Introduction

This paper comes at a pivotal moment, as climate phenomena have moved beyond the realm of the “exceptional” and entered what may be described as the “regularly unpredictable.” The challenge no longer lies merely in the occurrence of intense rainfall or sudden flooding, but in the widening gap between a new climatic reality and the capacity of existing planning and implementation systems to respond and adapt.

The paper adopts a neutral analytical approach. It does not seek to oversimplify complexities or assign responsibility in fragmented ways; rather, it aims to unpack the current landscape as it stands: infrastructure designed under climatic assumptions that are no longer valid; municipalities equipped with plans but lacking sufficient implementation tools; legislative frameworks in place but only partially translated into practice; and institutional coordination that exists yet remains insufficient to confront risks that cut across sectors and jurisdictions.

Accordingly, this paper offers an in-depth reading of challenges and opportunities by linking climate change to the concepts of urban resilience, fiscal sustainability, and long-term planning. It ultimately proposes realistic pathways to strengthen Jordan’s transition from crisis management to preparedness-building, and from reactive response to proactive prevention.

Chapter One: Climate Change in Jordan… The Urgency of Moving Beyond Emergency Management

Over the past decade, accelerating climatic shifts have manifested clearly through prolonged and intensified drought waves, sustained temperature increases, and more frequent episodes of high-intensity rainfall accompanied by flash floods. These phenomena have become recurring patterns rather than isolated events, rendering the framing of such occurrences as mere “emergencies” an incomplete reading of reality.

The central challenge lies in the fact that Jordan’s infrastructure—roads, bridges, drainage networks, dams, and urban zones—was historically developed under the implicit assumption of climatic stability, or at least predictability within narrow margins. With the collapse of that assumption, infrastructure systems are increasingly exposed to shocks that can transform development projects themselves into additional sources of vulnerability rather than instruments of resilience.

The core question is therefore no longer about the scale of damages caused by floods or droughts, but about the logic of planning itself. Does Jordan continue to treat climate as an external and occasional factor, or as a governing variable that must be embedded at the heart of public policy? The traditional separation between development planning and climatic considerations is no longer viable—scientifically, economically, or from a comprehensive national security perspective.

This dilemma is further complicated by the equation of climate injustice. Jordan is categorized among countries with limited contributions to global emissions, yet it is simultaneously among the most exposed to climate impacts. This contradiction places the state before a dual challenge: adapting to a reality it did not principally create, while also advocating for equitable positioning within international climate finance and support mechanisms.

Within this context, the transition from risk management to climate governance becomes imperative. This implies moving from post-disaster response toward proactive policy systems grounded in climate resilience, cross-sectoral integration, and anticipatory risk assessment. Embedding climate considerations into infrastructure planning becomes a prerequisite for safeguarding public investment and protecting state financial resources.

Practically, this necessitates redefining infrastructure design and implementation standards around climate resilience, environmental sustainability, efficient resource use, emission reduction, and the capacity to withstand future—not merely current—shocks. It also calls for a more assertive state role in steering investment toward green and resilient projects, whether through legislative tools, economic incentives, or strategic public–private partnerships.

At the legislative level, climate- and infrastructure-related laws constitute the first line of defense for safeguarding the rights of future generations and aligning national policies with international commitments, foremost among them the Paris Agreement. Such legislation can also advance the green economy, promote circular economic models, and subject major development projects to substantive—rather than procedural—climate impact assessments.

Climate action cannot be separated from the broader framework of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, particularly Goal 13 (Climate Action), which functions as an integrating objective rather than a standalone pathway. Water, energy, food security, health, and urban development are all directly contingent upon effective climate risk management. Integrating climate into development planning thus enhances public expenditure efficiency, reduces future losses, and transforms adaptation and mitigation from fiscal burdens into investments in long-term economic and social stability.

Chapter Two: From Diagnosing the Phenomenon to Unpacking Structural Dysfunction

Public awareness of climate change impacts in Jordan has undergone a qualitative shift in recent years, driven by the increasing intensity and frequency of climatic events and the visibility of their direct consequences in public spaces. Social media platforms have played a decisive role in reshaping this perception. Climatic incidents that were once localized and episodic are now instantly circulated as collective experiences, deepening public awareness. Yet this same immediacy has sometimes contributed to oversimplification—reducing complex structural failures to a single explanatory umbrella: “climate change.”

A balanced reading requires distinguishing between climate risks as an external variable and infrastructure weaknesses as the cumulative outcome of internal planning, administrative, and legislative trajectories. Major events witnessed in Jordan over the past decade—from the flooding of key urban areas, to the Dead Sea tragedy, to recurring flash floods in the southern and central regions—have exposed a profound gap between the new climatic reality and prevailing systems of planning and implementation.

Contrary to some generalized perceptions, Jordan’s infrastructure cannot be categorically described as deteriorated or primitive compared to the region. Broad indicators suggest a relatively acceptable level in terms of spatial coverage and basic operational capacity. The core problem lies not in the mere existence of infrastructure, but in the quality of its construction, the methodology of its execution, the sustainability of its maintenance, and its adaptability to evolving climatic conditions.

Beginning around 2011, a planning and execution pattern gradually emerged that prioritized “rapid delivery,” often aligned with funding cycles and grant-based timelines. Implementing entities sought to demonstrate visible results within compressed timeframes—frequently at the expense of rigorous prior studies, risk assessments, and long-term resilience considerations.

This approach became particularly evident in infrastructure projects executed according to minimum standards, without sufficient integration of hydrological and climatic context. Consequently, some projects proved vulnerable to early failure under the first significant stress test. The problem was compounded by weaknesses in routine maintenance systems, especially within municipalities and the Greater Amman Municipality, which operate under severe fiscal constraints, high debt burdens, and limited allocations for capital projects and maintenance relative to the scale of service networks under their jurisdiction.

Within this context, the crisis can be analytically unpacked across three interrelated levels: the legislative framework, technical tools and standards, and institutional governance structures.

First: Legislation – Present Texts and Absent Implementation

The Jordanian legislative framework is characterized by an abundance of laws and regulations related to urban planning, construction, resource management, and risk management. However, the challenge lies in the insufficiency of aligning these texts with the emerging climate reality, and in the weakness of their executive enforceability. Despite the development of advanced hydrological codes and their official approval after 2019, they have often remained documents “on the shelf,” not mandatorily required when preparing structural master plans or implementing major projects.

The same applies to climate maps, flood-risk maps, and wadi pathways, which were completed through national and international efforts but have not been transformed into governing tools in planning and zoning decisions. Added to this is the ambiguity of certain legal concepts, such as the definition of “hazardous areas” or “wadi buffer zones,” which opens the door to flexible interpretations sometimes subject to social pressures or immediate considerations, particularly in cities outside the capital.

Second: Technical Tools – The Gap Between Updating and Operation

At the technical level, building systems and adopted codes still suffer from significant temporal disparity, as some date back decades and have not been updated in line with new climate scenarios. Moreover, the weak integration between codes and the absence of mandatory linkage between them and climate risk assessment studies reduce their practical effectiveness, even when they are theoretically advanced.

Third: Institutional Governance – Multiplicity of Entities and Absence of a Reference Authority

Perhaps the deeper problem lies in the fragmentation of institutional responsibilities. Major climate events have revealed overlapping mandates among ministries, agencies, municipalities, and specialized authorities, without the existence of a single national reference body responsible for integrated climate risk planning. This multiplicity not only leads to confusion in response, but also creates an environment for shifting responsibilities and the erosion of accountability.

In addition, there is weakness in capacity-building at the local level, particularly in municipalities, in the areas of risk analysis, anticipatory planning, and data management. Some institutions also suffer from the fragmentation of climate and hydrological databases, as each entity maintains its own figures and indicators, which hinders the construction of a unified national risk profile.

Within this framework, the need emerges to involve professional associations, universities, and research centers as knowledge partners rather than marginal actors. The absence of such integration deprives decision-makers of cumulative national expertise capable of transforming urban planning from a tool of horizontal expansion into a comprehensive risk management system.

In conclusion, the infrastructure crisis in Jordan does not reflect technical incapacity as much as it reveals an imbalance in planning and management philosophy. The real challenge lies in redefining the concept of achievement—from short-term, formal accomplishment to sustainable, functional achievement measured by its resilience, operational lifespan, and its ability to reduce future costs for the state and society. Without this transformation, climate change will remain a revealing factor—not the sole cause—of deeper dysfunctions within the urban development and public governance system.

Chapter Three: The Oversight and Accountability Gap

If legislation forms the regulatory framework, and codes and technical tools represent the professional foundation, then effective oversight is the decisive link that determines whether policies are translated into reality or remain ink on paper. In the Jordanian case, accumulated field experiences reveal that the most significant deficiency lies in the weakness of a comprehensive oversight system—particularly post-implementation oversight, a stage often neglected despite being the most influential for public safety and infrastructure sustainability.

Repeated cases—across both older and newer urban areas—demonstrate how historically known flood channels were transformed into licensed roads and subsequently into densely populated residential zones, bearing official signatures and regulatory approvals issued by local authorities. The paradox lies in the fact that the state, through its municipalities and planning institutions, has at times actively contributed to producing risk—by granting permits and constructing road and service networks over natural watercourses—only to later attribute responsibility to citizens for building in “hazardous areas.” This contradiction reflects a stark gap between administrative action and official discourse.

This dysfunction cannot be separated from the nature of municipal and administrative practice, where professional considerations may become entangled with social and electoral pressures—or what is often referred to as a culture of “accommodations”—at the expense of public safety and long-term planning requirements. Instead of functioning as a regulatory safeguard, the building permit has, in some cases, become a mechanism for deferring risk into the future, with consequences emerging years or even decades later—when the cost of remediation far exceeds the cost of prevention.

Compounding this issue is the weakness of oversight during implementation. Infrastructure projects are sometimes executed according to standards lower than those theoretically adopted, without sufficient testing, strict on-site supervision, or meaningful accountability for contractors and consultants. Post-implementation oversight—arguably the most critical phase—remains the weakest link. Projects are rarely reviewed after handover to verify actual performance, compliance with designs and codes, or readiness to withstand atypical climate scenarios.

In this context, it must be emphasized that climate change does not operate in a vacuum; it amplifies the consequences of accumulated human error. Heavy rainfall, flash floods, or rising temperatures become catastrophic when they confront infrastructure constructed without adequate consideration of local geology, fragile soil conditions, or the presence of natural cavities and subsidence zones across wide areas of Jordan—particularly along the Great Rift Valley fault line. These are scientifically documented realities, yet they are not always translated into rigorous executive decisions.

Here, the human factor emerges as a central issue—not in terms of intent, but in terms of competence, specialization, and responsibility. Addressing complex matters such as climate change, water management, and soil stability cannot be reduced to a single discipline or a formal committee. It requires multidisciplinary teams that include engineers, geologists, hydrologists, and urban planners, operating within a clear institutional decision-making framework. The absence of such integration leads to partial solutions, symbolic projects, or initiatives measured by their quantity rather than their impact.

The same applies to certain environmental programs, such as tree-planting campaigns or rapid interventions, which are sometimes implemented without proper spatial planning, impact assessments, or alignment with road networks and infrastructure systems. In such cases, instead of mitigating risks, these initiatives may generate new forms of disruption. Environmental planning, like urban planning, is not an act of immediate response but a cumulative process measured by resilience rather than by the speed of its announcement.

In sum, the oversight crisis in the fields of infrastructure and climate change reveals a deeper governance deficit—namely, the absence of sequential accountability from decision to implementation to evaluation. Ultimately, citizens are less concerned with how phenomena are described than with ensuring that their homes, roads, and livelihoods are not placed at risk. Restoring trust between the state and society therefore requires rebuilding an independent, professional, and specialized oversight system that prioritizes public safety over short-term considerations and transforms long-term planning from a slogan into an enforceable institutional practice.

Chapter Four: From Symbolic Projects to Impact-Based Planning

Jordan’s experience in addressing climate change and infrastructure challenges reveals that the fundamental issue lies in the deep gap between intention and implementation, and between public announcements and tangible impact on the ground. This gap is often managed through a performative mindset that prioritizes “the scene” over “the system,” emphasizing rapid interventions with media appeal rather than investing in sustainable, integrated, and resilient solutions.

Tree-planting initiatives, for example, are frequently presented as positive environmental responses. Yet in the absence of a sustainable irrigation system, appropriate site selection studies, and long-term maintenance plans, such initiatives become short-lived seasonal efforts that fade once the campaign concludes or temporary water supplies are exhausted.

This dysfunction extends to broader administrative decisions involving the removal or alteration of existing infrastructure for aesthetic or symbolic reasons, without conducting cost-benefit analysis or long-term impact assessment. Replacing functional infrastructure solutions or dismantling effective protective elements in favor of projects deemed more “visually attractive” reflects a crisis in public administration philosophy—where institutional thinking is supplanted by individualized decision-making, continuity yields to discontinuity, and change shifts from cumulative development to unnecessary reinvention.

Conversely, international comparisons—even with countries of limited resources—demonstrate that the decisive factor is not capacity alone, but governance quality. Cities that have successfully developed green canopies, pedestrian-friendly urban corridors, and resilient infrastructure have done so through disciplined policy accumulation, respect for planning, appreciation of expertise, and investment in human capital before physical assets.

Here again, the human factor and professional selection become pivotal. Addressing complex domains such as climate change, urban planning, and risk management does not tolerate patronage, quota-based appointments, or non-meritocratic endorsements. Excluding qualified expertise or marginalizing specialized professionals in favor of loyalty-based appointments inevitably distorts public decision-making and produces fragmented solutions that fail to match the scale of the challenges.

This governance gap is particularly evident in urban planning. Jordan has experienced accelerated urban expansion driven by demographic and political shocks—including waves of migration and refugee inflows—without adequate anticipatory planning. The result has been unregulated urban sprawl and extensive “concrete expansion” at the expense of water basins, flood pathways, and geologically fragile areas.

Despite the availability of building codes, zoning requirements, and municipal legislation, weak law enforcement has rendered these instruments unable to perform their intended function.

This cannot be separated from the absence of genuine integration of the climate dimension into urban planning. Climate change is not an emergency event, but a long-term structural transformation that requires a comprehensive reassessment of urban vulnerability and cities’ adaptive capacity—in terms of infrastructure, public spaces, water management, and spatial justice. Although Jordan has produced national reports and scientific scenarios extending to the end of the century, this knowledge remains confined to documents and has not yet been translated into binding executive policies at the level of municipalities and different sectors.

The seriousness of this dysfunction increases when the scientific dimension—especially geology—is excluded from major projects, or when expert warnings are treated as obstacles rather than as preventive tools. Jordan’s urban history, including archaeological sites that have endured for centuries, confirms that construction aligned with nature is more capable of lasting than modern interventions that ignored soil characteristics and geological pressure, thereby redirecting risks instead of containing them.

In conclusion, this chapter shows that Jordan’s real challenge in confronting climate change does not lie in a shortage of plans, the absence of international funding, or weak public awareness, but rather in redefining the very concept of public administration: shifting from managing reactions to managing risks; from symbolic projects to impact-based policies; from individual decisions to institutional governance; and from short-term planning to a time horizon that extends across decades.

Without this structural transformation, efforts will remain fragmented and outcomes limited, and climate change will shift from a challenge that can be adapted to into a revealing factor of deeper crises in planning, management, and urban justice.

 

Chapter Five: What Should Be Done?

The question “What should be done?” in the context of climate change and infrastructure is fundamentally tied to the capacity of the state and society to build climate resilience—that is, the ability to absorb, adapt, and continue functioning amid increasingly frequent, intense, and less predictable climatic patterns.

A realistic assessment of Jordan’s infrastructure suggests that it is not collapsing, yet it is not fully prepared to confront forthcoming climatic transformations. The issue is no longer the annual volume of rainfall per se, but rather the change in rainfall patterns—shifting from precipitation distributed over several days to short, intense storms concentrated within hours, alongside a geographical shift in climatic intensity toward the eastern and southern regions. This transformation places pressure on drainage capacities originally designed under climate assumptions that are no longer valid.

Nevertheless, these challenges are not insurmountable. Technical solutions are, in principle, known and tested: systematic and deep maintenance of infrastructure networks; rehabilitation and expansion of drainage systems; enlargement of critical diameters in flood-prone areas; integration of Nature-Based Solutions; and enhancement of water harvesting systems, particularly in desert and peripheral zones.

A central challenge, however, lies in local financing—especially at the municipal level. Although climate resilience plans have been prepared for several major municipalities with international support and partnership, an implementation gap persists due to limited financial resources and funding mechanisms that are misaligned with the magnitude of municipal responsibilities. This challenge is further compounded by the multiplicity of actors and overlapping mandates within the same geographical space, leading to fragmented accountability, blurred decision-making, and the imposition of operational and structural burdens on municipalities disproportionate to their actual authority.

On the other hand, national efforts indicate the presence of an official coordination framework, including national climate change committees and comprehensive policy frameworks extending to 2050 and covering key sectors such as energy, water, health, and local administration. This framework has contributed to mainstreaming climate considerations into sectoral strategies and to dismantling the traditional perception of climate change as an isolated environmental issue, replacing it with a cross-sectoral and systemic approach.

Yet this conceptual progress continues to encounter implementation realities. Institutional capacities at the local level remain uneven, and effective linkage between national planning and the everyday needs of urban communities is sometimes absent. Transforming municipalities from financially constrained service providers into proactive climate adaptation actors requires rethinking funding models and leveraging non-traditional instruments—such as waste-to-energy projects and carbon markets—to alleviate operational budget pressures and generate sustainable self-financing mechanisms.

In this context, water harvesting emerges as one of the most strategically viable options—a dual-purpose instrument for enhancing water security while supporting local communities, wildlife habitats, and groundwater reserves, even when such structures are seasonal or short-lived. Treating every drop of water as a resource rather than as a threat represents a fundamental shift in risk management philosophy.

At the same time, critical voices cannot be overlooked. They point clearly to the fact that current infrastructure does not yet match the scale of the forthcoming climate challenge, and that continued reliance on reassuring rhetoric may lead to underpreparedness for more severe episodes—whether in the form of flash floods, dust storms, or extreme heat waves.

Placing “a finger on the wound” is the first condition for genuine transformation. Without acknowledging the gap between what is planned and what is implemented, policies will remain confined to documents, and cities will continue to face repeated climatic stress tests—tests for which the margin of error may not remain available in the near future.

 

Chapter Six: What Lies Ahead?

Scientific indicators and field observations point to a clear shift in rainfall mass trajectories toward the eastern and southern regions of Jordan, accompanied by increased probabilities of flash floods. This shift subjects stormwater drainage networks—designed according to earlier climatic standards—to severe stress beyond their original design assumptions. The issue, therefore, is not the mere existence of infrastructure, but its suitability and resilience in the face of more extreme climate scenarios.

Although a significant portion of infrastructure in Jordanian cities remains structurally sound from an engineering standpoint, the decline in routine maintenance and the absence of updates grounded in contemporary climate data render these systems vulnerable to functional failure at the first serious test. The challenge becomes more complex when rapid urbanization and unregulated expansion intersect with the shrinking of open spaces capable of absorbing rainfall.

The multiplicity of actors and overlapping mandates within the same geographic space represents one of the most critical barriers to building an effective climate response. In industrial and urban areas, municipalities, industrial estate authorities, metropolitan administrations, and central institutions share responsibilities for planning, implementation, and maintenance—without an integrated governance framework that ensures unified decision-making and coordinated interventions. This institutional fragmentation creates regulatory “gray zones,” where municipalities bear operational, traffic, and environmental burdens that exceed both their financial resources and legal authority.

Despite the preparation of urban adaptation plans and climate resilience strategies for several major municipalities—developed in cooperation with international and regional partners—the transition from planning to implementation remains constrained by financial limitations. Even where municipalities possess clear visions and documented strategies, they often lack sufficient funding to upgrade drainage systems, expand culvert diameters, or implement Nature-Based Solutions at meaningful scale.

In confronting these challenges, Jordan has witnessed notable institutional development in recent years, marked by the adoption of a Climate Change Regulation and the establishment of a National Committee chaired by the Minister of Environment, with representation from sixteen ministries and local institutions. This framework has enabled stronger cross-sectoral coordination and the mainstreaming of climate considerations into sectoral policies, including energy, water, health, and local administration.

A comprehensive National Climate Change Policy extending to 2050 has also been adopted, incorporating short-, medium-, and long-term pathways, alongside the preparation of sectoral adaptation plans and municipality-specific plans that account for each city’s geographic and demographic context.

Despite this progress, the central challenge remains translating policies and strategies into tangible interventions on the ground. Climate change has become a matter of national, economic, and livelihood security, directly affecting citizens’ daily lives. The flooding of a city center or the disruption of a major road network is not an incidental event; it is an indicator of structural shortcomings in urban planning.

Accordingly, there is a need for a more bold and realistic approach—one that updates engineering standards and specifications in line with stringent climate scenarios; expands reliance on water harvesting and retention basins in urban and semi-arid areas; invests in waste recycling and waste-to-energy projects as alternative financing sources through carbon credits; and strengthens the technical and financial capacities of municipalities as the first line of defense against climate impacts.

 

Conclusion

Addressing climate change cannot be achieved through isolated construction solutions or fragmented interventions. It requires a comprehensive approach that restores the primacy of integrated planning, unifies institutional reference frameworks, strengthens decentralization supported by adequate financing and capacity-building, and connects traditional infrastructure with nature-based solutions to relieve pressure on existing networks and enhance their absorptive capacity over the medium and long term.

There is also a pressing need to transition from emergency management to risk management, and from reactive responses to proactive action—through investment in accurate climate data, updating engineering standards, and developing innovative financing tools that enable municipalities to implement their plans rather than merely produce them.

 

 

Issued by the Jordanian Masarat for Development and Progress
16 January 2026