Talal Ghoneimat raises essential questions about recent developments in the Syrian scene. Chief among these is the situation in Idlib, where "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham" (HTS) entered smoothly and without resistance, while the Syrian army withdrew quickly and without a fight. This scenario is reminiscent of Baghdad's fall, where Saddam Hussein's army collapsed unexpectedly.

The critical question here is why Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is being positioned as a replacement for Bashar al-Assad. Jolani, with his new appearance and altered public persona, seems to have been groomed for this role. But why? And why has the idea of keeping Assad’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Jalali, in power for a short transitional period surfaced? Furthermore, how has Jolani risen to appear as the de facto authority in Syria? These developments raise doubts about the structure of power and who truly holds the final say over the country’s political future.

Another noteworthy point concerns the behavior of the armed opposition that overthrew Assad. Unlike Iraq and Libya, where the state’s collapse led to prolonged instability, the opposition seems to have avoided repeating past mistakes. This new approach suggests that the opposition may have learned from history, aiming to preserve Syrian institutions and mitigate the fallout of regime change on the state.

A key question remains: How will the transfer of power occur? Jolani has chosen Mohammad al-Bashir, an Islamist, as head of government. However, concerns persist over how a smooth transition can be ensured, given the complexities of the Syrian regime. Syria has over 16 overlapping and powerful security agencies. Navigating these institutions and dealing with remnants of the former regime will be a significant challenge. Observers will closely monitor how these agencies interact with the new government and the conflicts over authority that may arise.

Jolani’s political rhetoric appears reassuring, but it is likely shaped by international and regional players overseeing the Syrian file. The aim of this rhetoric is to calm regional actors, particularly as any escalation in Syria would directly impact the broader Middle East, including Lebanon and Gaza.

Among the key players in this scenario is Turkey, which has emerged as a primary influencer in Syrian affairs. Some describe Erdogan as an unofficial leader of both Turkey and Syria, given his military and political backing for Jolani. The failure of Erdogan and Assad to meet suggests Assad underestimated the regional dynamics, contributing to his swift downfall. U.S. support for Jolani also reflects alignment between American and Turkish interests, particularly concerning the Kurdish issue.

Iran, another key player, has faced significant losses in Syria. Despite its substantial investment in supporting Assad and leveraging Syria for regional influence, Iran’s setbacks have eroded its presence, particularly after diminished influence in Lebanon and strained relations with Hamas. Meanwhile, Russia, distracted by its war in Ukraine, has also been unable to provide sufficient support to the Syrian regime, relegating Syria to a lower priority despite maintaining its strategic military base there.

A crucial aspect of the current developments is the transformation of armed factions, particularly HTS. The group, which encompasses various factions, has undergone a dramatic shift under Jolani’s leadership. From espousing extremist rhetoric to adopting pragmatic policies, HTS has transitioned from a militia into an organized entity resembling a national army. This transformation appears to have been supported by Turkey and the U.S., aiming to recast HTS as a structured force capable of governing Syria during the next phase.

Jolani’s evolution as a leader raises many questions. His ideological journey—from al-Qaeda to Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS, and finally HTS—along with his new image as a political figure focused on state-building, warrants scrutiny. His recent interview with CNN marked a turning point, presenting him as a statesman while ignoring his status on U.S. terror lists, which offer a $10 million bounty for his capture.

Another pressing question concerns the 126 armed groups in Syria: Will they all accept Jolani as their sole leader? Will they disarm and align under his command? Or will they redirect their weapons toward other objectives, such as combating separatist threats in neighboring states like Turkey?

Among the key actors influencing these dynamics are the U.S., Turkey, and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s UN presentation on the "New Middle East Project” highlights broader geopolitical ambitions tied to these developments. The timing of Assad’s fall also aligns with the end of the Democrats’ term in the White House, suggesting an attempt to claim this achievement before transitioning power to Republicans.

Looking at the conclusions from recent events, it is evident that HTS’s rise to power signals its potential to play a central role in Syria’s future. Additionally, efforts to rehabilitate and repurpose extremist groups suggest a strategy to present them as viable alternatives for governance, especially following the failures of moderate Islamist movements in Egypt and Tunisia.

Iran and Russia’s inability to adequately support the Syrian regime further highlights their waning regional influence. Iran, having lost ground in Gaza and Lebanon, faces increasing challenges in maintaining its foothold in Syria, signaling the decline of its regional expansion. Similarly, Russia’s focus on Ukraine has limited its capacity to sustain its previous level of involvement in Syria.

The broader implications point to a shift in regional power dynamics, with the decline of Iran’s role and the search for new forces to balance U.S. influence. This could involve reshaping extremist groups into more palatable entities for regional governance.

Ultimately, these conclusions and questions remain open as the region moves toward an uncertain future. The coming phase will reveal the true contours of these developments and their impact on Syria and the broader Middle East.