Prepared by: Researcher Osama Al-Zaghloul

Introduction

Over the past years, Jihadist Salafist discourse has witnessed fundamental transformations associated with the social, political, and security changes experienced by the Arab region, along with the accompanying changes in the internal environment of these groups. After their traditional discourse had been based on transnational jihad, internationalism, and confronting the West, which they regarded as their primary enemy, some of these groups began undertaking revisions aimed at formulating a different discourse, rearranging the priorities of the current phase, responding to local and international realities, and overcoming the challenges that had limited the implementation of their vision and projects.

The phenomenon of Jihadist Salafism, as manifested in the Syrian experience, represents one of the most important contexts in which this transformation has occurred, particularly in the case of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was organizationally and ideologically affiliated with Al-Qaeda in its early stages before transitioning, through a series of political and organizational changes, into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and subsequently into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

These transformations were not limited to changes in name and organizational structure; rather, they were accompanied by a repositioning of discourse, identity, relationships, and perceptions of enemies, ultimately leading to the current pragmatic and national discourse, thereby departing from the group's historical jihadist and internationalist discourse.

These transformations raise a set of questions concerning their nature, motivations, and dimensions: Do they reflect a genuine transformation in the group's ideology and a shift from transnational jihad and internationalism toward local national groups? Is this a strategic transformation reflecting the extent of its responsiveness to the realities and requirements of the current phase, or is it merely a tactical move that does not express the substance of its ambitions and vision?

This paper seeks to analyze the transformation in jihadist Islamist discourse through the case of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, tracing the most prominent manifestations of this transformation and the factors that contributed to its occurrence, ultimately assessing its limits and future trajectories.

Research Problem

The research problem centers on understanding and explaining the nature of the transformation in the discourse of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Specifically, it seeks to determine whether this transformation represents a substantive intellectual and ideological shift or merely a political tactic adopted in response to the demands of the current phase, the specificities of the Syrian context, and the imperatives of exercising political authority.

Main Research Question

How has the Salafi-jihadist discourse of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham evolved, what factors have contributed to this transformation, and to what extent has it exerted an influence, and what are the limits of its effectiveness?

Sub-Questions

1. What were the defining characteristics of the jihadist discourse adopted by Jabhat al-Nusra during its formative phase?

2. What factors contributed to the reassessment and transformation of this discourse?

3. Why did the organization shift from a transnational, internationalist discourse to a locally oriented one?

4. To what extent has the transformation of its discourse been accompanied by substantive intellectual and ideological changes?

Section One: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The Concept of Salafi-Jihadism

Ahmed Sadat characterizes certain currents within Salafism and jihadism as follows: "Some Salafi movements [that] narrow and confine the call to monotheism (Tawhid) to forms of polytheism (Shirk) associated with amulets, love charms, and graves, while failing to address, either directly or indirectly, the polytheism associated with rulers, legislators, laws, and palaces. Indeed, some of these movements may align themselves with rulers and actively contribute to consolidating their authority".

He also refers to the propositions advanced by "some jihadist movements [that] confine their jihad to nationally defined frameworks and categorically and unequivocally reject extending their jihad beyond the borders of their homeland.[1]"

Marwan Shehadeh defines the Salafi-jihadist school of thought as follows: “It differs from other Salafi schools not in its theoretical religious principles, but rather in their practical application, particularly regarding the question of the legitimacy of ruling regimes, their relationships with colonial powers, and their foreign policies”[2].

The researcher operationally defines Salafi-jihadism as follows: “An Islamist fundamentalist movement that draws upon the same religious sources of authority as traditional Salafism but differs from it in their practical application and in the understanding and interpretation of religious texts. It incorporates opposition to and confrontation with existing political regimes into its ideological framework and regards armed struggle as a means of liberation from Western hegemony”.

Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra Front)

Researcher Abdul Rahman Al-Haj defines Jabhat al-Nusra as follows: “Jabhat al-Nusra represents the third generation of Al-Qaeda (global jihad), if we consider the Afghan Mujahideen as representing the first generation and the fighters in Iraq as representing the second generation. In the third generation, there is a clear inclination toward civilian engagement, accompanied by a shift in ideological convictions that has become increasingly prevalent among Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership. This shift is reflected in the tendency of its leaders (including Abu Muhammad al-Julani) to adopt a gradual, bottom-up approach, moving from grassroots activities to higher organizational levels and transitioning from civilian engagement to military action. As for Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership, its members are Syrians, predominantly originating from urban centers (some of whom demonstrate strong attachment to these centers), whereas its rank-and-file members are largely drawn from rural areas”[3].

The researcher also provides another definition, stating: “Jabhat al-Nusra is considered an extension of the Salafi-jihadist school of thought and, during its formative stage, an affiliated branch of Al-Qaeda. It engaged in jihadist activities in Syria and possessed independent internal organizational structures and institutions established by Abu Muhammad al-Julani (Ahmed al-Sharaa) during the outbreak of the Syrian revolution”.

Internationalist Discourse

Ioana E. Matesan, a political science researcher, defines global jihadism as follows: “Global jihadism refers to armed Islamist groups that have transnational goals, engage in transnational mobilization, and operate across multiple countries”[4].

The researcher defines internationalist discourse as follows: “Internationalist discourse is an ideologically grounded political discourse that transcends the boundaries of the modern nation-state in defining a group's identity, objectives, and scope of activity. This discourse views the Ummah (the Muslim community) as a single unified entity, thereby requiring the group to adopt a vision, objectives, and causes that extend beyond national borders”.

Local or Nation-State-Oriented Discourse

Nathan González Mendelejis defines local jihadist discourse as follows: “Local jihad is a pattern of jihadist activity whose primary operations and objectives are concentrated within a specific geographic theater, and its main goal is not to execute a global jihadist project or overthrow multiple regimes outside that theater”[5].

The researcher further provides an operational definition of local discourse as follows: “Local discourse refers to a form of discourse associated with armed activity conducted within clearly defined geographical boundaries. It seeks to transform an existing political or social order within a specific geographical territory, without aspiring or intending to engage in any activities or armed operations beyond the borders of the state”.

Section Two: The Historical Evolution of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) underwent several stages throughout its formation, organizational development, territorial consolidation, and eventual rise to power. The first stage began with the establishment of its principal predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, in 2011, at the outset of the Syrian revolution. This development represented an extension of the jihadist movement operating in Iraq, as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who had been a member of the Islamic State organization, moved from Iraq to Syria under the direction of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the organization's leader in Iraq at the time. Al-Julani subsequently began establishing Jabhat al-Nusra, drawing upon the ideological foundations of Salafi-jihadism, which advocated a transnational jihadist discourse.

Jabhat al-Nusra was organizationally affiliated with Al-Qaeda within a hierarchical structure. In 2013, the organization's affiliation with Al-Qaeda became publicly established when its leader announced allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the global Al-Qaeda organization. In 2016, Abu Muhammad al-Julani announced the severance of ties with any organization operating outside Syria, marking the beginning of a new phase characterized by a shift toward nationally confined jihadist activity. The group subsequently joined with other factions, leading to the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

The organization succeeded in establishing control over a geographical area in northern Syria and assumed responsibility for its administration during the subsequent period. It also engaged in armed confrontations with the Islamic State organization and the former Syrian regime. On December 8, 2024, approximately twelve years after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham succeeded in taking control of Damascus and subsequently assumed a central role in governing the Syrian state under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who had led both Jabhat al-Nusra and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and became Syria's transitional president.

These developments indicate that the former Jabhat al-Nusra, which later evolved into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, passed through successive stages of organizational transformation. Initially, it maintained links with the Islamic State organization. However, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi attempted to incorporate the group into the organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al-Julani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, categorically rejected the proposed merger and instead declared direct allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Subsequently, in 2016, the organization severed its transnational organizational affiliations and changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In 2017, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham was established, marking another phase in its organizational evolution that ultimately culminated in its accession to power.

These successive stages suggest that the organization gradually adapted to the requirements and circumstances of each phase while progressively reducing its external organizational affiliations, eventually achieving independence in its organizational structure and institutions. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of many human organizations, which, as social entities, seek to adapt to the necessities of changing circumstances and rearrange their priorities in accordance with their immediate interests.

Section Three: Factors Contributing to the Shift from Transnational to Localized Discourse

The Syrian context possesses distinctive characteristics, and the nature of its jihadist movements differs in terms of the social environment that supports them and the ideological orientations of those exercising leadership and control. Accordingly, this section examines the social and political factors that contributed to the transformation of jihadist discourse from a transnational orientation toward localization.

First: The Syrian Social Environment and the Emergence of Salafi-Jihadism

The Syrian environment and the emergence of the Salafi-jihadist movement within it must be understood in light of the secularization of society under Ba'ath Party rule, which generated tensions prior to the outbreak of the Syrian uprising. An additional dimension relates to the country's religious, sectarian, and doctrinal diversity, particularly the prevalence of Sunni Islam among the Syrian population, with many adhering to the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence, Ash'ari theological doctrine, and traditional Sufi religious practices.

Within this context, Salafi-jihadism can be interpreted as a radical social reaction to the practices of the Syrian regime, particularly its repression of religious manifestations and movements perceived as opposing its authority. This was especially evident in the historical confrontations between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama and Aleppo. The emergence of jihadist movements following the September 11, 2001 attacks also contributed to the broader ideological environment. Furthermore, many supporters of the Syrian revolution were associated with mosque communities, while a growing phenomenon of youth rebellion against the regime became increasingly visible.

As jihadist factions began to emerge and receive support from actors ideologically aligned with Salafism, the Salafi-jihadist movement gained prominence. This occurred against the backdrop of demonstrations spreading across almost the entire Syrian territory. The regime responded to protesters with severe repression, unprecedented violence, overwhelming military force, and bombardments targeting unarmed civilians. Its extensive use of destructive barrel bombs became a defining feature of the conflict. These practices contributed to pushing segments of Syrian society toward increasingly radical responses to the actions of the regime and its supporters.

Subsequently, Syrian fighters became more receptive to Salafi-jihadist figures and symbols, while dozens of foreign fighters arrived from Jordan and Gulf countries to participate in the armed struggle against the regime. Syria, historically referred to as Bilad al-Sham, was perceived by certain extremist circles and ideologically motivated young people as the location of an anticipated religious confrontation. Many of these individuals rapidly became involved in the Syrian conflict, viewing the emerging alternatives and revolutionary slogans as a potential means of escaping poverty, unemployment, and lack of educational opportunities. These developments coincided with the Syrian population's aspirations for freedom within the broader political atmosphere of the Arab Spring.

At the same time, the Syrian regime sought to discredit protesters by portraying them as takfiris and religious extremists through its media and propaganda apparatus. This portrayal contributed to an increasingly polarized environment and reinforced the tendency among some opponents of the regime to identify with or defend the groups subjected to such accusations.

Moreover, traditional Sufi religious currents generally refrained from adopting a decisive position in support of the revolution, with the exception of certain prominent religious figures, such as Sheikh Osama al-Rifai and a number of associated scholars. Conversely, other Sufi figures and institutions maintained close relations with the regime and contributed to promoting its narratives during the revolutionary period.

Second: Political Factors Contributing to the Rise of Salafi-Jihadism

Political factors also played a significant role in the rise of the Salafi-jihadist movement in Syria. Among these were the financial and political support networks and advocacy campaigns led by religious scholars from Gulf countries during the early stages of the Syrian revolution. Several Gulf states also expressed support for the demands of the Syrian population and sought to persuade Bashar al-Assad to relinquish power.

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime intensified its political, media, and security discourse by invoking its historical domestic confrontation with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood is generally characterized as a reform-oriented Islamist movement whose ideological literature emphasizes political participation and gradual reform, although certain episodes in its history involved recourse to violence and armed confrontation.

Furthermore, the rise of armed organizations during the Arab Spring in several countries experiencing popular uprisings indirectly influenced developments in Syria. The declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State organization and the subsequent military campaigns against it, alongside Al-Qaeda's activities in various geographical locations, contributed to shaping the wider regional jihadist environment.

Even Hizb ut-Tahrir, which differs ideologically and organizationally from Salafi-jihadist movements and is generally characterized as a radical Islamist political party, experienced renewed activity during the Arab Spring period. This reflected the broader resurgence and diversification of Islamist political and ideological movements amid the regional transformations of that period.

The Shift from Transnationalism to Localization of Discourse

The setbacks experienced during the Arab Spring, coupled with the inability of Islamist movements that came to power to develop effective solutions, contributed to a reassessment of the internationalist discourse that had prevailed during that period. Salafi-jihadism and its affiliated groups had traditionally embraced the principles of a shared destiny, transnational jihad, internationalist discourse, and the centrality of the Muslim Ummah. However, their failure to achieve their intended objectives prompted a reconsideration of these ideological and organizational orientations.

Consequently, these movements undertook internal reassessments aimed at identifying shortcomings in their practices and exploring possible approaches to achieving their objectives. As their leadership became increasingly convinced that the prevailing circumstances were incompatible with a transnational approach, they gradually shifted toward the localization of jihadist activity, the development of an independent political project and program, and organizational separation from transnational jihadist structures. While the Palestinian cause remained a shared concern, it was no longer positioned among their immediate strategic priorities.

The localization of discourse also created opportunities for neighboring states to engage with these movements on the basis of their newly articulated political orientations, thereby reducing the apprehension that had prevailed during the period of internationalist discourse. This transformation was accompanied by the adoption of a political project aimed at changing the existing regime, establishing a new Syria, and transforming the country's deteriorating economic conditions into a state of prosperity and improved living standards.

Accordingly, the traditional ideological discourse was increasingly replaced by a more pragmatic approach that distanced itself from the movements' historical ideological literature. This shift was further reflected in statements by prominent figures and leaders emphasizing their lack of affiliation with any transnational political or ideological project and their commitment to refraining from interference in the affairs of other groups or states within the region.

Within this context, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham's discourse evolved from its earlier association with the Islamic State organization and the broader ideological foundations of Al-Qaeda, including the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, which emphasized transnational jihadist objectives, toward a nationally oriented political discourse characterized by pragmatism. This emerging discourse represented a departure from the traditional ideological and organizational trajectories historically associated with such jihadist groups, movements, and organizations.

The transformation of this discourse constitutes one of the most significant developments in the history of Salafi-jihadism. Through its revised political discourse, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham was able to gain a degree of acceptance within the international order and create opportunities for diplomatic and political engagement that had previously appeared almost unattainable.

From this perspective, the transformations experienced by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham can be understood as adaptive developments shaped by the requirements of the prevailing political circumstances and the priorities arising from them. Ultimately, these changes reflect the organization's transition from an ideological movement to a state-building project and the exercise of political authority.

Section Four: To What Extent Has Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Ideology Been Influenced?

The accession of any political or ideological group to power, and its assumption of responsibility for governing and administering a state, represents a historic achievement for that group. Such a development inevitably influences its vision, ideological orientation, and capacity for adaptation, survival, continuity, and long-term sustainability. Accordingly, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s rise to power can be regarded as a significant achievement within the broader trajectory of Salafi-jihadism and as an experience that provides an opportunity to examine the capacity of a Salafi-jihadist movement to engage in governance and political administration.

The evolution of ideology and the transformation of Salafi-jihadist discourse may be considered necessary responses to changing political circumstances, requiring a balance between ideological consistency and the flexibility needed to address prevailing realities. However, the extent of the transformation experienced by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham was largely unexpected. The organization has demonstrated an almost complete departure from its former transnational orientation, focusing instead on Syria's domestic affairs as its overriding objective. While such a shift is not necessarily a shortcoming, it nevertheless raises fundamental questions: Has Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham permanently abandoned its transnational ambitions and its earlier discourse centered on the establishment of a caliphate? Or does this transformation merely represent a political tactic that does not reflect the organization's underlying ideological identity?

In this context, consideration must also be given to the evident political rapprochement between the current Syrian government and Turkey, despite the differences in their respective historical and ideological backgrounds. Although both political experiences have roots in Islamic political traditions, they have followed distinct ideological trajectories. The perceived success of Turkey's relatively moderate political experience has created an opportunity to examine the evolution of a movement historically associated with radical Salafi-jihadism, particularly in light of its apparent willingness to move away from its ideological legacy and reconsider the principles that previously shaped its political and organizational identity.

Analysis

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has undergone transformations at multiple levels and across various domains. However, the transformation of its discourse represents the most significant of these developments, as discourse reflects the organization’s identity, ideological orientations, and political ambitions. At the same time, it constitutes a fundamental factor in shaping its political relationships at both the domestic and international levels.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has reached a certain degree of political maturity within the evolutionary trajectory of movements and organizations. It has progressively developed its ideological content, operational approaches, strategic orientations, and overall vision, thereby enabling its eventual accession to power. Through the internal reassessments and revisions it has undertaken, the organization has come to recognize the importance of political discourse and its influence on its future political trajectory.

Within the broader experience of jihadist movements, this transformation constitutes a significant case that warrants systematic academic examination and detailed analysis. This is particularly noteworthy given that numerous other movements, despite having longer organizational histories, have failed to adapt to their changing political and social environments and have consequently been unable to achieve either their national or transnational objectives.

Regarding Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s internationalist orientation, regardless of the extent to which the organization seeks to distance itself from transnational ideological discourse, it may ultimately find itself compelled to articulate its underlying ideological identity and respond to emerging challenges. In this regard, it is essential to distinguish between the discourse associated with the exercise of state authority and governance and that traditionally employed by ideological movements. While many movements have struggled to differentiate between these two forms of discourse, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has demonstrated an ability to establish such a distinction.

Conclusion

Political priorities invariably require a clear understanding of prevailing realities, responsiveness to their demands, and the capacity to adapt and transform in accordance with political interests. In this regard, the ability to develop and articulate an appropriate discourse that takes these considerations into account is of paramount importance. However, movements whose institutions fail to sustain intellectual and organizational development, and which do not provide opportunities for critical thinking and internal reassessment, will ultimately encounter obstacles that may undermine their ability to continue pursuing their objectives.

The objective is not necessarily to reproduce a discourse identical to that adopted by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, but rather to formulate a discourse appropriate to the requirements of the prevailing political circumstances. This entails prioritizing a nationally and locally oriented discourse, which constitutes a central factor in the success of any Islamist experience, whether jihadist or reformist in nature.

At the same time, this does not necessarily require abandoning internationalist discourse altogether. Rather, such discourse may be employed during periods when circumstances necessitate its use, with a view to advancing both direct and indirect interests. It is equally important to carefully examine the messages conveyed through the use of internationalist discourse in various forms of political behavior, recognizing that these messages may carry precise and significant political implications.

Arabic Sources and References

1. Al-Sayyid Ahmed Sadat, “The Intellectual Principles of Salafi-Jihadism,” Contemporary Texts (Nosos), August 18, 2017. Section Two discusses “Types of Jihad in Salafi-Jihadist Thought.”

Full Text – Contemporary Texts

2. Marwan Shehadeh, “The Transformations Brought About by Al-Qaeda in Salafi Discourse,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, September 19, 2010.

Full Text – Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

3. Abdul Rahman Al-Haj, “Salafism and Salafis in Syria: From Reform to Jihad,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, May 20, 2013.

Full Text – Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

4. Ahmed Abazeid, “Islamist Movements in Syria: Dynamics of Fragmentation and Prospects for Rapprochement,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, September 5, 2016.

Full Text – Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

5. Ayman Al-Dessouki, “The Local Governance of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Its Perspective on Local Councils,” Omran Center for Strategic Studies, June 23, 2017.

Full Text – Omran Center for Strategic Studies

English References

7. Matesan, Ioana E. “Typological Varieties of Transnational Jihadism and Implications for Conflict Resolution.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 16, no. 1 (2022), pp. 12–22.

Full Article – JSTOR

Full Issue – PDF, Perspectives on Terrorism

8. González Mendelejis, Nathan. “Toward a New Typology of Sunni Jihad.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 43, no. 12 (2020), pp. 1064–1085.

Full Article – Taylor & Francis

https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1520797
 

[1] Al-Sayyid Ahmed Sadat, “The Intellectual Principles of Salafi-Jihadism,” Contemporary Texts, Research and Studies Section, August 18, 2017, Section Two: “Types of Jihad in Salafi-Jihadist Thought.”

[2] Marwan Shehadeh, “The Transformations Brought About by Al-Qaeda in Salafi Discourse,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Research Papers, September 19, 2010.

[3] Abdul Rahman Al-Haj, “Salafism and Salafis in Syria: From Reform to Jihad,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, May 20, 2013, Section: “Al-Nusra: The Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadism.”

[4] Ioana E. Matesan, “Typological Varieties of Transnational Jihadism and Implications for Conflict Resolution,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 16, no. 1 (2022): 12–22.

[5] Nathan González Mendelejis, “Toward a New Typology of Sunni Jihad,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 43, No. 12 (2020), pp. 1064–1085. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1520797