Researcher: Osama Al-Zaghloul

 

Introduction:

This paper examines the political behavior of Hamas following October 7, focusing on the shifts in its political practices and discourse, its approach to key issues, and the reordering of its priorities for the coming period.

October 7 represents a major turning point in the trajectory of Hamas, as the developments that followed brought about significant changes in the political and security environment in which the movement operates. These transformations make it particularly important to examine the changes in its political behavior and their implications for the Palestinian cause.

The significance of this issue stems from its impact on the trajectory of the Palestinian cause and the dynamics among Palestinian factions, particularly in light of the developments and changes that have contributed to shifts in the movement's behavior. These shifts encompass its engagement with regional and international actors, the governance of the Gaza Strip, its position on the question of weapons, and the associated reordering of political priorities.

This paper seeks to analyze the political behavior of Hamas following October 7, identify the causes and circumstances that have shaped this behavior, and examine the role the movement seeks to play in the coming period, drawing on its official positions, public statements, and political discourse.

The paper is developed in light of recent developments and an interview conducted with the recently elected Head of Hamas's Political Bureau, Dr. Khalil al-Hayya, which addressed the movement's orientations and aspirations for the coming period[1]. It also considers the meetings held with the American side and the understandings reached between the movement and mediators. Furthermore, the paper seeks to assess the extent to which these developments have influenced the movement's political behavior and whether they reflect an adaptation to the new realities or a degree of flexibility in addressing issues that were previously regarded as fundamental principles of its political approach.

Historical Context:

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was established in 1987, coinciding with the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada[2]. From its inception, the movement identified itself as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine[3], drawing on an Islamic ideological framework that shaped its political and organizational vision.

In its Charter, Hamas affirmed that Islam constitutes its guiding framework, from which it derives its ideas, concepts, and perspectives, and to which it refers for guidance in its practices. This ideological foundation has influenced the nature of the movement's behavior, as Hamas has combined resistance activities with social, organizational, and political engagement since its establishment.

At the domestic level, Hamas sought to build a broad social and political base through its activities within student organizations, trade unions, and social institutions, enabling it to consolidate its presence within Palestinian society.

This presence gradually evolved into direct participation in the political sphere, culminating in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, in which the movement secured 74 out of 132 seats[4].

This electoral victory marked a significant turning point in the movement's trajectory, as it transitioned from a resistance-oriented and social actor into a major political force within the Palestinian political system. This shift required Hamas to address issues of governance and domestic and foreign relations alongside its resistance activities.

In terms of external relations, Hamas's political behavior prior to October 7 was characterized by caution in its direct engagement with Israel and the United States, as the movement generally preferred to rely on intermediaries for communications concerning political and security matters.

Conversely, the Arab and regional dimensions occupied a prominent position in its foreign policy, as Hamas sought to establish a network of relations with several states and regional actors.

In this context, Jordan hosted the movement's Political Bureau until 1999, before it relocated to Syria. Subsequently, Hamas expanded its external presence to include Qatar, alongside maintaining relations and communications with several states and actors within and beyond the region.

The movement's regional relations underwent changes influenced by political transformations across the region. The rise of Islamist forces and movements to power in several Arab countries during the Arab Spring contributed to closer relations with certain Arab actors. However, subsequent developments prompted a restructuring of its regional network of relations. The movement's departure from Syria represented one of the most significant transformations in this context, accompanied by a period of tension in its relations with Iran, before relations between the two sides returned to a more stable course[5].

At the same time, Hamas maintained relations with several forces affiliated with what is commonly known as the “Axis of Resistance,” including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Islamic resistance factions in Iraq.

Within the Palestinian political arena, the movement's behavior was characterized by both competition and negotiation with Palestinian political forces, particularly Fatah. Despite deep political and organizational disagreements, channels of communication and dialogue between the two movements continued to operate to varying degrees, especially on issues related to the governance of the Gaza Strip, Palestinian reconciliation, and the future of the Palestinian political system.

The movement's position within the Palestinian political arena became one of the key determinants of its political behavior, particularly following its takeover of the Gaza Strip and its emergence as a major actor in shaping Palestinian political directions.

Repeated military confrontations with Israel also constituted an influential factor in the movement's political behavior, as military confrontation remained closely intertwined with political calculations and regional relations. This was particularly evident during the 2021 “Sword of Jerusalem” confrontation, during which Hamas sought to take the initiative in shaping the course of the confrontation and linking it to Jerusalem and the broader Palestinian cause. This intersection between political and military instruments continued until October 7, 2023, which marked a major turning point in the movement's trajectory and in the surrounding political and regional environment.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood,” which brought about a profound shift in the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and was followed by a large-scale Israeli military response in the Gaza Strip. The repercussions of the war were not confined to the Palestinian arena but extended to the regional environment, with various actors and factions associated with the Axis of Resistance becoming involved to differing degrees, alongside an expansion of political mobilization and public demonstrations at the Arab and international levels.

Consequently, Hamas found itself operating within a political environment significantly different from the one that had existed before October 7, which influenced the nature of its political behavior and channels of communication.

As the war continued and its political and humanitarian costs escalated, the movement moved toward expanding its political contacts and relying more extensively on regional and international mediation channels.

In this context, Qatar and Egypt, and subsequently Türkiye, played prominent roles in facilitating communications and mediation efforts related to ceasefire arrangements and the exchange of prisoners and detainees. This period also witnessed the establishment of indirect channels of communication with the United States[6], representing a shift in the movement's approach to managing relations with international powers compared with its previous position, which had been characterized by greater reluctance to engage directly with them.

At the same time, the movement's approach to the internal Palestinian political arena demonstrated a degree of renewed political openness through the resumption or expansion of contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Fatah leaders, and various Palestinian political factions and currents[7].

This reflects the movement's recognition of the importance of Palestinian consensus in determining the future of the Gaza Strip and shaping post-war arrangements, as well as its efforts to preserve its position within the Palestinian political system and avoid exclusion from political arrangements concerning the future of the Palestinian cause.

Accordingly, it can be argued that Hamas's political behavior following October 7 has undergone a transformation in the instruments used to manage political relations and channels of communication, rather than an explicitly declared shift in its ideological foundations. The movement has adopted a more flexible approach to engaging with mediators and regional and international actors, expanding its contacts to include parties with whom relations had previously been limited or indirect, while simultaneously revitalizing dialogue with domestic Palestinian political forces.

Therefore, the most significant transformation in the movement's political behavior lies in its transition from a political approach that relied more heavily on specific networks of regional relations toward a more diversified approach involving multiple channels, mediators, and actors. This transformation can be understood in light of the political and strategic environment created by the war following October 7 and the resulting changes in the movement's position within the Palestinian political system, its regional and international relations, and the nature of the arrangements concerning the future of the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian cause. Consequently, this shift raises an important analytical question as to whether it represents a pragmatic adaptation to the new political environment or a broader repositioning of the movement's political behavior.

First: Relations with the American Side

The meeting between Hamas's negotiating delegation, headed by Dr. Khalil al-Hayya, and U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner represented one of the most significant developments in the movement's political behavior toward the United States. This is particularly noteworthy given that, throughout the war, Hamas had adopted a highly critical stance toward Washington, holding it partly responsible for the course of the war and directing explicit political accusations against it.

The movement's decision to engage in negotiations with American representatives cannot be viewed merely as an isolated instance of communication. Rather, it can be interpreted as a shift in its political approach toward one of the most influential actors in shaping the course and outcomes of the war. This shift reflects a degree of political flexibility and pragmatism in managing international relations, as considerations of political interests and the potential to influence developments appear to have taken precedence over the ideological considerations that had previously shaped its discourse toward the United States during earlier stages of the conflict.

This becomes even more evident in the movement's response to the proposal put forward by U.S. President Donald Trump regarding Gaza, suggesting its willingness to engage with American initiatives as negotiable political instruments rather than rejecting them outright on the basis of its ideological and political differences with Washington.

From this perspective, this shift may create opportunities for establishing more direct channels of communication between Hamas and the United States in the future. It also reflects a growing recognition of the importance of engaging with the principal centers of influence in decision-making processes concerning the Palestinian cause.

In this context, communication with Washington can be understood as a partial departure from the pattern of indirect relations in which Hamas had relied more heavily on its regional allies, particularly Iran, while the United States had relied on Israel as a central actor in managing the issue.

Accordingly, the movement's relationship with the United States does not appear to be static or governed by immutable ideological determinants. Instead, it seems to be evolving toward a more flexible and interactive approach shaped by developments in the political environment, calculations of political interests, and opportunities to exert influence.

This transformation can therefore be regarded as an indication of the movement's efforts to enhance its international political engagement and expand its diplomatic room for maneuver in a manner consistent with its changing position within Palestinian and regional decision-making structures.

Second: Relations with Palestinian Political Forces

Hamas welcomed the Palestinian Authority's announcement regarding the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, expressing its readiness to participate through various options, foremost among them the formation of a joint national electoral list.

Hossam Badran, Head of Hamas's National Relations Office, announced the movement's willingness to participate in the elections as part of the broadest possible national coalition. He indicated that Hamas had been engaging in consultations with various Palestinian political forces, factions, and prominent figures to establish a broad electoral bloc based on a mutually agreed political program. According to Badran, this approach aims to broaden national representation, strengthen partnership in political decision-making, end the concentration of decision-making authority, and reorganize the Palestinian political system through legislative elections and elections to the Palestinian National Council[8].

Hamas demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in its engagement with Palestinian political forces by opening channels of communication with a broad spectrum of Palestinian actors, particularly the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian factions. The movement held meetings with representatives of Islamic Jihad, the Democratic Reform Current within Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian Ahrar Movement, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), the Popular Resistance Committees in Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). During these meetings, the participating factions discussed ways to strengthen Palestinian national unity[9].

The Palestinian political forces affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to elect their representatives freely, fairly, and transparently to both the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian National Council, while rejecting appointment, exclusion, and the monopolization of political decision-making. The parties also announced their agreement to continue consultations among political forces, factions, and national figures, work toward ending the internal Palestinian division, rebuild and reactivate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on democratic and participatory foundations, and formulate a unified national strategy.

Furthermore, Hossam Badran, Head of Hamas's National Relations Office, emphasized that the movement would continue to demonstrate a high degree of flexibility in its political engagement, guided by considerations of the national interest. He also stressed the importance of strengthening relations with Palestinian political forces, bridging existing divisions, and maintaining the movement's political rights, particularly its right to participate in and remain part of the Palestinian political landscape.

These developments suggest that Hamas is moving toward establishing common frameworks for political cooperation in the coming period, aimed at achieving national consensus and minimizing internal political disputes to the greatest extent possible. They also indicate the movement's willingness to engage in dialogue with the Palestinian President and Fatah in pursuit of a shared political vision.

Third: Relinquishing the Administration of the Gaza Strip

Hamas's decision to relinquish the administration of the Gaza Strip through its government[10] represents a significant transformation in the nature of its political role within the territory. It marks the beginning of a new phase following approximately 18 years of managing government institutions and exercising executive authority. This development cannot be regarded as a temporary measure, given its potential implications for redefining the movement's role and position in decision-making processes within the Gaza Strip.

Hamas established full security and administrative control over the Gaza Strip in 2007, in what was then referred to as the “military takeover” (Al-Hasm), amid its political and security conflict with Fatah. At the time, the movement maintained that its actions were based on the political legitimacy of the elected government headed by Ismail Haniyeh[11], a development that further deepened the Palestinian political division.

In the post-October 7 context, relinquishing governmental administration reflects a change in the movement's political behavior, characterized by a transition from the formal and direct exercise of authority toward maintaining its political and organizational role outside government institutions.

This transformation can be understood in light of the changes brought about by the war, particularly the need to create conditions conducive to ending the conflict and facilitating reconstruction, while preventing the movement's direct control over the Gaza Strip's institutions from becoming an obstacle to new political and administrative arrangements.

Accordingly, relinquishing governmental administration does not necessarily imply that Hamas will lose its influence within the Gaza Strip. Rather, it represents a political and organizational repositioning in response to the requirements of the new phase. The movement's continued popular and organizational presence, alongside its operational capabilities on the ground, provides it with instruments of influence beyond the framework of formal authority. From this perspective, this transformation can be understood as a transition from exercising governmental authority to managing political influence, allowing Hamas to maintain its political presence and role in shaping the future of the Gaza Strip without bearing the direct responsibilities associated with governing its institutions.

Finally: Hamas's Political Behavior and Its Implications After October 7

An analysis of Hamas's political behavior following October 7 reveals significant transformations in the way the movement engages with its surrounding political environment, both internationally and within the Palestinian political arena. Regarding its relationship with the United States, the establishment of direct channels of communication represents a shift in the movement's political behavior and reflects an acknowledgment of the United States' political influence on the Palestinian cause. At the same time, it highlights the significance of the American role and its capacity to influence Israeli decision-making. The movement has also demonstrated a greater ability to distinguish between ideological considerations and political interests, which may be interpreted as an evolution in its understanding of international interactions and the factors shaping political action.

Within the Palestinian political arena, the movement's efforts to establish new channels of communication with various political forces and factions, and to develop understandings and partnerships based on shared interests, reflect an orientation toward strengthening consensus-based political engagement and broadening political participation. This suggests a relative transition from a pattern of direct political competition toward efforts to establish more participatory arrangements, thereby enhancing the movement's ability to maintain its presence within the Palestinian political system.

As for Hamas's decision to relinquish the administration of the Gaza Strip, this can be understood as an adaptation to the requirements of the new political, regional, and international environment, rather than necessarily representing an abandonment of its political legacy or influence within the territory. The movement's transition from directly managing government institutions to exercising a political and organizational role outside them constitutes a repositioning of the instruments through which it exerts influence, particularly given its continued possession of political, organizational, and operational capabilities. Accordingly, relinquishing governmental administration does not necessarily entail a loss of influence over the future of the Gaza Strip. Instead, it may represent an attempt to avoid the political and administrative burdens imposed by the post-October 7 period.

October 7 brought about a transformation in the movement's political behavior commensurate with the magnitude of the event and its implications for the Palestinian cause. The developments that followed the outbreak of the war prompted Hamas to reconsider certain political instruments, expand its network of relations and communications, and reorder its priorities in response to the new political environment.

Furthermore, the repercussions of the war contributed to placing the Palestinian cause back at the forefront of regional and international agendas, while introducing new variables into the calculations of the various actors involved. Consequently, Hamas's political behavior following October 7 can be understood primarily as a process of political adaptation to a changing regional and international environment, rather than a fundamental transformation of its political identity or core objectives.

References

1. Abu Eid, A., et al. (1997). A study of the political thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): 1987–1996 (J. Al-Hamad & I. Al-Barghouti, Eds.). Middle East Studies Center.

2. Saleh, M. (2012). The Palestinian issue: Historical background and contemporary developments (Expanded and revised ed.). Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations.

3. Al-Samadi, F. (2015, September 7). Hamas and Islamic Jihad redefine their relationship with Iran: An analytical perspective. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2015/09/20159785611917564.html

4. Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). (1988, August 18). The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Full text of the Charter. Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question. https://www.palquest.org/ar/historictext/9672/

5. Palestinian Central Elections Commission. (2006). The second Palestinian legislative elections: Final results. Palestinian Central Elections Commission. https://www.elections.ps/tabid/639/language/ar-PS/Default.aspx

6. Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). (2026). Official statement issued by Hamas. Official Hamas Website.

7. Al-Hayya, K. (2026, September 26). Exclusive interview with Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khalil al-Hayya [Interview]. Al Araby TV.

8. Badran, H. (2026, August 12). Interview with the Head of Hamas's National Relations Office on Palestinian elections [Interview]. Al-Aqsa TV.

9. Al-Thawabta, I. (2026, July 6). Press conference by the Head of the Government Media Office in the Gaza Strip [Press conference]. Government Media Office. https://t.me/mediagovps

10. Bahbah, B. Interview on Mazeej Podcast [Podcast episode]. Al Arabiya. https://www.alarabiya.net/podcast/ma-baad-al-sabea

 

 

[1] Khalil al-Hayya, “Exclusive Interview with the Head of Hamas’s Political Bureau,” Al Araby TV, September 26, 2026.

[2] Abdullah Abu Eid et al., A Study of the Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): 1987–1996, edited by Jawad Al-Hamad and Iyad Al-Barghouti (Amman: Middle East Studies Center, 1997)

[3] slamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), August 18, 1988, Articles 1 and 2.

[4] Palestinian Central Elections Commission, The Second Palestinian Legislative Elections: Final Results (Ramallah: Palestinian Central Elections Commission, 2006).

[5] Fatima Al-Samadi, “Hamas and Islamic Jihad Redefine Their Relationship with Iran: An Analytical Perspective,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, September 7, 2015, p. 13.

[6] Bishara Bahbah, “Interview on Mazeej Podcast,” Mazeej Podcast, July 12, 2026.

[7] Hossam Badran, “Interview with the Head of Hamas's National Relations Office,” Al-Aqsa TV, August 12, 2026.

[8] Hossam Badran, “Interview with the Head of Hamas's National Relations Office,” Al-Aqsa TV, August 12, 2026.

[9] Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Official Website of Hamas, September 2, 2026.

[10] Ismail Al-Thawabta, “Press Conference by the Head of the Government Media Office in the Gaza Strip,” July 6, 2026.

[11] Mohsen Mohammad Saleh, The Palestinian Issue: Historical Background and Contemporary Developments, expanded and revised edition (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2022), p. 222.