Introduction

The position paper entitled: “Redefining the Jordanian National Interest and the Points of Leverage between the Race for Influence and the Controls of Positioning” constitutes an attempt to read the current landscape as an exposure of a struggle between major projects competing over the regional space: an Iranian project seeking to reshape the balance of influence, in contrast to an American–Israeli positioning that is reproducing itself with more rigid and aligned tools. As this conflict enters its fifth week—after initial estimates had suggested a short timeframe—deeper implications are emerging that go beyond the immediate military dimension toward a reconfiguration of the architecture of power in the region.

Within this framework, it is observed that Iran—despite the qualitative attrition it has faced, which has affected its leadership levels through assassinations and targeted strikes—has managed to demonstrate a pattern of “strategic resilience,” based on rapid reconstruction and repositioning according to a logic of “organized fragmentation.” This has enabled it to absorb the initial shock and to reproduce its capacity to act within a hostile and complex environment. This behavior reveals a strategic mindset that relies on the multiplicity of centers of power rather than their centralization.

Chapter One: Repercussions of the Compound Conflict versus Jordanian Positioning in a Transforming Regional Environment

Recent developments open the way for a package of open scenarios, ranging from prolonging the conflict in a manner that exhausts all parties, to containing it within temporary settlements, and extending to more radical hypotheses such as creating a deeply rooted imbalance within the Iranian system itself. The seriousness of these scenarios is compounded by their concurrence with field escalation in the West Bank, and measures of a symbolic and provocative nature, such as the closure of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the escalation of settler activities, which reintroduces the question of a multi-front explosion.

However, the deeper problem lies in the absence of a coherent Arab project capable of action rather than reaction. This strategic vacuum has allowed these projects to move with relative freedom within the Arab space, transforming it into a field of decentralized interactions managed from outside its own internal structure. While actors differ in assessing the primary source of threat—between those who see the Israeli project as the long-term structural danger, and those who place the Iranian project as the more urgent threat—this debate, despite its legitimacy, essentially reflects a state of strategic exposure more than it does an analytical difference.

In this context, the Jordanian position emerges as a model of an attempt at the “careful management of balances,” as it seeks to avoid slipping into a polarized discourse of a sharp sectarian or nationalist nature, while at the same time maintaining political constants related to rejecting threats to the security of the Gulf states, and emphasizing the necessity of containing the conflict rather than expanding it. This approach does not reflect negative neutrality as much as it represents a conscious attempt to manage risks within a highly fluid regional environment.

At the level of strategic assessment, some readings put forward the hypothesis that sharply weakening Iran may not necessarily serve the interest of regional balance, as it could lead to a state of “unilateral exposure” in favor of the Israeli project, with the direct implications this carries for Jordan, most notably the revival of demographic pressure scenarios, foremost among them the hypotheses of forced displacement.

Accordingly, it can be said that the current phase imposes on decision-making circles in Jordan the need to operate within a complex equation that requires a precise balance between the necessities of national security, regional commitments, and transformations in the international system, without falling into the trap of sharp alignments or reductionist readings. It is an equation managed through an integrated system of economic and security policies, which will remain under real testing as the trajectories of the conflict evolve.

Chapter Two: Redefining the Jordanian National Interest between Duality of Threat and Discipline of Interest

The discussion in this chapter proceeds from an implicit acknowledgment of the multiplicity of approaches and the divergence of perspectives regarding the nature of regional threats. However, this divergence is not read as cognitive fragmentation as much as it reflects an attempt to redefine the “Jordanian national interest” within an environment characterized by unprecedented fluidity. The Arab historical experience, as recalled in this context, reveals a cyclical pattern of delayed awakening; as each crisis or setback ends, the question of the absent Arab project is raised once again, without this being translated into an actual structure capable of engaging with transformations.

At the heart of this scene, a sharp dual conflict crystallizes between two main projects: the first is led by Israel as a Zionist project with deep extensions within the international system, and the second is represented by Iran as a regional project of an expansionist nature with multiple instruments. What is notable in this framing, however, is the recharacterization of the relationship between the United States and Israel, as it is presented as a case of “reverse identification,” in which American decision-making is reproduced under the influence of Israeli priorities, reflecting a shift in centers of influence within the Western power structure.

Within this framework, the West Bank emerges as the next pivotal arena, regardless of the trajectories of the ongoing conflict. The Israeli criterion of gain and loss is measured by its ability to reshape demographic and geographic realities, including pushing toward scenarios of displacement and population redistribution, which places Jordan at the heart of the equation of pressure, not at its margins.

In contrast, the narrative associated with the Iranian project is deconstructed away from any emotional approaches or religious reductions, through recalling the record of regional interventions, particularly in Iraq and Syria, reflecting a pattern of expansion based on reshaping the internal structures of states, not merely influencing their policies. Here, a clear problematic emerges: while Iran is viewed as a balancing force against the Israeli project, it is at the same time considered an actor that disrupts the Arab system from within.

This complexity leads to the conclusion that the preference between the two projects is nothing but a mere “perceptual trap” intended to push regional actors into forced alignment. Accordingly, the Jordanian approach—as inferred from this argument—rests on the principle of “neutralizing drift,” that is, avoiding transformation into a party in a conflict whose instruments of resolution it does not possess, while preserving the ability to exert selective influence on its trajectories.

In this context, the centrality of Jordanian sovereign decision-making is reaffirmed, as the product of a long accumulation of political experience in crisis management—an experience that manifested itself in pivotal historical moments, such as the First Gulf War, when Jordan adopted a position different from what was prevailing at the time, before subsequent transformations demonstrated the soundness of that choice. This recollection is not intended as glorification so much as it is used as an interpretive tool for understanding the pattern of Jordanian political behavior based on “preemptive caution.”

Yet the internal dimension is no less important than the external one. The discussion highlights a latent gap between governmental decisions and individual behavior, particularly with regard to resource management during crises. Policies of austerity, no matter how precise, remain limited in impact unless they are translated into a collective awareness that understands the nature of the moment as a prolonged crisis rather than a passing event. From here, the concept of “economic societal security” is introduced as an extension of national security, whereby individual behavior becomes part of the resilience system, not merely a circumstantial response.

At the level of public discourse, a warning is raised against slipping into binaries of treason or emotional alignment, because of the effect this has in distorting the public sphere and pushing it toward sharp polarization that weakens the capacity for strategic thinking. Instead, it is proposed that a discourse of “conditional demands” be adopted, particularly toward Iran, based on the principle of engagement conditioned upon changing regional behavior, rather than uncritical acceptance or absolute rejection.

In sum, this chapter reveals an equation of extreme complexity: Jordan is not in a position that allows it full neutrality, nor in a position that enables it direct engagement. Rather, it is bound to a careful management of a gray space, one that requires a high degree of disciplined pragmatism and the ability to read transformations through their deeper outcomes.

Chapter Three: The Economy of Conflict and the Logic of Hegemony… Jordan as a Balance Node in the Equation of Energy and Influence

This chapter goes beyond the conventional reading of conflict as a military or political confrontation, placing it instead within its deeper framework, namely a struggle over the reshaping of the global system of hegemony, where energy intersects with geography, and markets intertwine with strategies, in a complex structure that cannot be dismantled through a single approach. The Iranian role—in this context—is read only as an instrument of deployment within a broader equation aimed at asserting regional presence and re-establishing position on the map of influence.

In contrast, the United States emerges as an actor seeking to “engineer attrition” as a mechanism for redistributing resources and dominating energy markets. Statements issued by American decision-making circles, which link Iranian and Venezuelan oil within an equation of control over nearly one-third of global energy supplies, reveal a strategic logic based on turning crises into tools for resetting the global market, rather than merely responding to them.

Within this framework, energy—despite shifts toward alternatives—returns to occupy the position of the “hidden determinant” in the global economy. Although its percentage in the energy mix has declined, the absolute volume of its consumption continues to increase, meaning that the transition beyond fossil fuels remains a distant horizon. More dangerously, the repercussions of the conflict extend to the possibility of the “erosion of the real value of money,” reflecting the transformation of the crisis from a price shock into a structural imbalance in the financial system.

Turning to the Jordanian case, this chapter presents a dual analytical approach: a “fundamental analysis” based on macroeconomic indicators—growth, inflation, public debt, and trade balance—and a “technical analysis” that reads the behavior of the economy in the face of shocks. According to this division, the Jordanian economy appears to have begun a path of relative recovery, alongside a reordering of economic policy priorities, yet this recovery remains fragile in the face of uncertainty tests, as markets tend toward rapid reactions that are inconsistent with fundamentals.

However, the real significance lies in Jordan’s ability to influence the outcomes of major events, not their course. Jordan, despite the limitation of its resources and its heavy pressures—particularly in the fields of energy, water, and food—possesses a strategic asset represented in its geographic location, political stability, and international acceptability, all of which qualify it to play the role of an “economic intermediary” or a “logistical facilitator” in a turbulent regional environment.

From here, the equation of the Jordanian role crystallizes as a “balance node” based on three pillars:

First, location as a space in which the routes of trade and energy intersect;

Second, stability as a condition attractive to capital and regional actors;

Third, international acceptance, which grants this role a legitimacy that goes beyond the limits of material capabilities.

This role means positioning itself as a “functional necessity” for others, where competition is not over superiority but over indispensability. In this context, Jordan can strengthen its presence by developing a qualitative economy based on logistics services, market connectivity, and facilitating the flows of goods and energy, thereby making itself an element that cannot be bypassed in any forthcoming regional arrangements.

At the level of crisis management, the first month shows a relative ability to contain the pressures related to energy security, food security, and supply chains. However, this containment remains conditional upon two decisive factors: the duration of the conflict and its geographic expansion. The longer the crisis lasts, the more “containment” turns into gradual attrition, especially in light of the pricing of geopolitical anxiety within economic equations, whether at the level of states or individuals.

Here, a highly important dimension emerges, represented in consumer behavior, where the rush on goods is interpreted not merely as a psychological reaction, but also as an indicator of the fragility of purchasing power and its lack of preparedness to absorb additional price shocks. This necessarily calls for a deeper review of economic policies, both in terms of the instruments and the philosophy governing them.

In sum, this chapter redefines Jordan’s position on the map of conflict: it is an “economic hinge” capable of influencing the outcomes of regional balance. And as the probabilities of the redistribution of influence escalate, with the participation of international actors such as Russia and China, the opportunity widens for Jordan to reposition itself as a partner in shaping its economic outcomes.

Chapter Four: Between the Misleading of Narratives and the Solidity of the Interior… Redefining the Threat and the Equation of Jordanian Resilience

Historical memory is invoked in this context to recall pivotal moments that shaped the consciousness of the region, where the danger was not always except in its “narrative.” In the aftermath of the 1967 war, a false awareness was formed among wide sectors of the Arab street as a result of media disinformation, which led to a doubled shock when reality was uncovered. Similar patterns were repeated during the 2003 Iraq war, where discourse preceded the event, and expectations became detached from realities. This recollection comes as a methodological warning against becoming immersed in a one-dimensional reading that may blind one to more complex dangers forming in the shadows.

Within this framework, the priorities of threat are rearranged according to an approach that distinguishes between “conflict” and “occupation.” While regional projects struggle over influence, the occupation—represented by Israel—remains a singular condition that cannot be resolved within the logic of balances, as it represents a structural imbalance that exists in and of itself. Yet this realization does not cancel the fact that other threats, including Iran’s regional behavior, may intersect with Jordanian national security, which imposes a rule that cannot be relinquished: everything that threatens Jordan, whatever its source, constitutes a danger that cannot be treated lightly.

On that basis, it becomes clear that Jordanian policy, historically, has followed a pattern of “diplomatic hedging,” whereby it avoided sharp alignment and preferred managing balances through flexible margins. However, the escalation of the current crisis imposes a transition from the question of “Who will win?” to a more complex question: “What comes after?” Field indicators—from a possible Israeli expansion toward southern Syria, to the escalation of threats related to Al-Aqsa Mosque, passing through mobilizational rhetoric of a religious character from the Iranian side—all suggest that the coming phase may be more intense and complex.

In confronting this scene, the concept of “strategic hedging” emerges as a necessity, not a choice, within the broader Arab space. Despite the erosion of the idea of the “Arab project” in its classical form, the need for it returns today in flexible forms—bilaterals, trilaterals, or even functional alliances—to balance external interventions. In this context, the engagement of parties such as Turkey, or the possible intersections with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is read as part of the reshaping of the network of regional balances, not as final alliances.

Yet the most sensitive challenge lies in “internal resilience,” where the battle of the state goes beyond the limits of geography into the spaces of the economy, society, cyber security, and the security of energy and water. In this context, the danger lies in the “liquefaction of knowledge,” when public discourse turns into a field of non-specialized fatwas, oscillating between excessive minimization and confusing exaggeration, thereby producing a state of strategic confusion.

Here, another more impactful crisis intersects—namely, the crisis of trust. Doubt in the official narrative—even in direct security matters—reflects a gap between the state and society, a gap which, if not addressed through effective and transparent communication tools, may turn into a critical point of weakness at a moment that requires the highest levels of cohesion.

At the level of the energy economy, this chapter presents a detailed reading showing that Jordan, despite its relative fragility in resources, possesses a reasonable margin of safety in the short term. Energy supplies rely on a diversified mix that includes imports from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in addition to derivatives imported through maritime routes, which limits the risks of immediate disruption. This stability is further supported by the presence of internal alternatives, including oil shale and renewable energy, alongside electricity interconnection projects with Egypt and neighboring countries.

In this context, the project of “energy centrality” emerges as one of the strategic bets, supported by infrastructure such as the Arab Gas Pipeline extending across the region, in addition to advanced capabilities in renewable energy, where Jordan occupies an advanced position regionally and globally in this field. However, this ambition remains conditional upon the state’s ability to manage internal demand, which brings back the issue of the “culture of consumption,” whether at the level of the government or individuals.

The figures related to the waste of energy and food reflect an indicator of the absence of consumption awareness as part of the national security system. Hence, “rationalizing consumption” becomes an extended strategic policy that requires reshaping societal behavior, not merely issuing administrative decisions.

In sum, this chapter shows that the Jordanian challenge at this stage lies in its ability to build a cohesive internal front, based on critical awareness, mutual trust, and disciplined economic behavior. Between misleading narratives and the complexity of reality, the state’s ability to read beyond the event and to reproduce its internal balance remains the decisive factor in navigating the phase.

Chapter Five: Between the Mood of the Street and the Discipline of Decision… The Problematic of Representation and the Limits of Response in the Jordanian Case

This chapter reveals one of the most sensitive problematics in moments of crisis, namely the gap between “elite perception” and the “popular mood,” and the tension that results from it in describing reality and determining the priorities of response. The attempt to reduce the Jordanian street to a single position—whether supportive of or opposed to any of the parties to the conflict—constitutes a flawed simplification that does not reflect the multiple nature of societal awareness, which is formed under the influence of overlapping factors, from identity to economy, and from media to historical experience.

In this context, a fundamental observation emerges, namely that the popular mood is a graduated spectrum of positions, oscillating between absolute rejection of any threat that touches the Jordanian interior, and conditional sympathy with regional causes, foremost among them the Palestinian cause. However, this fragile balance is subjected to harsh tests when slogans intersect with realities, as in cases of missiles falling inside Jordanian territory, where any possibility of justifying the event under any ideological or emotional cover is negated.

From here, a clear warning is raised against “discursive disjunction,” that is, the gap between what is said in the elite political sphere and what is circulated in the street. When official reassurances—particularly on economic or security issues—do not intersect with the citizen’s daily experience, this deepens doubt and reproduces the crisis of trust in sharper forms.

Within this framework, the problematic is not limited to describing the popular mood; it extends to the role of political actors, who are supposed, by virtue of their position, to define their stances clearly on the basis of national interest, not according to populist calculations or circumstantial pressures. The political position, unlike the general mood, requires a “determination of position” within a complex equation in which choices are measured by the balance of cost and return, not by impressions.

Within this equation, post-conflict scenarios are raised again, as a warning is issued that any sharp weakening of Iran may open the way for Israel to expand the scope of its policies, especially in the West Bank, through tools of “strategic compensation,” which are based on transferring pressure to arenas of lower cost. This scenario is read as a logical extension of the Israeli pattern of behavior based on investing regional moments to reshape realities on the ground.

In contrast, attention is drawn to another pattern of complexity represented in the “economy of extortion,” where crises are transformed into tools for redistributing financial burdens, particularly onto the Gulf states, within the context of post-conflict arrangements. These dynamics are not separate from statements issued by the White House indicating expectations of financial contributions from regional allies, which reflects the transformation of the conflict into a platform for re-engineering economic and political relations at the same time.

At the military-strategic level, the possibility is raised that Iran, if it manages to overcome the current phase, may reorder its priorities by focusing on non-conventional instruments of influence rather than relying exclusively on missile power, which may reactivate fronts such as southern Lebanon or Yemen within an approach of “indirect pressure.”

However, the discussion returns to the Jordanian interior, where the centrality of “national identity” is reaffirmed as a first line of defense in the face of attempts at polarization or penetration. The challenge lies in preventing external threats from being transformed into tools for reproducing internal division, whether through a discourse of treason or through invoking simplistically binary categories such as “loyalist” and “opposition.”

In this context, the problematic of “joint Arab defense” is raised as a concept that has lost much of its practical effectiveness in light of the divergence of Arab states’ priorities, which pushes toward the search for more flexible alternative formulas based on functional regional alliances rather than on overarching slogans that are not capable of activation.

Finally, this chapter rereads Jordan’s geopolitical position, which has long been described as a strategic burden, to show that—under current transformations—it is becoming one of the sources of strength. The location that once generated pressures now provides opportunities for repositioning, especially in light of regional interconnection projects, whether in energy or trade, thereby enhancing Jordan’s role as a link that cannot be bypassed.

 

Chapter Six: Beyond the Noise… Deconstructing the Trajectories of the Conflict and Redefining Jordanian Points of Leverage

This chapter moves from describing the moment of conflict to an attempt to foresee its deeper trajectories, through a reading that goes beyond direct military outcomes toward what may be called “silent transformations.” War is measured by its ability to reshape the rules of engagement, redistribute centers of power, and redefine the concepts of deterrence and alliance.

In this context, the hypothesis is raised that the absence of a military resolution between Iran and Israel, backed by the United States, may not signify balance as much as it indicates the transition of the conflict to a more complex level, where “non-resolution” turns into a permanent condition that reproduces itself. Within this framework, this outcome is expected to translate into an enhancement of Iranian self-confidence, pushing toward an expansion of the margin of regional action, which raises concerns related to Arab national security and opens the door to a non-conventional arms race.

This race is understood as a shift in the Arab strategic mindset, which may find itself for the first time facing a radical reconsideration of the constraints historically imposed upon it, whether with regard to possessing advanced military technology or to reshaping its alliances outside the traditional framework that governed its relations with the West. In this context, the possibility of the formation of flexible regional alliances emerges, which may intersect with international powers such as Russia and China, in the context of a gradual transition from a unipolar international system to a multipolar one.

However, this transformation feeds on previous accumulations, whose roots go back to the attacks of October 7, 2023, which constituted—according to this analysis—a political earthquake that reordered the priorities of the actors and launched a series of successive interactions, from the repositioning of regional projects to the cracking of some traditional patterns of alliance.

In contrast, the hypothesis that the American objective is to overthrow the Iranian regime is deconstructed, as an alternative conception is presented which sees that the real objective may be “readjusting behavior” rather than “overthrowing the regime,” which explains the absence of investment in instruments of internal change, in contrast, the focus on instruments of external pressure. This understanding reinforces the idea that the conflict may end in a formula of “neither victor nor vanquished,” allowing each party to declare a symbolic victory without a radical change in the balances of power.

However, this apparent outcome conceals behind it more dangerous transformations, most notably the reshaping of the geopolitical geography of the Gulf, including the conflict over strategic islands and the associated redistribution of maritime influence, in addition to economic repercussions that may extend to countries such as Pakistan, which plays intermediary roles in some tracks of undeclared negotiations.

In this context, the circle of impact expands to include Arab states, which may find themselves facing a dual cost: the cost of indirect participation in the conflict, and the cost of the arrangements that follow it, particularly in light of what may be termed the “economy of settlements,” where financial and political burdens are restructured according to the outcomes of negotiations.

At the Jordanian level, it is reaffirmed that Jordan’s position within this equation is determined by its ability to leverage what may be called “strategic points of anchorage,” which crystallize around three main axes:

First, the geopolitical location, which has shifted from a historical burden into a strategic opportunity, as Jordan has become a regional connectivity node that cannot be bypassed in energy and trade routes.

Second, societal and cultural resilience, which constitutes the first line of defense against attempts at penetration, whether by the Iranian or Israeli project, as Jordanian society demonstrates a relative cohesion grounded in a unifying national narrative and a historical connection to the Palestinian cause as part of national security.

Third, political balance, represented by Jordanian diplomacy in its ability to manage complex relations with opposing powers without slipping into sharp alignments, thereby granting Jordan a vital margin of maneuver in a turbulent regional environment.

Within this framework, it is reaffirmed that the ongoing conflict is a long-term struggle for influence, in which each battle serves as a prelude to what follows. Accordingly, the real question is not “Who will win?”, but rather “How do we prepare for the post-victory phase—whoever its victor may be?”

Conclusion:

In sum, the position paper presents a composite reading that views the current phase as a transitional moment that cannot be reduced to immediate outcomes; rather, it must be understood as part of a long trajectory that is reshaping the region. As for Jordan, it stands before a dual test: preserving its internal cohesion and maximizing its capacity for external maneuvering, through leveraging its points of anchorage rather than becoming hostage to variables it does not control.

 

 

 

Jordanian Masarat Foundation for Development and Progress
6/4/2026