerging international order become fully clear before taking strategic action may prove costly. Once new balances of power are established, opportunities for repositioning become more limited, and states may shift from being potential partners in shaping the rules to actors that merely adapt to rules established by others.

Arab states therefore face a strategic choice: either to invest in this period of international disorder to rebuild their strategic position and move from dependency toward becoming influential actors in the emerging international order, or simply to replace one sphere of external influence with another, shifting from dependence on one global power to dependence on a different one. The latter may appear to be the easier option, but it could prove far more costly in the long term.

One of the most important opportunities available to Arab states lies in redefining the concept of alliances and international partnerships. Current transformations create greater room for diversifying foreign relations and reducing reliance on a single pathway in international affairs, thereby giving states greater strategic autonomy and more space for maneuver. Alliances in a changing international system should not be based solely on political legacy or historical relationships; rather, they should reflect future interests and the ability of each party to generate mutual benefits.

This phase also highlights the importance of strengthening the Arab world’s own sources of power, including the ability to develop a credible Arab deterrence system. International standing in the emerging order will not be determined solely by military capability or the size of an economy. It will increasingly depend on a broader range of assets, including technology, food security, energy, innovation, and the capacity to produce knowledge. Power in the twenty-first century has become more complex, and the most influential states are those capable of combining these different elements and integrating them into a long-term strategic vision.

Seizing this opportunity does not mean ignoring the significant challenges facing the Arab region. However, the absence of a broader **Arab strategic project based on a strong and coherent vision—not only at the level of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, but across the wider Arab region—**may deepen these challenges. It could also expose the region to conflicts and consequences that do not originate from its own interests, while threatening its regional security.

It is therefore essential for Arab states to become actors that both respond to and contribute to shaping the emerging international order. Transitional periods do not offer unlimited or frequently recurring opportunities, and decades may pass before a similar moment arises in which states can redefine their positions and roles. Treating the current phase merely as a temporary crisis may therefore result in the loss of an important strategic opportunity, while a conscious and deliberate investment in this transformation could open the way for a more influential and strategically autonomous Arab role in the international order to come.

Conclusion

The greatest mistake states can make during periods of international transition is to treat disorder as a temporary crisis that must simply be endured until it passes. Historical experience, however, demonstrates that such periods are often the most consequential in shaping the future. States that understand the nature of the moment and invest in strategic repositioning are more likely to participate in shaping the emerging international order. This does not mean that international disorder is an opportunity without risks; on the contrary, it carries significant challenges that may threaten states lacking strategic vision or the capacity to act effectively.

In this context, Arab states face an important strategic test. The current phase of international transformation may provide an opportunity to redefine their position within the global system, provided that they move beyond crisis management toward the development of long-term strategic choices and future-oriented policies.

The emerging international order will not be shaped only after the current disorder comes to an end; many of its fundamental features will be defined within the disorder itself. International disorder is therefore not necessarily the end of the system, but rather the moment in which it is determined who will participate in writing the new rules and who will merely adapt to their consequences.

In a world where balances of power are changing rapidly, the ability to seize and strategically invest in moments of transition may ultimately become the dividing line between states that help shape the future and states that wait for the future to be shaped for them.

Issued by the Jordanian Masarat Foundation for Development and Progress

Thikra Al-Naaimneh

Specialist in Political Training and Development and Youth Empowerment