Introduction

The most pressing question in addressing Jordan’s national security is no longer simply whether the state can thwart a security threat or contain a terrorist attack. Rather, it concerns the state’s ability to confront a regional environment that continuously reproduces sources of threats, expands their scope, and transforms their methods, while economic, social, and political pressures emerge within the domestic sphere, potentially making the costs of responding to such threats increasingly complex. Between a state that has historically succeeded in overcoming severe security challenges and a region facing accelerating risks of fragmentation and shifting balances of power, a new strategic equation is taking shape—one that cannot be adequately understood through conventional security analysis or effectively addressed through a reactive approach that responds to incidents only after they occur.

The recent attacks witnessed in the Kingdom, particularly the crime targeting citizens in the Al-Hmoud area of Karak Governorate, alongside the terrorist attack against Jawad Al-Salaytah while performing his official duties in the capital, Amman, have exposed a paradox that warrants careful examination. On the one hand, the societal response demonstrated a deeply rooted capacity to transcend religious and social divisions and rally around the victims as an inseparable part of the national community. On the other hand, these incidents have revived long-deferred questions concerning the transformations of violent extremism, the limitations of detecting small extremist cells, the sources of ideological mobilization, and the adequacy of the preventive approaches adopted by official institutions over previous decades.

The gravity of these questions, however, stems from their emergence within a regional environment characterized by overlapping repercussions of the war in Gaza, rapidly evolving developments in the West Bank, political and security transformations in Syria, tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, and the continued activities of armed groups and transnational networks. These developments confront Jordan with challenges whose underlying sources are not entirely within its control, even as it remains responsible for managing their repercussions on its security, stability, economy, and social cohesion.

Within this context, there is a growing need to reconsider explanatory approaches that reduce extremism to school curricula, religious discourse, or the cultural characteristics of society, without necessarily disregarding the influence of these factors. Historical experience reveals that significant waves of violent jihadist activity have been associated with major geopolitical transformations, beginning with the repercussions of the Afghan conflict during the 1990s, continuing through the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and culminating in the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) following the regional upheavals that began after 2011.

Jordan’s experience is particularly distinctive because certain figures and ideological currents associated with the country have played influential roles within transnational jihadist organizations, while the Kingdom itself has not become a stable organizational stronghold for these groups to the extent observed in other contexts. This paradox raises a fundamental question about the relationship between Jordan’s domestic environment and external conflict zones: Are the threats confronting the Kingdom primarily generated within its local environment, or do they emerge from a turbulent regional security complex before their effects are transmitted domestically through networks of recruitment, influence, and communication?

Alongside this geopolitical dimension, technological transformation necessitates a redefinition of the threat itself. Extremist recruitment and radicalization are no longer dependent on face-to-face encounters or traditional organizational structures. Digital platforms, encrypted communication channels, and, more recently, generative artificial intelligence applications have created new environments for content production, ideological influence, and behavioral manipulation. The challenge, therefore, lies in understanding the potential risks posed by interactive systems that may be exploited for disinformation, manipulation, or ideological grooming, together with the legislative, educational, security, and ethical challenges arising from their misuse.

Nevertheless, focusing on the evolution of threat mechanisms should not obscure a more profound structural challenge: the gap between crisis management and the development of national resilience. The success of state institutions in containing a security incident does not necessarily mean that the underlying conditions enabling its recurrence have been addressed. Similarly, strengthening intelligence and military capabilities cannot substitute for a comprehensive national framework capable of monitoring indicators of societal polarization, fostering critical thinking, rebuilding public trust, engaging young people, and improving the effectiveness of official communication.

From this perspective, national resilience encompasses society’s capacity to resist polarization, institutions’ ability to respond effectively to pressures, the economy’s capacity to absorb shocks, and the state’s ability to preserve the independence of its political decision-making in an environment characterized by increasing attempts at external influence.

The importance of this concept becomes even more pronounced when external threats coincide with accumulated domestic challenges, including unemployment, rising living costs, and varying levels of public confidence in institutional performance. These challenges do not, in themselves, constitute indicators of extremism, nor should political criticism or social demands be treated as security threats. They nevertheless influence the ability of the state and society to withstand shocks, particularly when accompanied by a major regional crisis or simultaneous economic and security disruptions.

Accordingly, the central strategic dilemma lies in the possibility that multiple sources of pressure may converge at a critical regional juncture, placing the state before a test that extends beyond the effectiveness of its security response to encompass the resilience and structural integrity of the entire national framework.

Building on these challenges, this position paper, informed by specialized contributions and discussions, examines six interconnected analytical dimensions: the transition from security containment to building national resilience; the reassessment of closed narratives and explanatory frameworks for understanding extremism; the analysis of the drivers of violence and the evolving dynamics of communication and influence; the evaluation of Jordan’s experience in confronting extremist organizations amid the rise of artificial intelligence; the examination of the relationship between waves of extremism and geopolitical transformations; and, finally, the assessment of scenarios involving the convergence of regional and domestic pressures and their implications for Jordan’s domestic front.

The paper does not proceed from the assumption that a comprehensive regional confrontation is inevitable, nor does it presume that every security incident is operationally linked to a specific external agenda. Instead, it seeks to distinguish between verified facts, analytical assessments, and potential scenarios, thereby developing a position grounded in evidence-based analysis rather than impressions, and in strategic foresight rather than alarmism.

The paper’s central argument is that Jordan’s demonstrated ability to overcome previous security challenges, while significant, is not sufficient on its own to guarantee its capacity to confront future threats. The nature of the current phase requires a transition from a state proficient in containing crises to one equipped with an institutional and societal framework capable of anticipating them, reducing the vulnerabilities that increase exposure to their consequences, and preventing the convergence of multiple crises from escalating into a comprehensive strategic imbalance.

In this sense, the resilience of Jordan’s domestic front will be tested by the extent to which the state and society can redefine the relationship between security and reform, stability and accountability, and border protection and the preservation of public trust. This relationship will largely determine Jordan’s ability to maintain its strategic equilibrium within a region whose emerging geopolitical order has yet to take a definitive shape.

Chapter One

From Threat Containment to Building National Resilience

The challenge facing states has increasingly become associated with their ability to anticipate the transformations that precede the emergence of threats and to identify and address the factors that enable such threats to develop and expand. There is a fundamental distinction between a state that possesses effective instruments for containing threats and one that has established a comprehensive system of national resilience. While the former can intervene once a crisis has materialized, the latter works to reduce the likelihood of its emergence, address its underlying social, ideological, and economic drivers, and mitigate its potential consequences before it reaches a critical tipping point.

In Jordan’s case, this distinction assumes exceptional significance given the Kingdom’s geopolitical position and the close interconnection between its national security and a regional environment characterized by profound and complex structural imbalances, where threats move across geographical borders, digital spaces, and social structures alike. Security risks can no longer be understood as isolated incidents detached from their broader contexts. Rather, they increasingly represent the visible outcomes of deeper interactions that may begin with shifts in collective consciousness, extend through the erosion of public trust, and ultimately culminate in polarization, extremism, and violence.

From this perspective, the recent incident in Karak, with its loss of human life and profound impact on the national consciousness, underscores the necessity of asking how the pathways leading to such incidents can be identified before the conditions enabling their occurrence have fully developed.

This approach neither diminishes the importance of security efforts nor calls into question the competence of the institutions responsible for maintaining national security. Instead, it seeks to broaden the concept of national security so that prevention is no longer regarded as the exclusive responsibility of security agencies, but rather as a shared institutional and societal function involving the education system, media, cultural institutions, the economy, political institutions, and civil society organizations.

First: Proactive Security and the Challenge of Shifting from Managing Consequences to Addressing Root Causes

One dimension of the traditional security approach involves identifying and monitoring sources of danger and intervening to contain them as they approach the state’s vital interests and strategic sphere. Although this function remains essential, relying on it exclusively exposes the state to recurring pressures and resource depletion, as it addresses the ultimate manifestations of crises without necessarily possessing sufficient capacity to influence the underlying conditions that produced them.

National resilience, by contrast, is grounded in a different philosophy: stability cannot be achieved merely by preventing security breaches; it also requires the development of a political, social, and intellectual environment capable of resisting such breaches in the first place.

Accordingly, the transition toward proactive security involves more than upgrading surveillance technologies or improving the effectiveness of operational responses. It requires a fundamental redefinition of the threat itself. A threat does not necessarily begin when an extremist group is formed or when an intention to commit an act of violence becomes apparent. Its roots may lie in growing social isolation, feelings of political alienation, declining trust in institutions, or the exposure of certain youth groups to transnational recruitment and radicalization networks.

This highlights the need to establish a national early warning system that extends beyond direct security indicators to encompass social, behavioral, and ideological transformations that may signal increasing vulnerability to extremist recruitment and influence within particular communities or environments.

Such a system cannot be effective if its role is limited to information collection. The strategic value of early warning lies in translating knowledge into actionable preventive decisions and ensuring that state institutions possess the capacity to undertake proportionate interventions before social vulnerabilities escalate into security threats.

Achieving this requires a coordination framework among relevant institutions, periodic risk assessment mechanisms, and clearly defined indicators for measuring changes in public trust and social cohesion. At the same time, appropriate safeguards must ensure that preventive measures do not become practices that restrict fundamental freedoms or conflate legitimate dissent with violent extremism.

Within this context, an important institutional question arises concerning how to strengthen the national security decision-making framework and whether there is a need for a permanent strategic coordination mechanism capable of integrating security intelligence with political, economic, and social assessments, rather than relying primarily on exceptional responses after crises occur.

Second: Societal Polarization as an Early Indicator of Weakening Domestic Resilience

Threats to national cohesion do not always originate beyond national borders. Certain forms of vulnerability may develop within society itself, particularly when divisions between social groups widen or institutions become less capable of managing differences within an inclusive framework of citizenship.

In this regard, the Jordanian context calls for an examination of potential patterns of polarization along religious, regional, social, or gender-based lines, as well as forms of intolerance that may manifest through sporting, cultural, or political affiliations and serve as expressions of broader societal divisions.

The existence of such affiliations does not, in itself, constitute a threat. Social and cultural diversity is a natural characteristic of societies. Rather, risks emerge when particular identities shift from being expressions of diversity to instruments of exclusion, and when belonging to one group becomes dependent on denying the legitimacy of other groups or inciting hostility against them.

This challenge is closely connected to levels of public trust. As trust between citizens and state institutions declines, the gap between official narratives and public perceptions may widen, creating greater opportunities for the spread of extremist interpretations and disinformation.

In environments characterized by weak institutional communication, information vacuums become contested spaces in which unreliable sources compete to provide alternative explanations, potentially relying on exaggeration, incitement, or the exploitation of perceived grievances.

Public trust should therefore be treated as a strategic asset of national security. A state whose institutions enjoy high levels of credibility is better positioned to manage crises, guide collective responses, counter rumors and misinformation, and accommodate differences before they develop into tensions.

Accordingly, there is a need for periodic national studies assessing levels of public trust, societal polarization, and institutional identification, while identifying disparities across age groups, geographical regions, and socioeconomic segments. These indicators should become an integral component of national risk assessments and public policy formulation.

Third: Education and Critical Thinking... From Curriculum Review to Reconstructing the Philosophy of Learning

Incidents associated with extremism often trigger public debates about educational curricula. However, reducing the concept of curriculum to school textbooks alone obscures a more fundamental dimension concerning the philosophy of education and the mechanisms through which knowledge is produced within educational institutions.

In its broader sense, the curriculum encompasses how dialogue is managed in the classroom, the nature of the relationship between teachers and learners, the space permitted for differing opinions, and students’ ability to raise questions and critically examine ideas without fear or intellectual coercion.

From this perspective, critical thinking becomes an essential component of national resilience, as it equips individuals with the capacity to distinguish between reasoned argument and propaganda, between informed belonging and emotional conformity, and between legitimate religious or political discourse and attempts to manipulate such discourse to justify violence.

Higher levels of education or enrollment in scientific disciplines cannot automatically be assumed to provide protection against extremist recruitment and radicalization. Specialized academic knowledge does not necessarily translate into the possession of social analytical skills or the ability to critically deconstruct ideological narratives.

Although various estimates and studies concerning the educational backgrounds of individuals involved in extremist organizations have been widely discussed, generalizing their findings across all contexts or educational groups requires rigorous methodological verification. The relationship between education and extremism is influenced by multiple factors and cannot be reduced to university specialization or academic attainment.

Accordingly, educational reforms should extend beyond reviewing textbook content to transforming the educational environment itself, enabling schools and universities to become spaces for open and responsible dialogue, constructive engagement with differences, and the development of independent thinking.

Furthermore, the role of schoolteachers and university professors extends beyond transmitting knowledge to shaping patterns of thought and interaction. This makes the preparation and professional development of educators, particularly in facilitating dialogue and addressing sensitive questions, an integral component of any serious national initiative aimed at preventing extremism.

Fourth: Digital Recruitment and the Transformation of Extremism into a Transinstitutional and Transnational Phenomenon

Digital transformation has fundamentally altered the mechanisms of extremist recruitment and radicalization. Extremist organizations no longer consistently require traditional organizational structures or face-to-face encounters to attract individuals, as digital platforms have created extensive opportunities to reach diverse audiences and tailor messages to the psychological and social characteristics of targeted individuals.

The danger associated with this transformation lies in the possibility that radicalization processes may unfold within digital spaces that are difficult for families, schools, or traditional institutions to monitor. Such processes may also develop gradually, beginning with emotionally charged or identity-based content before progressing toward exclusionary worldviews and justifications for violence.

At this intersection, digital prevention becomes closely connected to education, societal trust, and youth participation. Young people who have safe spaces to express their questions and concerns, encounter institutions willing and able to listen to them, and participate in activities that foster a sense of purpose and belonging are better equipped with the tools needed to resist extremist recruitment and manipulation.

Accordingly, strengthening the national response to digital recruitment requires an integrated approach combining digital awareness, information verification skills, youth dialogue programs, and appropriate psychosocial interventions, while ensuring respect for privacy and fundamental rights.

Fifth: Regional Instability and the Test of Jordan’s Preparedness for Scenarios of Regional Turmoil

Jordan operates within a regional environment in which ongoing wars intersect with unresolved conflicts, while regional and international powers compete for influence over energy corridors, borders, and strategically significant areas.

In light of the possibility of renewed military confrontations or an expansion of existing conflicts, particularly those associated with US–Iran tensions and the repercussions of regional wars, it is increasingly important to move beyond monitoring developments toward constructing national scenarios for managing their potential consequences.

The outbreak or escalation of a new confrontation should not be regarded as inevitable. Such possibilities remain contingent upon political and military decisions and a range of variables whose trajectories cannot be predicted with certainty. Nevertheless, uncertainty does not absolve institutions of their responsibility to prepare.

The central challenge lies in developing the capacity to operate under multiple scenarios, including disruptions to supply chains, rising energy costs, mounting economic pressures, potential border threats, cyberattacks, and intensified disinformation campaigns.

From this perspective, national resilience planning becomes a strategic necessity. It requires assessing the capacity of critical sectors to maintain operational continuity, testing emergency preparedness plans, establishing resource allocation priorities, and strengthening mechanisms for communicating with citizens about the nature of potential risks and the preparations required.

This also requires moving beyond what may be described as “seasonal mobilization,” whereby initiatives and official rhetoric intensify during crises only to diminish once the immediate threat subsides. Instead, a sustainable institutional approach is needed—one that systematically accumulates experience, strengthens institutional capabilities, and regularly tests national preparedness.

Sixth: The Legitimacy of Security Discourse and the Boundaries of Classification Between Dissent, Extremism, and Violence

Countering extremism raises a fundamental challenge concerning the definition of concepts underpinning security policies and political discourse, particularly in a region where issues of occupation, resistance, armed conflict, and terrorism frequently intersect.

The significance of this issue stems from the need to distinguish between political and ideological positions, including strongly expressed or oppositional views, and actions involving unlawful violence or the deliberate targeting of civilians.

Security classifications should not become extensions of political disagreements or instruments for criminalizing dissent. Rather, they must be grounded in clear legal standards and the nature of the actions and methods employed, while respecting international law and judicial safeguards.

Conversely, disagreements over political definitions cannot be invoked to justify attacks against civilians or places of worship, nor can they confer legitimacy upon acts of violence that violate fundamental rights.

This highlights the importance of developing a balanced national discourse that rejects extremism and violence without portraying intellectual, religious, and political diversity as a security threat or holding educational institutions and society as a whole responsible for the actions of a limited number of individuals or groups.

Furthermore, the widespread expressions of societal solidarity following the Karak incident underscore the importance of recognizing Jordanian society as a source of resilience rather than merely a potential arena of risk. Solidarity that transcends religious and regional affiliations constitutes a valuable national asset that should be strengthened and translated into sustainable institutional practices.

Seventh: Government Communication and the Crisis of the Information and Interpretation Vacuum

The consequences of security crises intensify when the gap widens between society’s need for information and the capacity of official communication to provide accurate and timely updates.

During critical moments, citizens seek to understand the significance of an incident, the level of risk it represents, the measures being taken to protect them, and what they may reasonably expect in the subsequent period.

When information is delayed or official messages lack clarity, an information and interpretation vacuum may emerge, allowing rumors and misleading content to position themselves as alternative sources of knowledge.

Government communication should therefore be regarded as an integral component of national security management, provided that it is grounded in transparency and accuracy and does not compromise investigative requirements or legitimate confidentiality considerations.

This approach requires a transition from reactive communication to proactive engagement that explains the nature of broader challenges, provides accessible and comprehensible information, establishes channels for questions and interaction, and acknowledges what remains uncertain rather than filling information gaps with unsubstantiated reassurances.

Trust emerges when official messages are consistent with reality, demonstrate respect for citizens’ judgment, and recognize the public as partners in shouldering national responsibility.

Eighth: Youth—From Subjects of Protection to Partners in Building National Resilience

Building sustainable national resilience requires reconsidering the position young people occupy within processes of societal decision-making.

Traditional programs frequently approach youth as target audiences for awareness-raising initiatives or as a demographic group requiring protection from negative influences, while their participation in identifying priorities, designing programs, and leading initiatives remains limited.

The paradox lies in the fact that institutions seek to protect young people from extremist recruitment and polarization while potentially failing to provide them with sufficient opportunities for expression, initiative, accountability, and meaningful participation.

Consequently, national resilience cannot be developed merely by intensifying messages directed at young people. It requires enabling them to shape and articulate their own perspectives within open institutional frameworks and engaging them in political parties, universities, community initiatives, advisory councils, and national activities.

Youth participation must also move beyond symbolic engagement. Their involvement should not be reduced to attending lectures or participating in occasional events, but should instead be linked to clearly defined responsibilities, appropriate decision-making authority, and genuine opportunities to influence outcomes.

This issue assumes additional significance amid growing competition to shape the perceptions and attitudes of younger generations within the digital sphere. Institutions cannot reasonably expect to build trust with young people if communication remains one-directional or if their questions are treated as sources of inconvenience rather than valuable opportunities to understand ongoing social transformations.

Ninth: Toward an Institutionalized National Framework for Resilience and Preparedness

The challenges outlined above highlight the need to develop a comprehensive national initiative that moves beyond fragmented sectoral interventions and establishes an integrated framework combining security prevention, social cohesion, educational reform, political participation, institutional communication, and economic preparedness.

Such a framework could be structured around three interconnected levels:

The First Level: Early Warning and Risk Detection

This involves developing national mechanisms to monitor indicators of societal polarization, declining public trust, digital disinformation, and social vulnerability, alongside conducting periodic assessments of these indicators within a framework of legal safeguards that protect privacy and fundamental freedoms.

The Second Level: Structural Prevention

This entails improving educational and dialogue environments, expanding meaningful youth participation, strengthening public trust in institutions, and developing programs that address the underlying social and ideological factors that may increase individuals’ vulnerability to extremist recruitment and influence.

The Third Level: Resilience and Crisis Response

This focuses on enhancing the preparedness of critical sectors, developing crisis scenarios and contingency plans, improving government communication, and conducting regular institutional reviews to identify and incorporate lessons learned from previous incidents and challenges.

These three levels cannot function effectively in isolation. Early warning systems that do not translate into preventive interventions lose their strategic value. Prevention efforts that are not grounded in an accurate understanding of risks may become broad programs with limited impact. Meanwhile, crisis response remains considerably more costly when it is not preceded by sustained investment in public trust, institutional preparedness, and societal resilience.

Chapter Two

Between the Constraints of Closed Narratives and the Imperatives of National Security... The Jordanian Model Facing the Test of Awareness, Legitimacy, and Societal Resilience

Crises within states do not necessarily begin at the moment their institutions are breached or when unfamiliar security threats become apparent. They may begin much earlier, when closed explanatory narratives become deeply embedded in institutional and societal consciousness, gradually evolving into seemingly definitive frameworks for interpreting events and narrowing the space available for reassessment, criticism, and reconsideration. In such circumstances, the problem may extend to the very processes through which the state and its elites construct their perceptions of danger, the boundaries separating objective knowledge from preconceived judgments, and the distinction between the imperatives of national security and the desire to monopolize the interpretation of events.

This challenge assumes particular significance in the Jordanian context, given the Kingdom’s accumulated experience in managing regional instability and its demonstrated ability to maintain stability in a region where numerous states have experienced institutional collapse, internal wars, and protracted conflicts. Nevertheless, this capacity, despite its importance, should not become an unquestioned assumption that exempts the national model from critical scrutiny, nor should it evolve into a self-contained narrative suggesting that past successes necessarily guarantee future security.

A security system capable of containing threats does not become immune to vulnerabilities merely because it has overcome previous crises. Similarly, the stability achieved by a state does not eliminate the need to critically examine the mechanisms through which it is maintained, particularly when the nature of threats changes and their security, social, ideological, and media dimensions become increasingly interconnected.

This raises a question that extends beyond the assessment of individual security incidents: Does the Jordanian model possess the capacity to reassess its traditional assumptions concerning extremism, stability, and social cohesion, or have certain entrenched narratives become obstacles to developing a more nuanced and multidimensional understanding of reality?

First: Crisis Management Through a “Firefighting” Approach and the Limitations of Institutional Response

Successive crises reveal one of the profound challenges confronting risk management: the tendency to address threats through emergency responses rather than incorporating them into a forward-looking framework that examines causes, probabilities, and consequences as interconnected elements.

This pattern may be described as a “firefighting” approach, in which institutional resources and attention are directed toward the most visible or publicly prominent crisis, while the capacity to monitor less apparent vulnerabilities diminishes, even though such vulnerabilities may pose greater long-term risks.

The problem with this approach does not lie in rapid response itself, as immediate intervention remains indispensable in security and public administration. Rather, it arises when emergency management becomes the dominant framework for addressing risks, leaving institutions more focused on containing consequences than on examining the underlying conditions that produced them.

In the Jordanian context, this pattern raises questions about the consistency of institutional reviews following crises, the ability of relevant authorities to transform operational experience into cumulative institutional knowledge, and the extent to which lessons learned move beyond internal reports to inform public policymaking.

While a security crisis necessitates immediate measures to protect citizens and restore stability, the conclusion of its direct consequences should mark the beginning of a deeper evaluation process. Such an assessment should examine the indicators that preceded the crisis, the nature and effectiveness of the response, and the institutional or structural weaknesses that may have contributed to its complexity.

Moreover, prioritizing responses to the most visible events may distort the allocation of institutional attention and resources. Not every risk that dominates public attention has the greatest implications for national security, just as threats that remain outside the public spotlight are not necessarily of limited significance.

Accordingly, the transition toward strategic risk management requires distinguishing between three levels: managing an incident when it occurs, analyzing the factors that led to it, and redesigning policies to reduce the likelihood of its recurrence. No security framework can achieve its full effectiveness if the third level remains subordinate to the first two.

Second: Closed Narratives and the Predicament of Preconceived Judgments Among Elites

Political, intellectual, media, and academic elites play a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of the state, society, and the threats surrounding them. Although they are not necessarily part of formal decision-making structures, they possess considerable influence over public opinion, the formulation of questions that dominate national debate, and the production of interpretive frameworks through which events are understood.

However, this role loses part of its value when predetermined political positions become the governing reference points for analysis, turning new developments into opportunities to reaffirm existing convictions rather than subjects for critical examination and reassessment.

Within this context, a phenomenon may emerge that can be described as “wishful analysis,” in which the analytical process begins with a desired conclusion and subsequently searches for facts that appear to support it.

The dangers of this approach are particularly evident in sensitive political and security matters, where a single incident may be interpreted as confirmation of a pre-existing position toward the state, its institutions, or regional and international powers, without waiting for sufficient information or verifying causal relationships.

This does not imply a demand to neutralize political positions or eliminate intellectual disagreement. Rather, it emphasizes that holding a particular position does not exempt an individual from methodological rigor. Objective criticism of the state does not require assuming its responsibility for every failure, just as defending the state does not necessitate denying the possibility of institutional mistakes.

One of the challenges that may confront public debate arises when polarization shifts from disagreements over assessments and interpretations to disagreements over the facts themselves. In such circumstances, truth becomes contested not solely because of insufficient information, but because different actors approach it through conflicting and selective interpretive frameworks.

This challenge becomes even more complex when political analysis is replaced by personal labeling or when the professional, security-related, or ideological backgrounds of commentators become predetermined criteria for judging their views, rather than critically examining the arguments and evidence they present.

Consequently, dismantling closed narratives represents an essential intellectual prerequisite for building national resilience. A society that is unable to reassess its underlying assumptions becomes more vulnerable to polarization and less capable of developing balanced responses to emerging challenges.

Third: The Distinctive Characteristics of the Jordanian Model of Violent Extremism... The Challenge of Social and Political Interpretation

Jordan’s experience in dealing with extremist jihadist movements raises questions that extend beyond the scale of the phenomenon or the number of individuals involved. These questions concern the nature of the ideological and organizational patterns that emerged during different phases of the phenomenon and the factors that contributed to their formation.

Prominent Jordanian figures have been associated with the history of transnational jihadist movements, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. This makes examining the Jordanian experience essential to understanding the relationship between the domestic environment and regional and international ideological transformations.

However, analyzing this phenomenon requires caution against cultural or psychological generalizations that attribute extremism to fixed characteristics of Jordanian society. The emergence of extremist figures from a particular national environment does not justify concluding that the society as a whole possesses a collective predisposition toward violence or that its social structure necessarily produces more extreme forms of radicalization than those found elsewhere.

Similarly, comparisons between figures associated with jihadist movements in different countries should not be limited to their rhetorical styles or educational backgrounds. Rather, such comparisons must also consider the political and organizational contexts, personal experiences, and historical circumstances that contributed to their emergence and influence.

Within this framework, field-based research examining family and social ties, recruitment networks, and channels of ideological influence becomes particularly important for understanding how extremist ideas spread among individuals and groups.

The relationship between social structures and extremism involves a complex interaction among personal relationships, networks of trust, political circumstances, lived experiences, and patterns of religious and ideological affiliation.

Accordingly, it is essential to distinguish between the presence of individuals or prominent figures associated with extremist movements and the transformation of society itself into an environment conducive to extremism.

Jordanian society, with its social networks, traditions of solidarity, and religious and regional diversity, has demonstrated on numerous occasions its capacity to reject violence and takfir—the practice of declaring others to be unbelievers. This underscores the importance of examining the factors that have contributed to building such resilience, without overstating the extent to which it provides absolute immunity.

The more meaningful question, therefore, is not whether Jordan has witnessed the emergence of extremist figures, but rather how those figures developed, why their ideas did not necessarily translate into widespread societal acceptance, and which variables might influence this relationship in the future.

Fourth: Between Security Confidentiality and the Right to Information... The Balance of Trust in Times of Crisis

Security operations and investigations involving extremism and terrorism entail specific requirements concerning the protection of sources and sensitive information, the integrity of investigative procedures, and the prevention of premature disclosures that could compromise investigations or place individuals at risk.

Consequently, demands for the immediate disclosure of all details are not always consistent with the professional requirements of security operations, particularly when investigations remain ongoing or when the facts may involve networks extending beyond those who directly carried out the act.

In such cases, the arrest or identification of perpetrators may not mark the conclusion of an investigation. Rather, it may constitute the beginning of a broader process aimed at understanding potential connections, communications, motivations, financing arrangements, and recruitment mechanisms, where such elements exist.

Nevertheless, recognizing the legitimacy of operational confidentiality does not mean granting ambiguity a permanent status or treating security considerations as a blanket justification for withholding information.

There is a fundamental distinction between information whose disclosure could jeopardize investigations and information that society needs in order to understand the nature of a threat, the level of risk involved, and the measures being taken to ensure public safety.

The difficulty of achieving this balance lies in the fact that excessive disclosure may undermine security interests, while excessive withholding of information can widen the information vacuum, potentially facilitating the spread of rumors and unsupported interpretations.

The management of security-related information is also connected to broader national interests, including economic and investment confidence and the country’s reputation as a stable and secure environment. Protecting these interests, however, should be based on accurate communication that balances confidentiality, transparency, and accountability.

Accordingly, institutional protocols are needed to define what information may be disclosed, when disclosure should occur, which authorities are authorized to communicate it, and how information should be updated and corrected.

Public trust is also grounded in the conviction that institutions handle events competently and honestly, and that any information withheld is subject to specific professional and legal necessities rather than an unrestricted desire to monopolize the official narrative.

Fifth: The Karak Incident Between Security Investigation and Geopolitical Interpretation

The Karak incident carries implications that extend beyond its immediate security dimensions, particularly given the questions it has raised concerning religious and social cohesion and the potential exploitation of attacks with sectarian characteristics within broader political and regional contexts.

According to the chronology discussed in the expert contributions, the incident coincided with a period in which relations between Muslims and Christians featured prominently in political and media discourse surrounding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Within this context, reference was made to the positions expressed by King Abdullah II in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2026, in which he rejected portraying the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a confrontation between religions and emphasized that the central issue concerns the rights of Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, alongside the protection of the Christian presence and its historical heritage in the region.

The significance of this discourse lies in its repositioning of religious questions within their political and human rights context, while rejecting attempts to transform religious differences into lines of confrontation that could serve to redefine the conflict or justify exclusionary policies.

However, from an analytical standpoint, the temporal proximity between this discourse and the Karak incident is insufficient to establish an operational or causal connection between them.

Attributing responsibility to an external actor, or assuming that the incident was carried out in response to a particular political position, requires investigative evidence and reliable information that mere chronological coincidence cannot provide.

Nevertheless, the absence of evidence establishing a direct relationship does not diminish the importance of examining the potential political and media exploitation of security incidents, particularly when they involve issues of religious identity and societal coexistence.

Different actors may seek to exploit an incident to construct narratives that advance their interests, without necessarily having planned or participated in its execution.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between three analytical levels: direct responsibility for the act, the political contexts in which it occurred, and the actors that may attempt to capitalize on its repercussions.

This distinction is necessary to prevent geopolitical analysis from becoming a substitute for criminal investigation and to ensure that identifying potential beneficiaries does not overshadow the more fundamental questions concerning the actual perpetrators and their substantiated motives.

Sixth: The Political Instrumentalization of Religious Identity and the Reshaping of Conflict Narratives

Religious identity occupies a prominent position in the struggle over legitimacy and political narratives in the Middle East, particularly amid the growing prevalence of discourses that seek to redefine political and human rights conflicts as confrontations between opposing religious or civilizational communities.

The danger of this transformation lies in shifting the debate away from policies, rights, and legal responsibilities toward the realm of existential identities, where political disagreements may evolve into religious antagonisms that are considerably more difficult to contain.

In the Israeli–Palestinian context, this dynamic assumes particular significance, as portraying the conflict as a religious confrontation may obscure the fact that Palestinians, regardless of their religious affiliations, are affected by occupation and restrictions imposed on their rights and daily lives.

Furthermore, discourse that presents the protection of Christians as a justification for political alignment must be evaluated against the standard of actual rights protection rather than accepted solely on the basis of identity-based rhetoric.

Conversely, the existence of Israeli interests in influencing international narratives concerning the region does not, in itself, constitute evidence of Israeli responsibility for any particular security incident. Potential political interests must be distinguished from established responsibility, just as the theoretical ability to benefit from an event does not imply participation in its orchestration.

This issue calls for treating competition over narratives as a distinct field of analysis in which media outlets, digital platforms, political discourse, and religious authorities interact.

For Jordan, preserving the image of Muslim–Christian coexistence should not be limited to defending it through media narratives following attacks. Rather, it requires strengthening the social and institutional foundations that make such coexistence an established feature of everyday life.

Religious and societal resilience, therefore, depend on institutions capable of protecting pluralism, preventing incitement, consolidating equality in citizenship, and promoting equitable participation in public life.

Seventh: The Jordanian Paradox Between the Emergence of Influential Extremist Figures and Societal Rejection of Extremism

Jordan’s experience presents a paradox worthy of examination: the emergence of figures who have exerted significant influence on the history of extremist jihadist movements, alongside continued manifestations of widespread societal rejection of takfiri ideologies and violence directed against civilians.

This paradox cannot be explained through a single variable. It may reflect the interaction of family and social networks, the role of religious institutions, the historical experiences of society, levels of local trust, and the capacity to distinguish between religious observance as a social practice and involvement in violent organizations.

In this context, it is important to distinguish between religious conservatism and violent extremism. Religious conservatism is not synonymous with takfir, or declaring others to be unbelievers, just as the presence of diverse religious orientations within society does not necessarily indicate a willingness to embrace violence.

Indeed, developing credible intellectual and religious alternatives capable of engaging conservative communities through their own language and reference frameworks may represent an important avenue for prevention, provided that such alternatives are grounded in respect for pluralism and the rejection of violence, rather than the exclusion of differing religious currents or the monopolization of religious representation.

From this perspective, countering extremism requires socially and intellectually credible voices within the communities concerned, rather than top-down discourse that merely condemns the phenomenon without understanding why it may appeal to certain individuals.

Research into cases of involvement in extremist organizations should also examine, alongside ideological motivations, factors relating to belonging, identity, personal relationships, and a sense of purpose, as well as the influence of external conflicts in reshaping individual perceptions.

This approach requires the development of independent research grounded in field data, interviews, and comparative analysis, rather than continued reliance on generalized explanations that reduce extremism to educational curricula, religious discourse, or economic conditions.

Eighth: Regional Turmoil and the Potential Transmission of Vulnerabilities into the Domestic Sphere

The possibility of expanding regional conflicts represents one of the most significant future tests of Jordan’s national resilience, particularly because wars can leave behind institutional, social, and economic vacuums that may create environments conducive to the growth of smuggling networks, organized crime, and extremism.

Several regional experiences have demonstrated that institutional collapse or a decline in the capacity of state institutions to regulate public affairs may facilitate the emergence of armed groups and informal networks of influence competing over resources, legitimacy, and control.

Nevertheless, these experiences do not imply that all states are destined to follow the same trajectory or that disorder is an inevitable consequence of every war. Societies differ in their capacity to withstand crises according to the nature and strength of their institutions, levels of public trust, social cohesion, and effectiveness in managing resources and emergencies.

In Jordan’s case, the importance of institutional stability is particularly evident given the Kingdom’s geographical position, its interconnectedness with crises in neighboring countries, and the resulting challenges related to borders, trade, energy, and population movements.

However, relying exclusively on past successes may lead to an underestimation of emerging threats, particularly if widespread regional instability coincides with domestic economic or social pressures.

Under such circumstances, certain segments of society may become increasingly vulnerable to extremist narratives or disinformation, while opportunities may expand for exploiting humanitarian and political crises for recruitment and radicalization purposes.

Accordingly, preparedness for potential regional turmoil must extend beyond military and security planning to include assessments of society’s capacity to absorb shocks, the continuity of essential services, economic resilience, the effectiveness of government communication, and the ability of educational, religious, and community institutions to prevent external tensions from spilling over into the domestic sphere.

Ninth: From Monopolizing the Narrative to Knowledge Partnership... The Responsibility of Elites in Safeguarding the National Sphere

One of the essential prerequisites for advancing the Jordanian model lies in redefining the relationship between the state, elites, and society. This relationship should not be based on a division of roles between an actor presumed to possess the truth and others expected merely to accept its interpretation. Rather, it should be grounded in recognition of the diversity of knowledge sources, expertise, and perspectives.

Official institutions possess information and capabilities that may not necessarily be available to researchers and analysts, while universities, research centers, and civil society organizations bring methodological tools and analytical perspectives that can help identify vulnerabilities and structural weaknesses that may remain undetected in conventional security assessments.

This relationship should not evolve into a contest over epistemic authority or the legitimacy of knowledge. Instead, the integration of security expertise, social research, and political analysis can produce a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the nature of emerging threats.

Achieving this requires establishing regular channels for dialogue and the exchange of assessments, creating an enabling environment for independent research, encouraging evidence-based criticism, and developing institutional mechanisms to incorporate research findings into public policymaking.

At the same time, political, intellectual, academic, and media elites bear a professional and ethical responsibility to avoid preconceived judgments, refrain from exploiting security incidents as instruments for settling political or ideological disputes, and clearly distinguish between verified information, hypotheses, and analytical assessments.

A public sphere in which standards of verification deteriorate becomes increasingly vulnerable to manipulation and infiltration, not only by extremist organizations but also through disinformation and polarization campaigns that exploit declining public trust and conflicting narratives.

Accordingly, safeguarding national security requires establishing shared standards for public debate that allow for diverse interpretations while preventing unsubstantiated allegations from being circulated and accepted as established facts.

Chapter Three

Beyond the Visible Perpetrator: The Political Economy of Extremism, the Engineering of Chaos, and Shifting Patterns of Consciousness in the Jordanian Context

Violent extremism cannot be fully understood by focusing exclusively on the individuals who engage in violent acts or the social environments that facilitate the spread of extremist ideas. In its more complex manifestations, the phenomenon extends beyond individual motivations and societal support structures to a third dimension involving actors who may seek to capitalize on the consequences of violence and exploit them within broader political, security, or geostrategic calculations. Accordingly, identifying who carries out an act does not necessarily exhaust the questions concerning its causes, repercussions, and the interests that may emerge around it.

This approach requires distinguishing between three interconnected levels: the motivations that drive individuals toward extremism; the environments that facilitate the dissemination of extremist ideas or recruitment; and the strategic exploitation of violence by organized actors or political forces seeking to advance objectives that extend beyond the immediate motivations of the perpetrators.

However, this distinction does not imply that a hidden actor necessarily stands behind every incident or that those who benefit politically from an event must have been responsible for its occurrence. The relationship between a terrorist act and its political consequences may involve direct planning, subsequent exploitation, or merely an unintended convergence between outcomes and interests. Reliable evidence and specialized investigations therefore remain essential foundations for any conclusions regarding responsibility or organizational connections.

In Jordan’s case, the importance of distinguishing among these dimensions is heightened by the nature of the surrounding regional environment, the potential transmission of sectarian and political tensions across borders, and the rapid transformation of communication technologies and digital recruitment mechanisms. There is also a growing need to reassess methodologies used to measure attitudes within Jordanian society, ensuring that impressions derived from digital platforms or media discourse are not transformed into sweeping judgments about its intellectual and social structures.

Accordingly, developing a more effective national approach to countering extremism requires integrating an understanding of individual motivations, an analysis of enabling environments, an assessment of patterns of political exploitation of violence, and a restructuring of communication between the state and society on the basis of measurable, evidence-based knowledge.

First: The Triad of Motivation, Enabling Environment, and Strategic Driver... Toward a Multilevel Explanation of Extremism

The study of violent extremism begins with the recognition that the transition from adopting radical ideas to engaging in violence does not follow a single pathway and cannot be explained by any one factor. Involvement in extremist organizations may be associated with ideological convictions, perceptions of injustice and exclusion, crises of identity and belonging, or diverse psychological and social motivations that interact differently from one case to another.

This does not mean that experiences of injustice or alienation necessarily lead to extremism. Individuals and communities may encounter similar circumstances without resorting to violence. Rather, the significance of such factors lies in their potential exploitation when recruitment networks are able to reinterpret personal experiences through ideological narratives that justify exclusion or attacks against others.

The enabling environment, meanwhile, should not be reduced to the local community, family, or religious institution. It may also emerge within virtual spaces, personal networks, or small groups that reproduce closed ideological narratives and provide their members with a sense of distinction and belonging.

In this context, an important analytical challenge arises from conflating the existence of a broadly supportive social environment with the presence of limited networks that facilitate support, recruitment, or ideological justification. The circulation of extremist discourse within a particular group does not justify concluding that the wider society to which its members belong constitutes an environment supportive of extremism.

The third level, involving the strategic driver or actor seeking to exploit violence, introduces a more complex analytical dimension. Organized groups or political actors may seek to instrumentalize violence through direct support, ideological influence, or the exploitation of its consequences to reshape existing balances of power.

However, this dimension requires the highest degree of analytical scrutiny. Without a sound evidentiary basis, the assumption that an unseen actor is directing events may evolve into an all-encompassing explanation that attributes every incident to hidden forces without allowing meaningful verification or empirical testing.

Security and strategic studies must therefore distinguish between established motivations, potential organizational affiliations, and subsequent political interests, examining each dimension through appropriate research methods and evidentiary standards.

The practical value of this distinction lies in avoiding the reduction of extremism to the individual perpetrator while simultaneously resisting the temptation of conspiratorial explanations that extend beyond what the available evidence can substantiate.

Second: The Geopolitical Instrumentalization of Violence... From the Cold War to Contemporary Struggles for Influence

Modern history has witnessed repeated instances in which armed groups and ideological movements have been instrumentalized in struggles for influence among states, particularly during the Cold War, when indirect confrontations were intertwined with political and military support for local actors operating in unstable environments.

Afghanistan, during the confrontation with the Soviet Union, represented a prominent example of the intersection of international and regional interests with armed movements, generating transformations whose consequences extended beyond the original objectives of the parties involved in the conflict.

This experience demonstrates that instruments employed to secure short-term strategic gains may subsequently generate threats that operate independently of the actors who contributed to their emergence. It also illustrates that political investment in violence does not necessarily translate into an enduring ability to control its consequences.

Conversely, placing armed leftist movements, jihadist organizations, and contemporary sectarian groups within a single explanatory framework may obscure significant differences in their historical contexts, objectives, and organizational structures. Each experience must therefore be examined within its specific historical and political circumstances.

This gives rise to the concept of “strategic blowback,” whereby certain instruments of indirect conflict evolve into independent sources of threat that exceed the boundaries of their original intended use and reproduce themselves in new environments, taking advantage of institutional collapse, protracted conflicts, or declining state capacity to maintain effective governance and public order.

In the Middle East, the persistence of proxy conflicts, the proliferation of non-state armed groups, and the intersection of ideological and sectarian affiliations with geopolitical interests make the study of the strategic instrumentalization of violence an essential component of understanding regional security risks.

However, such analysis cannot be completed merely by identifying actors who might benefit from instability. It must also assess their actual capacity to influence events, the nature of their networks, the instruments at their disposal, and the constraints under which they operate.

Not every actor who benefits from an event possesses the capacity to orchestrate it, just as the existence of a strategic interest does not establish the existence of an operational plan to pursue it.

Third: The Potential for Armed Sectarianization and the Risks of Regional Conflicts Spilling Over into the Societal Sphere

Regional transformations raise the possibility of an expanded use of sectarian identities in political and military mobilization, particularly if the region enters a new phase of direct or indirect confrontation among competing powers.

Within this context, concerns arise over the potential exploitation of sectarian discourse by certain armed groups aligned with regional power blocs, thereby transforming political conflicts into broader confrontations defined by identity-based divisions.

However, describing this possibility as “Safavid terrorism” remains a polemical characterization laden with sectarian and historical connotations and does not, in itself, constitute a sufficiently precise analytical framework. A more appropriate approach is to distinguish between the policies pursued by a particular state, the actions committed by specific armed groups, and the religious affiliations of communities that must not be held collectively responsible for those actions.

The danger of the armed sectarianization of conflict lies in its capacity to transform political disputes that may be amenable to negotiation into confrontations fueled by mutual fear, drawing upon historical and sectarian narratives to justify and perpetuate violence.

In such environments, religious edicts or inflammatory religious discourse may become instruments of mobilization. Their influence, however, remains dependent on organizational, political, and social contexts, and it cannot be assumed that they will automatically generate widespread collective responses.

Similarly, the presence of Iran-aligned armed groups in certain regional arenas requires a specific assessment of their capabilities, objectives, and patterns of activity, rather than extending the perception of threat to entire sectarian communities or treating regional disorder as an inevitable outcome.

For Jordan, the strategic risk lies in the possibility that particularistic identities may be exploited to generate loyalties that transcend national institutions, justify violence, or transfer external conflicts into the domestic sphere.

Accordingly, strengthening national resilience requires rejecting sectarian incitement regardless of its source, developing the capacity to identify patterns of violent mobilization, and maintaining a clear distinction between freedom of belief and expression and organized activities involving threats or incitement to violence.

Fourth: The Strategic Dimension of the Karak Incident and the Limits of Political Inference

The Karak incident has renewed questions concerning the nature of threats targeting societal cohesion, particularly given the sensitivity of the relationship between religious identity and national security, and the role of Muslim–Christian unity as a foundational element in the historical development of the Jordanian state.

These questions assume greater significance when the incident is considered within the context of regional political discourse, particularly Jordan’s positions rejecting attempts to portray the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a religious confrontation and emphasizing the unity of Palestinian rights regardless of religious affiliation.

The expert contributions raised a hypothesis concerning the possibility that Jordan’s image or political standing could be targeted during a period of regional transition, linking this possibility to competition over narratives concerning the Christian presence in the region.

However, regardless of the potential relevance of this hypothesis from the perspective of analyzing strategic interests, it cannot be adopted as an explanation for the incident without reliable evidence establishing the nature of any connection between the direct perpetrators and a potential external actor.

Similarly, relying on the proposition that increasing complexity reduces the likelihood of coincidence is insufficient to establish intent or deliberate planning. Complexity may also arise from the interaction of independent factors or from limitations in the information available to researchers.

Accordingly, rigorous strategic analysis must maintain a clear distinction between possibility and conclusion, differentiating among what can be established through evidence, what may be considered more plausible, and what remains a hypothesis requiring further examination.

Within this framework, it is legitimate to investigate whether the incident created opportunities for political or media exploitation aimed at undermining Jordan’s image of religious coexistence, without transforming such an inquiry into a premature accusation against any party.

Protecting national security does not require excluding hypotheses from consideration. Rather, it requires subjecting them to systematic verification so that strategic concerns do not become accepted as established facts without sufficient evidence.

Fifth: Strengthening Intellectual Resilience Between Immediate Response and Long-Term Strategic Development

Countering extremism requires distinguishing among levels of intervention according to the nature of the threat and the relevant time horizon. Immediate interventions seek to prevent attacks and contain direct threats; medium-term interventions focus on strengthening legislative, economic, and institutional frameworks; while long-term interventions aim to reshape the intellectual, educational, and social systems that influence the formation of attitudes and behavior.

The importance of this graduated approach stems from the recognition that security measures, regardless of their effectiveness, cannot independently address all the conditions that may render certain individuals vulnerable to extremist recruitment and influence.

Conversely, intellectual and educational programs cannot substitute for security measures when an immediate threat endangers the lives and safety of citizens.

This underscores the necessity of integrating all three levels of intervention. Security responses protect society from immediate threats, institutional reforms contribute to reducing structural vulnerabilities, and educational, cultural, and dialogue-based initiatives strengthen individuals’ capacity to resist ideas that justify violence.

This approach also raises the challenge of developing “intellectual alternatives.” Deconstructing extremist discourse or diminishing its influence is insufficient unless intellectual and social spaces are made available to engage with the questions and concerns that extremist narratives have sought to exploit.

However, constructing such alternatives should not become an exercise in imposing a single ideological model or replacing one exclusionary discourse with another. Rather, it requires enabling responsible pluralism that allows citizens to express their convictions, provides credible intellectual and religious reference points, and reinforces the principle that disagreement does not justify violence.

The effectiveness of any intellectual alternative also depends on its ability to communicate with the intended audiences in accessible language and to provide responses grounded in their lived experiences, rather than relying exclusively on abstract theoretical discourse disconnected from their concerns.

Accordingly, the challenge lies not merely in the absence of written strategies, but in the capacity of institutions to translate them into programs that are implementable, measurable, and sustainable.

Sixth: The Family, Schools, and Socialization Institutions... Overlapping Responsibilities and the Declining Influence of Traditional Roles

Institutions of socialization occupy a central position in shaping values, attitudes, and behaviors. However, economic, technological, and cultural transformations have redistributed influence among families, schools, universities, media outlets, and digital platforms.

The family is no longer the sole or necessarily the most influential source in shaping the perceptions of younger generations, just as schools no longer monopolize the transmission of knowledge or the formation of intellectual frameworks.

This transformation has given rise to a multi-source socialization environment in which individuals receive diverse, and sometimes contradictory, messages from traditional institutions, digital platforms, and transnational social networks.

Nevertheless, acknowledging the declining influence of the family does not imply that its role has disappeared. Similarly, assigning families exclusive responsibility for preventing extremism overlooks the fact that families themselves are shaped by broader educational, economic, and cultural interactions.

Parents are influenced by their educational experiences, living conditions, and prevailing societal narratives. Their ability to engage in meaningful dialogue with their children is also affected by technological transformations and the rapid evolution of communication patterns.

Accordingly, building intellectual resilience should not involve concentrating responsibility within a single institution. Rather, it requires strengthening integration and coordination among the various institutions of socialization.

This entails equipping families with digital parenting and communication skills, developing schools as environments that foster critical thinking, strengthening universities’ role in cultivating independent personalities, and engaging religious and cultural institutions in producing discourse that rejects exclusion and embraces pluralism.

This approach becomes particularly important in relation to national values, belonging, and citizenship. Such values cannot be sustainably instilled through instruction and memorization alone; they must be reinforced through individuals’ everyday experiences and their relationships with institutions and society.

Citizenship taught merely as a theoretical concept, without tangible manifestations of justice, participation, and respect for human dignity, may lose much of its capacity to influence attitudes and behavior.

Seventh: The Crisis of National Communication... When Institutions Speak a Language Society Does Not Hear

The relationship between the state and society in the sphere of communication is a fundamental determinant of public policy effectiveness, particularly in environments experiencing rapid transformations in patterns of knowledge acquisition, information consumption, and public trust.

The function of communication is not limited to conveying official messages or improving the image of institutions. It also encompasses understanding audiences, analyzing their perceptions, identifying their concerns, and developing communication capable of influencing knowledge, attitudes, and behavior.

Accordingly, any communication strategy that is not grounded in rigorous field research risks becoming disconnected from the very society it seeks to engage.

This challenge becomes evident when seminars, lectures, and media campaigns are repeatedly implemented without sufficient evidence demonstrating their ability to change attitudes or address deficits in public trust.

A high volume of communication activities does not necessarily indicate effectiveness. Similarly, the widespread dissemination of a message does not establish that its intended audience has understood it, accepted it, or changed its behavior as a result of exposure to it.

In Jordan’s case, there is a growing need for national studies measuring changes in citizens’ awareness, perceptions, and attitudes over recent years, particularly amid economic crises, political transformations, regional wars, and expanding digitalization.

It would be inaccurate to categorically assert that such studies are absent across all institutions. Nevertheless, the need to make their findings accessible and assess the extent to which they inform policymaking remains a fundamental concern.

When communication decisions are based on untested assumptions about audiences, the likelihood that official messages will fail to correspond with social realities increases.

Furthermore, the use of formal or elitist language that differs substantially from prevailing patterns of expression may weaken the ability of messages to reach their intended audiences, particularly younger generations who engage with digital content through different formats, rhythms, and communication styles.

This challenge is closely connected to what may be described as a “perceptual gap” between institutions and the public. Such a gap emerges when institutions communicate primarily from the standpoint of their own priorities, while citizens interpret the same issues through the lens of their everyday needs and lived experiences.

Addressing this gap requires more than simplifying language. It demands restructuring the communication process around active listening, meaningful interaction, and continuous research.

Eighth: Artificial Intelligence and Digital Recruitment... The Migration of Threats into Personalized Interactive Environments

The expansion of generative artificial intelligence applications and automated conversational systems opens a new area of inquiry into the risks associated with extremism and radicalization, given these technologies’ ability to rapidly generate interactive content and tailor messages to users’ interests and patterns of inquiry.

This environment differs from traditional forms of propaganda. Users can engage in continuous dialogue with automated systems and receive responses that appear personal and direct, potentially increasing the influence of the content they encounter, particularly when they lack the skills needed to verify information and critically assess its credibility.

However, it is essential to distinguish between automated conversational systems that generate responses using artificial intelligence models and accounts or platforms operated by actual individuals, including actors who may employ automated tools to expand the reach of their communications or influence.

It is inaccurate to assume that every response generated by an automated conversational system originates from a human operator behind the interface. Nevertheless, certain platforms may be misused, and artificial intelligence tools may be exploited to produce extremist propaganda or misleading content.

The principal risks arise from the capacity to generate persuasive messages at relatively low cost, distribute them on a large scale, simulate personalized communication, and produce content targeting different groups according to their characteristics and interests.

The use of synthetically generated images, audio recordings, and videos may also make it increasingly difficult to distinguish authentic content from fabricated material, creating opportunities for attempts to influence public opinion or intensify societal divisions.

Conversely, the same technologies can be employed to develop awareness-raising and verification tools, analyze patterns of disinformation, and provide educational content that helps young people understand digital risks.

Accordingly, the required national approach should not be based on generating generalized fear of artificial intelligence. Rather, it should focus on developing institutional and societal digital literacy and capabilities, including training teachers, families, and young people; strengthening reporting and response mechanisms; and conducting periodic assessments of emerging risks.

Such an approach must also safeguard privacy and freedom of expression, ensuring that efforts to counter digital extremism do not become a pretext for monitoring individuals’ beliefs or criminalizing legitimate dissent.

Chapter Four

Jordan’s Domestic Front Confronting the Third Generation of Terrorism: From State Resilience to Algorithmic Dominance

The capacity of states to safeguard their national security is measured by their ability to draw lessons from crises and reconstruct their defensive and preventive frameworks in response to the evolving nature of emerging threats. A state’s security history, regardless of its record of resilience and success, does not automatically provide immunity against threats that continuously evolve in their structures, methods, and spheres of operation, particularly when they migrate from traditional geographical and organizational environments into digital spaces that transcend borders, institutions, and conventional mechanisms of oversight.

In Jordan’s case, this challenge assumes exceptional significance. Although the Kingdom has not been immune to the waves of political and security instability that have affected the region over recent decades, it has managed to preserve institutional continuity and the cohesion of its national structures despite successive episodes of security threats and terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this accumulated institutional and societal experience now faces a fundamentally different test, one that concerns not only the state’s ability to contain terrorist operations after they occur but also its preparedness to confront a profound transformation in the environments where extremist ideas emerge and through which they reach individuals.

While traditional terrorism relied on direct communication, organizational networks, and personal relationships, and subsequently expanded its recruitment and radicalization activities through social media and encrypted platforms, recent developments in generative artificial intelligence have opened a new domain in which interactive extremist narratives may potentially be produced, capable of simulating personal conversations and adapting messages to users’ interests and questions.

Accordingly, the strategic question is no longer confined to how borders can be protected or extremist networks pursued. It now extends to how the cognitive and digital environments in which younger generations form their beliefs and perceptions can be safeguarded, particularly as an increasing proportion of knowledge-seeking activities shifts from traditional institutions toward intelligent systems.

First: Jordan’s Recurring Security Tests... Stability as a Historical Achievement, Not a Permanent Guarantee

Jordan has experienced complex political and security developments that have repeatedly tested the state’s ability to preserve its stability and institutional continuity. From the regional upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, through the transformations following the Afghan war and the return of Arab fighters during the 1990s, to the successive waves of transnational terrorism after 2001, the Kingdom has confronted diverse challenges that differed in their motivations, methods, and regional dimensions.

Overcoming these challenges was not solely the result of security measures. It was also associated with the state’s ability to preserve institutional cohesion, maintain the continuity of political and administrative functions, and draw upon a reservoir of public trust and national belonging that helped prevent crises from escalating into broader institutional breakdown.

However, public trust is not a fixed or permanent asset. It is influenced by institutional performance, the nature of crises, and the state’s capacity to respond to citizens’ needs and explain its decisions. Maintaining stability therefore requires continuously renewing its underlying foundations rather than relying exclusively on the achievements of the past.

Since the 1990s, Jordan has witnessed transformations in the nature of threats associated with violent extremism, including the emergence of ideological currents and networks influenced by regional conflicts, followed by the expanding influence of transnational jihadist organizations over the subsequent two decades.

The 2005 Amman hotel bombings represented a particularly traumatic moment in Jordan’s national memory. These were followed by other security challenges, including the murder of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh in 2015 and subsequent attacks in the Rukban area, Baqaa, Karak, and Salt.

These incidents demonstrate that Jordan has confronted terrorist threats in multiple forms and that the state’s ability to contain them has not signified the disappearance of the phenomenon. Rather, it has underscored the continuing need to develop and adapt the instruments used to address it.

Within this context, the recent Karak incident presents a new test concerning the nature of the attack and its implications for national cohesion, particularly when the consequences of violence extend to religious and social symbols that form part of Jordanian society’s shared national identity.

Consequently, comparisons between previous incidents and the most recent attack should not be confined to casualty figures or the nature of the security response. They should also examine the potential messages conveyed by the targeting and its implications for public trust and societal cohesion.

Second: Karak—From the Site of an Attack to a Space of National Solidarity

Societal responses to terrorist incidents are no less significant than security responses, as the nature of public reactions reveals the level of domestic cohesion and society’s capacity to prevent the consequences of violence from spreading beyond the immediate victims into broader social relationships.

The expressions of solidarity following the Karak incident demonstrated a national response that extended beyond the locality where the attack occurred, with Jordanians from different governorates and social backgrounds participating in offering condolences and expressing their rejection of the crime.

The significance of this response lies in its reaffirmation of national bonds capable of transcending particularistic affiliations and demonstrating that an attack targeting one component of society can become an occasion for expressing the unity of the national community as a whole.

However, the strength of an emotional response is not, by itself, sufficient to assess the extent of national resilience. Solidarity emerging during moments of collective shock requires institutional mechanisms capable of sustaining it and transforming it from a temporary emotional reaction into an enduring public culture and sustainable pattern of societal behavior.

Within this framework, a distinction must be made between “absorbing the shock” and “preventing its recurrence.” The former reflects society’s ability to preserve its cohesion following an attack, while the latter requires the development of proactive mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of threats emerging in the first place.

Accordingly, the expressions of solidarity witnessed in Karak constitute a valuable national asset upon which further efforts should build. Nevertheless, they do not exempt institutions from examining potential vulnerabilities, assessing the effectiveness of preventive programs, and analyzing developments that may influence the behavior of groups vulnerable to extremist recruitment and radicalization.

Third: Jordan’s Four Approaches to Countering Extremism... Accumulated Experience and the Limits of Effectiveness

Jordan’s efforts to counter extremism and terrorism did not begin from scratch. Over recent decades, the state has developed a range of parallel approaches addressing the security, legislative, intellectual, and societal dimensions of these threats.

The first approach has focused on strengthening security, military, and intelligence capabilities, including proactive operations, monitoring threats within and beyond the Kingdom, and enhancing the capacity to identify extremist networks and prevent attacks.

The second approach has involved developing the legislative and legal framework, including amendments introduced to the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2014, alongside measures aimed at combating terrorist financing and related activities.

The third approach has concentrated on religious and intellectual dimensions through initiatives intended to promote moderation and reject takfir and extremism. Prominent among these are the Amman Message and the A Common Word initiative, together with efforts undertaken by religious, cultural, and educational institutions in this field.

The fourth approach has centered on community engagement through youth initiatives, dialogue and awareness-raising programs, efforts to strengthen national belonging, and measures aimed at countering hate speech.

Taken together, these approaches reflect accumulated institutional experience. They also suggest that the current challenge does not necessarily lie in the absence of policies or initiatives, but rather in their capacity to keep pace with emerging transformations, measure their outcomes, and achieve effective integration.

The existence of a strategy to counter extremism does not, in itself, demonstrate its success, just as the proliferation of initiatives does not necessarily indicate a corresponding expansion in their impact.

This underscores the need for periodic evaluations of existing approaches to determine the results they have achieved, the difficulties they have encountered, and their relevance to emerging threats.

Furthermore, the continued development of these approaches must preserve the balance between security imperatives, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights. Effective prevention does not depend on the indefinite expansion of security measures, but rather on their precision, proportionality, and accountability.

Fourth: From Direct Recruitment to Digital Propaganda... The First Transformation in the Structure of Terrorism

The proliferation of the internet and social media has significantly transformed extremist organizations’ ability to reach audiences beyond their traditional local environments.

Whereas recruitment previously depended heavily on face-to-face encounters, personal networks, and closed organizational circles, digital platforms have created broader opportunities to disseminate ideological content, establish relationships, and recruit individuals across national borders.

The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) over the past decade provided a clear example of how digital environments could be exploited for propaganda and recruitment through the production of visual content, the development of messages targeting diverse audiences, and the use of social media platforms and communication applications to disseminate extremist narratives and expand their reach.

The significance of this transformation lies in its reduction of certain barriers that previously separated extremist organizations from their intended audiences. It has facilitated access to ideological content and enabled forms of communication that do not necessarily require a direct organizational presence within local communities.

This transformation has also demonstrated that extremist organizations may adopt emerging communication technologies more rapidly than institutions can develop appropriate responses.

Nevertheless, countering digital recruitment should not be reduced to platform surveillance or content removal. The digital environment is not merely a channel for transmitting messages; it is also a space in which relationships, affiliations, and perceptions are formed.

Accordingly, developing an effective response requires integrating technical capabilities, social research, and digital awareness, while maintaining a clear distinction between content involving incitement to or recruitment for violence and legitimate religious and political expression.

Fifth: The Algorithmic Generation... The Shift in Epistemic Authority from Institutions to Intelligent Systems

The ongoing transformation in younger generations’ relationships with technology represents one of the most significant challenges confronting systems of socialization, education, and communication.

Generations raised in digital environments do not engage with knowledge in the same ways as previous generations. Screens, digital platforms, search engines, and recommendation systems have become integral to everyday life and major sources of information, interaction, and the formation of perceptions.

With the rapid proliferation of generative artificial intelligence applications, this relationship has acquired a new dimension, characterized by a shift from searching for information across multiple pages and sources toward obtaining direct answers from conversational systems capable of generating seemingly coherent and persuasive responses.

This does not mean that young people have entirely abandoned schools, families, or religious and cultural institutions. Rather, it indicates a shift in the balance of influence that requires reassessing the capacity of traditional institutions to communicate effectively with them.

The challenge lies in the fact that conversational systems may present answers in confident language even when the underlying information is incomplete or inaccurate, making uncritical reliance on their outputs a potential source of misinformation.

Furthermore, the interactive nature of these systems may reinforce users’ perceptions that they are receiving responses specifically tailored to their questions, creating an experience fundamentally different from general media messages or content published for mass audiences.

Accordingly, the concept of the “algorithmic generation” should not be employed as a negative characterization of younger generations. Instead, it should serve as an analytical framework for understanding the knowledge environments within which their attitudes and decisions are shaped.

The underlying problem, therefore, lies in the absence of adequate tools that enable individuals to verify AI-generated outputs, understand their limitations, and distinguish between reliable knowledge and content designed to influence or manipulate perceptions.

Sixth: Artificial Intelligence and Extremism... From Mass Propaganda to Interactive Radicalization

Generative artificial intelligence introduces new possibilities for the misuse of technology in disseminating extremist narratives, particularly through the production of multilingual content, the simulation of personalized communication, and the adaptation of messages to users’ interests.

These possibilities differ from conventional digital propaganda because interactive systems can respond to successive questions, reformulate messages, and provide a more continuous conversational experience than static publications or prerecorded videos.

From a technical perspective, extremist actors could attempt to develop customized conversational systems that generate ideologically biased responses or exploit sensitive social and religious issues to gradually introduce exclusionary narratives.

However, technical feasibility does not necessarily indicate that such practices are widespread or that their effectiveness has been empirically established. It is also essential to distinguish between general-purpose models developed by technology companies and modified applications or systems that independent actors may create for malicious purposes.

Seventh: The Legislative Framework Confronting the Artificial Intelligence Challenge... From Content Regulation to System Accountability

Digital transformations have generated legal challenges that extend beyond traditional frameworks governing online publishing, particularly with the emergence of systems capable of automatically generating content and interacting directly with users.

Laws designed to regulate publications, online accounts, and interpersonal communication do not necessarily address all the complexities associated with generative systems. These include the responsibilities of developers and operators, risk assessment mechanisms, transparency requirements, personal data protection, and the reporting of serious incidents.

Within this context, the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act provides a regulatory model worthy of examination, particularly because it adopts a risk-based approach and establishes differentiated obligations for specific categories of AI systems and their providers.

Certain obligations include model evaluation and testing, risk management, the documentation and reporting of serious incidents, and the implementation of cybersecurity measures, depending on the scope and applicability of the relevant provisions.

Nevertheless, drawing lessons from the European experience does not imply that its regulatory model should be transferred wholesale to Jordan. Institutional capacities, digital markets, and legal frameworks differ considerably. Moreover, certain European obligations apply to specific categories of models and systems and do not uniformly extend to all conversational AI applications.

It is equally important to distinguish between reporting technical incidents or serious risks and monitoring all user queries or treating questions concerning sensitive topics as evidence of criminal intent.

Establishing a national framework for user protection should not result in violations of privacy or the criminalization of legitimate knowledge-seeking activities. Instead, it should focus on defining the responsibilities of relevant actors, developing safety standards, and establishing clear mechanisms for addressing content involving actual incitement to violence or specific threats.

For Jordan, there is a growing need to review the adequacy of existing legal and regulatory frameworks in addressing risks associated with artificial intelligence and to identify gaps requiring further legislative or institutional action.

Such a review should also encompass the roles of educational institutions, regulatory authorities, data protection bodies, and agencies responsible for cybersecurity, while ensuring effective coordination among them and preventing overlapping or conflicting mandates.

Eighth: Protecting Youth in the Age of Intelligent Technologies... Prevention Before Surveillance

Protecting young people from digital radicalization requires an approach that goes beyond prohibition and warnings to develop their practical capacity to engage critically and responsibly with intelligent systems.

Users who lack information verification skills may regard automated responses as definitive sources of authority, particularly when such responses are presented in clear, structured language or address religious, social, or political issues that raise personal questions and concerns.

Accordingly, prevention should focus on the relationship between users and technology, rather than on technology alone.

This approach begins within educational institutions by integrating critical AI literacy into school and university curricula and training students to verify sources, compare responses, and recognize the potential for bias, error, and manipulation.

It also requires equipping teachers and university faculty members with the skills needed to address new questions arising from these technologies and strengthening their ability to guide students toward responsible use rather than relying solely on generalized warnings.

At the family level, particular importance should be placed on enabling parents to understand the applications their children use and fostering patterns of dialogue that allow digital content to be discussed openly without transforming family relationships into systems of surveillance based on constant suspicion.

Religious, cultural, and youth institutions can also play an important role by providing spaces for dialogue that accommodate sensitive questions, offer credible and persuasive responses, and reduce reliance on unknown or biased sources of information.

The importance of this integrated approach lies in the recognition that digital protection cannot be achieved through the efforts of a single institution. Nor can technical solutions alone address all the factors that may render certain individuals vulnerable to extremist narratives.

Ninth: Spillover Effects from the Regional Neighborhood... Where Geographical and Digital Borders Intersect

Jordan’s security challenges cannot be separated from developments in its surrounding regional environment, particularly amid continuing tensions and conflicts in several neighboring countries and the associated presence of armed networks, border threats, and transnational security risks.

Developments in Syria and Iraq are particularly significant given their shared geography with Jordan, interconnected security, economic, and social interests, and previous experiences involving the movement of fighters, weapons, and extremist ideologies through unstable environments.

However, assessing these risks requires an up-to-date understanding of conditions on the ground and the institutional realities of neighboring countries. It should not assume that all neighboring areas experience the same degree of vulnerability or that the likelihood of threats spilling across borders is uniform.

Contemporary transformations have also made digital borders an integral component of the regional security environment. Extremist narratives and disinformation campaigns can reach Jordanian society without the physical movement of individuals or equipment across national borders.

Consequently, safeguarding national security requires a dual approach that combines effective control of geographical borders with strengthened digital and cognitive resilience.

This underscores the need to reassess the continued relevance of programs originally designed to counter terrorist organizations during earlier periods, particularly as recruitment, communication, financing, and propaganda mechanisms evolve.

The effectiveness of a security or preventive program during a particular phase does not guarantee its continued relevance indefinitely. Persistently relying on the same instruments without systematic evaluation may widen the gap between the evolving nature of threats and the capacity of institutions to address them.

Tenth: Toward a Specialized Jordanian Framework for Cognitive Security and Digital Prevention

The transformations outlined above highlight the need to consider developing a specialized national framework addressing the risks associated with digital radicalization and artificial intelligence within the broader context of national security and societal resilience.

Such a framework does not necessarily require the establishment of new institutions or the expansion of administrative structures. It could begin by clarifying existing responsibilities, strengthening coordination among relevant authorities, and developing the technical and research capabilities needed to respond to emerging risks.

This framework should be grounded in a set of complementary priorities, most notably:

1. Developing Knowledge of Emerging Risks: Conducting field-based and technical studies examining patterns of artificial intelligence use among young people, their levels of trust in AI-generated outputs, and their exposure to misleading or inflammatory content.

2. Strengthening Institutional Capacities: Training professionals working in education, cybersecurity, communication, and counseling to understand generative AI applications and the risks associated with their misuse.

3. Reviewing Regulatory Frameworks: Clarifying the responsibilities of institutions concerned with digital system safety, protecting personal data, and ensuring proportionality between preventive measures and fundamental rights.

4. Implementing Targeted Interventions: Developing specialized programs addressing clearly identified groups and challenges, subject to independent evaluations that measure their actual impact rather than relying solely on the number of activities conducted or participants reached.

5. Establishing Research and Technology Partnerships: Promoting collaboration among universities, research centers, government institutions, and the technology sector to develop evidence-based analytical tools and response mechanisms suited to the Jordanian context.

The significance of these priorities lies in their ability to shift the discussion from generalized warnings about technology toward building institutional capacities to understand and respond to its implications.

They also recognize that addressing emerging risks does not necessarily require abandoning previous security and intellectual approaches, but rather adapting and strengthening them to operate effectively within an environment characterized by fundamentally different threats and mechanisms of dissemination.

Chapter Five

When the Region Generates Its Own Threats: Jordan Confronting the New Wave of Transnational Extremism

A profound methodological challenge shapes a considerable portion of discussions concerning violent extremism and terrorism in the Arab world: the tendency to explain these phenomena primarily through the cultural and religious characteristics of societies, rather than subjecting them to historical and political analysis that accounts for the conditions that produced them, the transformations that reshaped them, and the balances of power that influenced their trajectories. In some approaches, this tendency has reduced a multifaceted phenomenon to questions concerning educational curricula, religious discourse, or social structures, while marginalizing more fundamental questions relating to wars, foreign interventions, institutional collapse, and the closure of political space.

This does not imply that ideology or culture plays no role in shaping the convictions of individuals and groups. Ideas contribute to providing violence with subjective legitimacy and supplying the language through which perpetrators justify their actions. However, this role does not make culture an independent or sufficient explanation for the emergence of extremist organizations, nor does it independently explain variations in the prevalence of violence across societies or historical periods.

International comparisons demonstrate that political violence and extremism are not confined to societies with particular religious or cultural backgrounds. Western societies also experience diverse forms of violence associated with racial supremacy, religious hatred, political extremism, and hostility toward women and minority groups. Nevertheless, quantitative comparisons between these phenomena and terrorism in Jordan require standardized definitions and indicators, as hate crimes, armed violence, and terrorism do not constitute identical statistical categories.

From this perspective, there is a need to move beyond restrictive culturalist explanations of extremism and adopt an analytical approach that examines the relationship between geopolitical transformations and successive waves of armed mobilization, particularly in countries directly affected by surrounding conflicts.

In Jordan’s case, this approach offers a framework for understanding a striking historical paradox: the Kingdom has witnessed the emergence of influential figures within transnational jihadist movements and the involvement of Jordanians in various external conflicts, without necessarily experiencing the development of a comparable domestic organizational infrastructure to that established by the same movements in other conflict zones.

Accordingly, the central question concerns the relationship between extremism and external conflicts, the mechanisms through which the repercussions of those conflicts are transmitted into the domestic sphere, and the extent to which the state can manage risks whose original sources lie beyond its control.

First: Extremism as a Product of Political Conflict Rather Than an Inevitable Reflection of Culture

The study of violent extremism requires distinguishing between the ideological frameworks adopted by its perpetrators and the political circumstances that may lead some individuals or groups to move from intellectual or political activism toward the use of violence.

Modern history provides numerous examples of armed movements emerging within different ideological contexts, ranging from leftist and nationalist organizations that appeared in Europe and Latin America during the twentieth century to jihadist movements that subsequently expanded in regions affected by wars, foreign interventions, and institutional collapse.

Certain approaches within political sociology, including research associated with social movement theory, emphasize the importance of restricted opportunities for political participation and diminishing prospects for negotiated settlements in explaining why some groups adopt increasingly radical courses of action.

However, the relationship between political exclusion and violence is neither automatic nor inevitable. Most movements facing political restrictions do not evolve into terrorist organizations, just as violent groups may emerge in environments characterized by varying degrees of freedom and political participation.

The importance of this distinction lies in preventing the conflation of political or social grievances with the adoption of violence as a means of addressing them.

Accordingly, culture and ideology may help explain how violence is justified and how its targets are defined, while the study of political conflicts and regional transformations contributes to understanding the conditions that enable armed organizations to expand and recruit.

Within this framework, geopolitical analysis becomes essential—not as an absolute substitute for social and ideological explanations, but as an indispensable analytical dimension in the study of transnational organizations.

Second: The Three Waves of Jihadist Extremism Associated with Jordan

A historical examination of the Jordanian experience reveals that significant waves of violent jihadist activity have been closely associated with major regional transformations, with each wave coinciding with an external conflict that reshaped networks of mobilization, recruitment, and cross-border movement.

The First Wave: The Afghan War's Repercussions During the 1990s

This phase was associated with the Afghan war and the subsequent return of some Arab fighters to their home countries, bringing with them combat experience, networks of personal relationships, and ideological perspectives shaped by the external conflict.

In Jordan, this period witnessed the emergence of groups and security-related cases associated with jihadist movements, including what became known as the “Army of Muhammad” case, reflecting the transmission of certain repercussions of the Afghan conflict into the domestic environment.

The significance of this phase lies in its demonstration of how individuals, ideas, and networks could move from foreign battlefields into the domestic sphere, without necessarily resulting in the establishment of a broad local organization capable of sustaining an insurgency.

The Second Wave: The Repercussions of the 2003 Occupation of Iraq

The US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent collapse of security and state institutions marked a turning point in the structure of jihadist movements across the region. Multiple armed environments emerged, while organizations capable of exploiting political and security vacuums and intensifying internal divisions gained prominence.

The name Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became closely associated with this period, whose repercussions extended into Jordan and culminated in one of the country's deadliest terrorist incidents: the 2005 Amman hotel bombings.

This experience demonstrates that threats confronting a state may originate beyond its borders and that the state's lack of control over the environments in which extremist organizations emerge limits its ability to address the original causes of those threats, even when it possesses effective mechanisms for managing their domestic manifestations.

The Third Wave: The Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and the Rise of ISIS

The period following 2011 witnessed a substantial expansion of jihadist organizational activity in Syria and Iraq, coinciding with the collapse of certain security structures, the widening scope of armed conflict, and the proliferation of competing armed actors.

With the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), battlefields in Syria and Iraq became destinations for foreign fighters from numerous countries, including Jordan. Cells and attempted attacks associated with the organization or influenced by its ideology also emerged.

Security incidents associated with this phase include the 2016 events in Irbid, the attacks that occurred in Karak later that year, and the incidents in Salt and Fuheis in 2018.

The expert contribution refers to estimates concerning the number of Jordanians who joined foreign battlefields across the different waves, reaching more than 2,400 individuals during the rise of ISIS. However, these figures require independent verification and clarification as to whether they encompass all organizations, conflict zones, and relevant periods before they can be adopted as definitive statistics.

The three waves reveal a pattern worthy of further investigation: the escalation of jihadist activity has been associated with major transformations beyond Jordan's borders, although the magnitude of their impact, the nature of the organizations involved, and their recruitment mechanisms have varied from one phase to another.

Third: “Solidarity-Based Jihadism”... The Distinctive Relationship Between Jordan's Domestic Environment and External Conflict Zones

The concept of “solidarity-based jihadism” offers an important explanatory framework for understanding certain characteristics of the Jordanian experience. It refers to a pattern of involvement in jihadist movements primarily directed toward external conflict zones, motivated by ideological, religious, or political solidarity with causes extending beyond national borders.

According to this interpretation, certain jihadist currents associated with Jordan did not necessarily seek to establish extensive domestic organizational structures. Instead, some of their members became involved in networks and organizations operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

This distinctive characteristic is reflected in the historical prominence of Jordanian figures or individuals associated with Jordan within global jihadist movements, including Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, alongside other figures affiliated with organizations that emerged in Syria and Iraq.

However, describing the phenomenon as solidarity-based should not obscure differences between historical phases or individual actors, nor should it lead to an underestimation of the dangers posed by domestic cells or the possibility that certain organizations may shift from external operations toward targeting the domestic environment.

Similarly, the argument that organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS have not succeeded in establishing stable domestic structures comparable to their external branches does not imply the complete absence of organizational activities, connections, or operational planning within Jordan.

There is a fundamental distinction between the absence of an openly declared and sustainable organizational branch and the presence of small cells, limited networks, or individuals maintaining varying degrees of affiliation with extremist organizations.

The significance of this distinction lies in its implications for the nature of the response required. Countering a cohesive domestic organization differs from addressing individuals influenced by extremist ideology, just as both differ from confronting transnational networks that target the state from beyond its borders.

Accordingly, the analysis of solidarity-based jihadism should be accompanied by an examination of the mechanisms through which ideological influence develops into organizational involvement, the factors that lead certain individuals to participate in external conflicts, and those that prompt others to engage in violence within the domestic environment.

Fourth: Geography, Kinship, and Small Cells... The Social Structure of the Threat

Jordan's experience with certain extremist cells highlights the importance of examining the social and geographical relationships that may contribute to the formation of violent groups.

In some cases, kinship, marriage ties, friendships, or neighborhood relationships may facilitate the development of trust among individuals, enable communication, and reduce dependence on formal organizational structures.

However, this does not mean that families or tribal networks constitute environments supportive of extremism. Indeed, these same relationships may serve as important sources of societal solidarity and protection against violence.

Similarly, the association of certain cells with particular geographical areas does not justify attributing collective responsibility to those locations or their residents. Geographical explanations require an integrated examination of social, organizational, and economic contexts.

This issue becomes particularly significant when examining individuals who operate without direct operational guidance from a central organization, or small groups that emerge through shared exposure to extremist narratives.

Contemporary extremist organizations may benefit from the dissemination of their ideologies without necessarily establishing formal organizational structures in every country, creating distinct challenges for security monitoring and preventive efforts.

However, classifying a particular incident as an individually perpetrated attack or the activity of an autonomous cell requires investigative findings. Such a classification cannot be inferred solely from the absence of a claim of responsibility or the nature of the relationships among the perpetrators.

Accordingly, the study of extremist social networks must be grounded in evidence and field-based analysis, while clearly distinguishing between ordinary social relationships and connections actively exploited for violent activities.

Fifth: The Regional Security Complex... Why Jordan’s Security Threats Cannot Be Understood in Isolation from Its Neighbors

The concept of the “Regional Security Complex” provides a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between a state’s security and its surrounding geographical and political environment. It is based on the premise that security threats and concerns among geographically interconnected states are so closely interrelated that analyzing the security of each state independently offers only limited explanatory value.

This concept is particularly relevant to Jordan, given the Kingdom’s geographical position among areas that have experienced successive conflicts and the resulting population movements, economic pressures, border threats, and transformations in trade and energy networks.

A war in a neighboring country may generate consequences within Jordan even in the absence of any direct targeting of the Kingdom, through border disruptions, changes in trade flows, the movement of weapons and fighters, and mounting economic and social pressures.

Transnational armed organizations may also exploit differences in states’ capacities to exercise control over their territories, establishing themselves in more fragile environments while seeking to influence other countries through recruitment, propaganda, or direct operations.

Consequently, Jordan’s success in managing its borders and countering security threats does not eliminate its exposure to developments occurring beyond its sovereign jurisdiction.

The central strategic challenge lies in the fact that certain sources of threat cannot be addressed through domestic policies alone, as they are connected to regional conflicts and international decisions that Jordan cannot independently control.

Accordingly, strengthening national resilience requires integrating domestic preparedness with diplomatic engagement and regional coordination to mitigate the repercussions of external conflicts on national security.

Sixth: The Formation of Environments Conducive to Extremism... Wars, Religious Edicts, and Transnational Mobilization

Waves of armed mobilization do not emerge in a political vacuum. They are shaped by ongoing conflicts, narratives that confer religious or ideological legitimacy upon participation in those conflicts, and the positions adopted by states and influential actors toward them.

Different phases of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria witnessed various forms of mobilization and encouragement to participate in fighting, whether through religious, political, or media discourse.

These experiences suggest that certain positions adopted within temporary political contexts may produce long-term consequences, particularly when mobilization develops into military and organizational networks that become difficult to dismantle after the circumstances that initially gave rise to them have changed.

However, examining the role of official discourse or religious edicts (fatwas) in encouraging participation in armed conflicts requires identifying the specific actors, statements, and historical periods concerned. Responsibility cannot legitimately be generalized to all states or religious institutions without supporting evidence.

It is equally important to distinguish between political calls to support populations subjected to violence and direct incitement to join terrorist organizations or participate in attacks against civilians.

The significance of this distinction lies in the fact that external conflicts may generate widespread and legitimate expressions of solidarity, while certain extremist organizations may exploit such sentiments to recruit individuals into projects that extend beyond the publicly stated objectives of that solidarity.

Accordingly, countering extremism requires examining the relationship between public discourse and individual behavior, as well as assessing the influence of political, religious, and media messages on how individuals perceive external conflicts.

It also requires developing a national discourse capable of articulating political and humanitarian positions clearly, without allowing extremist organizations to monopolize their interpretation or transform them into calls for violence.

Seventh: The Next Wave... Could Regional Instability Generate a Renewed Expansion of Extremist Organizations?

Current regional transformations raise the possibility of a new wave of violent extremism, particularly if military confrontations expand, certain states experience further institutional fragmentation, or security vacuums emerge that enable armed organizations to regroup.

This hypothesis draws upon historical experiences demonstrating how extremist organizations have benefited from the collapse or weakening of state authority, as occurred during different phases of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

However, the proposition that a new wave of terrorism emerges every ten years should not be treated as an established historical law. Such waves vary in duration, causes, and manifestations, and no regular chronological cycle guarantees the emergence of a new wave at a particular ten-year interval.

Nevertheless, examining the transitional periods between previous waves may help identify conditions that precede the expansion of extremist activity, including major wars, declining state control over territory, shifts in alliances, and the emergence of new opportunities for recruitment and financing.

Within this context, concerns arise that any large-scale military escalation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran could trigger regional disruptions extending beyond the immediate parties to the conflict, particularly if attacks affect energy infrastructure or major trade routes.

However, whether such a confrontation will occur, its timing, scale, and the nature of potential responses remain unresolved questions and must not be presented as certain outcomes.

Similarly, extreme scenarios involving the collapse or disappearance of states as a consequence of war constitute highly consequential assumptions requiring independent evidence and analysis. They cannot be accepted merely because they appear in political assessments.

From the perspective of Jordanian strategic planning, a more appropriate approach is to examine potential escalation through multiple scenarios, ranging from limited disruptions to markets and energy supplies to a broader regional confrontation affecting trade flows, security, and economic stability.

Preparedness should therefore be grounded in systematic scenario assessment rather than certainty about the occurrence of any particular outcome.

Eighth: Syria as a Decisive Variable in Jordan’s Security Equation

Developments in Syria represent one of the most influential variables shaping Jordan’s security environment, given the length of the shared border, the interconnected economic and social interests of the two countries, and the continuing challenges associated with armed groups, smuggling networks, and multiple spheres of influence.

This issue becomes particularly sensitive during transitional periods characterized by the restructuring of political and security institutions, when gaps may emerge between central authorities and local forces, or when levels of territorial control and governance vary across different areas.

However, assessing the Syrian authorities’ capacity to exercise effective control requires updated field-based information. The situation cannot be reduced to broad characterizations that assume the absence of state control over most of the territory without adequate verification.

At the same time, the continued presence of cells associated with the Islamic State (ISIS) or other extremist organizations in certain Syrian environments represents a source of concern requiring ongoing monitoring, particularly if conditions emerge that facilitate renewed recruitment or the reactivation of financing and communication networks.

The expert contribution refers to estimates suggesting an increase in the number of ISIS fighters in Syria, alongside a hypothesis that the organization may, during certain periods, prefer to rebuild its capabilities and await more favorable conditions rather than intensify direct operations.

These assessments require independent verification concerning the estimated numbers, the locations of leadership structures, and the organization’s intentions. A conclusion that the organization is pursuing a strategy of strategic waiting cannot be drawn solely from a decline in operational activity.

Nevertheless, the broader hypothesis warrants examination. Armed organizations may exploit periods of instability to reorganize their networks even when their activities are not highly visible in the public sphere.

For Jordan, the priority lies in monitoring developments in Syria through a comprehensive approach that integrates border security, regional cooperation, surveillance of armed networks, and assessments of the political and economic implications for border communities.

Ninth: American and Israeli Strategic Visions for the Region and the Risks of Reshaping the Regional Order

The security risks confronting Jordan intersect with transformations in the strategic outlooks of international and regional powers, particularly the United States and Israel, given the influence of their policies on conflict dynamics, peace processes, and the restructuring of regional balances of power.

Israeli debates concerning the future of regional security, the nature of relations with the United States, and potential changes in the balance of power in the Middle East raise important questions about their implications for neighboring Arab states.

Furthermore, narratives that diminish the significance of the nation-state or reinterpret the region primarily through sectarian and ethnic identities may reinforce perceptions of Arab societies as entities susceptible to fragmentation, rather than recognizing them as sovereign states with established institutions and national interests.

However, analyzing these perspectives requires distinguishing between the views of researchers and former officials, official strategic documents, and policies that have actually been adopted and implemented.

The proposals advanced by an Israeli security expert or research institution do not necessarily constitute binding government policy. Similarly, the existence of discussions concerning new strategic approaches does not, by itself, establish that a comprehensive project aimed at generating regional instability has been adopted.

Within this context, particular importance should be attached to examining transformations in Israeli strategic discourse following October 7, 2023, and their implications for concepts of deterrence, borders, and regional security, while avoiding the assumption that all circulating perspectives form part of a single, coherent strategic plan.

These developments have direct relevance to Jordan, particularly in light of events concerning the West Bank, Jerusalem, and southern Syria, and the potential political, security, and demographic pressures that may arise from them.

Accordingly, assessments of the strategic environment should integrate analyses of discourse, interests, and actual capabilities, while distinguishing between declared intentions, feasible policy options, and observable outcomes.

Tenth: Potential Spillover Effects on Jordan... From Regional Shocks to Domestic Pressures

Should the region experience a large-scale military confrontation or prolonged security instability, Jordan could face a range of interconnected consequences extending beyond the immediate security sphere.

Foremost among these are economic risks associated with energy prices, disruptions to supply chains, rising transportation and insurance costs, and potential adverse effects on trade, investment, and tourism.

Accumulated economic pressures could also contribute to heightened social tensions, particularly if accompanied by rising living costs, declining employment opportunities, or disruptions to essential services.

However, the progression from economic pressure to social unrest is not inevitable. It depends on institutional capacity to manage resources, the effectiveness of social protection systems, levels of public trust, and the nature of communication between the state and its citizens.

Within the security sphere, border monitoring, surveillance of smuggling networks and armed groups, and responses to disinformation campaigns exploiting wartime uncertainty may become increasingly important.

At the societal level, particular attention should be given to preventing regional polarization from spilling over into the domestic environment, especially when external conflicts acquire sectarian or identity-based dimensions.

Accordingly, national preparedness should not be based on a single scenario but on a graduated range of possibilities, with clearly defined levels of impact and appropriate response measures for each.

This requires strengthening coordination mechanisms among security, economic, service-delivery, and media institutions, updating business continuity plans, and identifying national priorities under conditions of regional instability.

Eleventh: From Internal Security to Managing Geopolitical Exposure

The historical waves of extremism associated with Jordan demonstrate that a significant proportion of security threats originate in external environments before their consequences are transmitted domestically through individuals, networks, ideologies, and economic and political circumstances.

Accordingly, reliance on domestic approaches alone, regardless of their effectiveness, may prove insufficient to address all sources of risk.

This highlights the need for a broader concept that may be termed “Geopolitical Exposure Management,” based on assessing the extent to which the state is vulnerable to surrounding conflicts, identifying the channels through which their repercussions are transmitted, and developing the capacity to mitigate their effects.

This concept requires integrating security, diplomacy, economics, energy, trade, and societal communication so that regional threats are not treated as isolated policy issues.

It also calls for developing specialized research capabilities in scenario analysis and establishing early warning indicators that monitor military, political, and economic transformations in neighboring countries.

Within this context, investing in regional stability becomes an integral component of safeguarding national security, while preventive diplomacy, cross-border cooperation, and information sharing serve as complementary instruments to direct security measures.

This does not imply that Jordan can control the trajectories of major regional conflicts. Rather, it underscores the Kingdom’s capacity to strengthen its preparedness, reduce its exposure to their consequences, and preserve institutional and societal continuity amid regional instability.

Conclusion

The themes examined in this position paper reveal that Jordan is confronting a qualitative transformation in the nature of its security and strategic challenges, characterized by changes in the environments where extremism emerges, the diversification of channels through which it spreads, and the expanding range of actors and conflicts that may exploit its consequences. The Kingdom, which has accumulated extensive experience in confronting extremist organizations and demonstrated the ability of its institutions and society to overcome severe security challenges, now faces a considerably more complex strategic equation. In this evolving environment, the boundaries between domestic threats and regional spillover effects, ideological influence and geopolitical instrumentalization, and security stability and societal resilience are becoming increasingly blurred.

The historical analysis has demonstrated that significant waves of jihadist extremism associated with Jordan coincided with major transformations in the regional environment, and that the rise of transnational extremist organizations was closely connected to wars, institutional collapse, and expanding security vacuums. However, this finding does not justify overlooking ideological, social, and organizational factors. Rather, it reinforces the need to situate these factors within a broader analytical framework that explains how individuals and groups transition from ideological influence to the perpetration of violence, as well as the conditions that enable external threats to develop domestic dimensions.

Conversely, approaches that interpret every terrorist incident as evidence of fundamental deficiencies in society’s culture or educational curricula involve generalizations that are not necessarily supported by the available evidence. The cohesion demonstrated by Jordanians in response to attacks motivated by sectarian or takfiri ideologies underscores the importance of distinguishing between the actions of limited groups and the broader attitudes prevailing within society. It also calls for treating education and religious discourse as areas requiring continuous reform and development, rather than as predetermined explanations for every manifestation of violence.

Perhaps the most significant transformation lies in the shift of threats from traditional organizational structures toward smaller and less visible networks, occurring alongside rapid developments in digital communication technologies and artificial intelligence applications. This transformation necessitates reassessing the adequacy of existing preventive and legislative policies and developing specialized capabilities to understand emerging patterns of radicalization and recruitment, without compromising fundamental rights or allowing generalized surveillance to replace prevention grounded in objective risk indicators.

Nevertheless, technological advancements, however important, cannot independently address the deeper challenge identified in this paper: the gap between the capacity to contain threats and the capacity to prevent the conditions that enable their recurrence. Proactive security is not limited to detecting extremist cells before they carry out attacks. It also encompasses monitoring social, political, and economic transformations that may increase certain individuals’ vulnerability to extremist recruitment and strengthening institutional capacities to respond before such vulnerabilities develop into crises.

Within this framework, public trust emerges as one of the most essential foundations of national resilience. A state equipped with effective security institutions simultaneously requires credible official communication, institutions capable of acknowledging and correcting mistakes, policies responsive to economic and social demands, and spaces that allow criticism and accountability without transforming disagreement into hostile polarization. National cohesion is not founded on the absence of differences, but rather on the existence of institutional and political frameworks that enable those differences to be managed without undermining the unity of society.

The paper further indicates that the most complex strategic risk lies in the potential convergence of multiple pressures arising from Israeli policies, the repercussions of the conflict involving Iran, and transformations in Syria, intersecting with Jordan’s domestic economic and social challenges. Under such circumstances, individual crises may develop into mutually reinforcing pressures, increasing the costs of response and testing the ability of institutions to maintain the continuity of their essential functions.

However, this possibility should not evolve into a deterministic narrative suggesting that chaos is imminent or unavoidable. Sound strategic planning is grounded in examining scenarios, identifying levels of risk, and developing alternatives, rather than assuming that the most pessimistic outcomes will inevitably materialize.

On this basis, the paper concludes that the national priority lies in moving beyond managing threats as separate policy issues toward establishing an integrated framework for national resilience and preparedness. Such a framework should be grounded in early warning mechanisms, institutional coordination, economic and public service preparedness, legislative development, protection of the digital environment, the promotion of critical thinking in education, and the meaningful engagement of young people and civil society in prevention and response.

This framework must also recognize that stability and reform are not competing objectives. Addressing unemployment and pressures on living standards, improving public services, and strengthening political participation are not matters that can be postponed until regional tensions subside. Rather, they constitute essential components of building national capacity to withstand those tensions. The wider the gap between the state and society becomes, the greater the costs of crisis management. Conversely, stronger public trust, justice, and institutional effectiveness enhance the state’s ability to absorb shocks.

At the external level, the paper emphasizes the necessity of preserving the independence of national decision-making, avoiding involvement in confrontations that do not serve Jordanian interests, and strengthening diplomatic and preventive engagement in addressing threats originating beyond national borders. Geography imposes burdens on Jordan that it cannot eliminate, but it does not deprive the Kingdom of its ability to manage strategic choices, reduce its exposure to external risks, and expand the room for maneuver available to it.

Accordingly, the question that should guide the coming period is not whether Jordan can overcome another security incident. Its experience has already demonstrated that it possesses significant capabilities in this regard. Rather, the fundamental question is whether its institutional, economic, and societal structures are evolving at a pace commensurate with the changing sources of threats, and whether its preventive mechanisms can keep pace with regional transformations, technological developments, and emerging patterns of radicalization.

Building Jordanian national resilience therefore requires moving beyond the “firefighting” approach toward reducing the conditions under which crises emerge; transitioning from reaction to anticipation, from fragmented initiatives to integrated policies, and from relying on societal cohesion during moments of danger to sustained institutional investment in the conditions that generate and reinforce that cohesion.

Ultimately, the Kingdom faces a strategic question concerning its future capacity to safeguard its internal equilibrium within a region where the balance of power and spheres of influence are undergoing rapid transformation. Its ability to navigate this challenge will depend on the extent to which it can transform its historical experience of resilience into a continuously evolving national framework for prevention, preparedness, and strategic foresight.

A state that waits for danger to materialize before demonstrating its ability to confront it may succeed in overcoming each individual challenge. A state that proactively strengthens the foundations of its resilience before danger arrives, however, stands a greater chance of safeguarding its future against tests that have yet to begin.

Issued by Jordanian Masarat for Development and Progress

November 8, 2026