Executive Summary

While international recognition of the Palestinian state has expanded and legal frameworks rejecting settlement activity, annexation, and displacement have become increasingly evident, realities on the ground are moving in the opposite direction, undermining the material conditions necessary for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Between growing international legitimacy and limited enforcement capacity, the contours of the current phase are taking shape, and the questions addressed in this paper are emerging in a balanced, declarative manner.

Key Conclusions:

- A change of government in Israel does not automatically mean a change in policies; there is a fundamental difference between a change in the political leadership and a change in the underlying project governing it.

- October 7 re-established security as a governing criterion of Israeli political consciousness, narrowing the space for a political settlement and increasing the cost of moderate discourse.

- The American role is an influential factor but is not decisive in itself, as it is governed by domestic considerations and strategic interests that limit the extent of pressure.

- International recognitions do not translate into tangible impact unless they are linked to specific objectives, a clear legal basis, and coordination among states capable of implementation.

- Displacement, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian state constitute an interconnected system that directly affects Jordanian national security, making the cost of waiting a cumulative one.

- Strategic realism requires distinguishing between facts and assessments, and between rhetoric and decision-making, while developing situation assessments based on multiple scenarios and monitoring indicators.

 

 

First: Introduction — A Phase That Goes Beyond the Boundaries of Confrontation

The Palestinian cause stands at a turning point whose repercussions extend beyond the boundaries of direct confrontation, affecting the future of the Palestinian state, the nature of regional balances, and the extent of the international system’s ability to protect law and rights, in addition to its direct implications for Jordanian national security. With the continuation of the war and its repercussions, the escalation of Israeli policies related to settlement expansion, annexation, and displacement, and the diminishing practical prospects for a settlement, the question is no longer confined to how to contain the conflict or limit its spillover effects. Rather, it has become connected to the extent of the ability to change the course that perpetuates it and prevent the realities imposed on the ground from turning into political and geographical equations that are difficult to reverse.

The central problem lies in the widening gap between the legal and political frameworks that affirm Palestinian rights and the realities on the ground that undermine the possibility of translating them into a viable settlement. Despite the recognition of Palestine by more than 140 countries and the growing number of positions rejecting settlement activity, annexation, and displacement, the ability to transform these positions into effective pressure remains questionable. Here, the challenge shifts from mobilizing international support to identifying the tools that can make such support an effective factor in changing political behavior, rather than allowing it to remain limited to statements and diplomatic positions.

This paper approaches the issues under consideration as an interconnected system rather than separate matters, in which the calculations of major powers intersect with transformations within Israel, Arab divisions, and attempts to reshape the political geography of the Palestinian territories and their surroundings. In doing so, it adopts a threefold methodological distinction between established facts, analytical assessments, and potential scenarios. It does not seek to predict the outcomes of the conflict with certainty, but rather aims to develop an analysis that accommodates multiple possibilities.

The narrative structure of the paper follows a gradual progression: it begins with the Israeli domestic arena and its political and constitutional rules, then extends to the American factor and the regional track, followed by the situation on the ground and the transformations taking place there, the international legal framework, and the Arab and Palestinian environment, leading to the implications of the Royal Address before the United Nations General Assembly, and then the repercussions of all these developments for Jordan. It concludes with scenarios, monitoring indicators, and strategic conclusions.

The Guiding Question: What transforms international legitimacy from an existing political asset into a force capable of changing realities on the ground?

Second: The Israeli Domestic Arena — Changing Faces and an Unchanged Course

Do the ballot boxes change the course of the state, or reproduce the same approach under a different facade?

The Upcoming Elections: A Referendum on Standards, Not Individuals

The significance of the upcoming Israeli elections is not limited to competition between political parties or the possibility of new leadership rising while others decline. Rather, these elections touch upon the nature of the Israeli political project, how society views security and stability, the limits of the use of force, and the future of relations with the Palestinians and Israel’s regional surroundings. Accordingly, the more pressing question centers on whether voters will reconsider the approach pursued by their governments or grant it a renewed mandate to continue the same policies, even if the faces, slogans, and alliances change.

An accurate reading of the political landscape cannot be achieved by reducing it to the personality of the prime minister or the nature of the governing coalition. Institutions, political parties, and parliamentary blocs are important elements, but they alone do not explain the deeper transformations within society. A more precise understanding requires examining the outcomes of the policies pursued, how they are presented to the public as national achievements or security guarantees, and their impact on voters’ perceptions of the future of the state and its position in the region. Within this framework fall what the Israeli right considers strategic achievements, including the fragmentation or weakening of certain Arab centers of power and changes in the balance of power surrounding Israel. This raises a question about how voters will assess these outcomes.

Therefore, the central issue is not whether Israeli society will punish a particular government for its failures or grant it another opportunity, but rather whether the criteria for evaluating political performance have fundamentally changed. If security remains the most influential criterion shaping voters’ choices, criticism directed at the government may not lead to a shift in the strategic approach. However, if the cost of existing policies, along with the instability and prolonged risks they generate, becomes a decisive factor in the evaluation, a different space for political debate may emerge. In both cases, any conclusion regarding societal trends remains dependent on electoral realities and the positions of political forces. It cannot be assumed that a change of government will automatically lead to a change in the vision toward the Palestinians or to the restoration of prospects for a political settlement.

Post-October 7: Security as a Reference Point for Political Consciousness

October 7 constituted a pivotal point in reshaping political discourse within Israel. Society has become increasingly influenced by notions of fear, threat, and revenge, and this environment has imposed constraints on the ability of political currents, including those that disagree with the ruling right wing, to adopt a discourse that does not align with the prevailing public mood that emerged in the aftermath of the events. According to this interpretation, competition between the right and the left, or among rival political parties, does not necessarily reflect a fundamental difference in approaches to security issues, as long as these issues remain governed by a hardline political and social framework.

Here, the importance of distinguishing between security as a legitimate need for any society and security as an open-ended justification for expanding military operations, obstructing political settlements, or treating Palestinian rights as a permanent source of threat becomes evident. Israeli discourse after October 7 has been based on the notion of "security necessity," meaning the portrayal of military actions and regional escalation as options dictated by necessity, leaving little room for objection or negotiation. This discourse is not primarily directed at the international community; rather, it is used to address the Israeli domestic audience and reinforce a narrative that the state faces continuous threats and that expanding the use of force is an indispensable response to ensuring its security.

The danger of this logic lies in its potential to transform the "security exception" into a permanent rule and make the continuation of the conflict part of the very definition of security, rather than making security an entry point toward ending the conflict and addressing its root causes. When every political settlement is presented as a risk, every political concession as a threat, and every demand for rights as a security challenge, the space available for political solutions diminishes, and the continuation of confrontation increasingly becomes a policy in its own right.

The Rightward Shift and the Crisis of Representation

The consolidation of the right wing in Israel cannot be explained solely by election results, nor by the personality of the prime minister and the coalitions formed around him. The issue goes deeper than the transfer of power between political parties and is linked to social and political transformations that have accumulated over decades, reshaping voters’ priorities and perceptions of security, peace, and relations with the Palestinians. Waves of immigration from the former Soviet Union since the 1990s, alongside other political and electoral developments, are among the factors that have changed the environment in which political parties operate, although determining the precise weight of each factor requires an independent study based on electoral and social data.

This rightward shift has been reflected in the decline of political forces historically associated with the peace process. The Labor Party, which previously enjoyed broad parliamentary representation, has seen its representation shrink, while other forces that were part of the political landscape associated with peace agreements have also declined. Consequently, relying on the return of the left to a position that would enable it to redirect policy toward the Palestinians is no longer a guaranteed prospect, given the changes affecting the structure of party competition and voting trends. Furthermore, a significant part of the sharp partisan disagreements revolves around the nature of the political system, the powers of institutions, the role of the judiciary, and the limits of executive and legislative authority, without being accompanied by an equally serious disagreement over the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Accordingly, a distinction must be made between opposition to the government and the existence of an alternative that carries a different political project in dealing with the Palestinians.

However, this interpretation does not mean that Israeli society is a homogeneous bloc moving in a single, inevitable direction. Voting trends are influenced by security, the economy, identity, religion, party leadership, and developments in the conflict. Crises may strengthen hardline forces at one stage and broaden opposition to their policies at another. Therefore, the rise of the right wing should be viewed as a trend requiring analysis and monitoring, rather than an irreversible course. The central argument here is that the prospects for peace are determined by the extent to which political parties can build a popular base that views a political settlement as a security and political gain, rather than a concession that threatens the state.

The Constitutional and Electoral Structure: The Impact of Rules on Outcomes

Israel does not have a single, unified written constitution in the traditional sense. Rather, its constitutional system is based on a set of Basic Laws that regulate public authorities, certain rights, and institutional structures. This reality is linked to the debate that accompanied the establishment of Israel regarding its identity and the relationship between its religious character and the democratic system. However, this issue requires a precise legal distinction: the absence of a constitution contained in a single document does not mean the absence of a constitutional framework, just as the existence of Basic Laws does not, in itself, resolve all the issues related to the balance between religion and state, or between the principle of equality and the national character of the state. The system has evolved through cumulative constitutional and legislative arrangements, rather than through a single founding document that definitively resolves these disagreements.

Elections are conducted according to a system of proportional representation based on closed party lists, whereby voters cast their ballots for a list rather than for an individual candidate. Seats are allocated according to election results and the governing rules, and are then distributed within each list according to the approved ranking of candidates. The voting age is eighteen, while eligibility to run for membership in the Knesset is generally linked to reaching the age of twenty-one, subject to legal conditions and exceptions. This mechanism gives political parties a central role in selecting candidates, formulating political programs, and building alliances, making government formation dependent on their ability to assemble sufficient parliamentary support.

This structure produces political consequences of considerable significance. A party with a limited number of seats may exercise influence exceeding its electoral size if its participation becomes necessary for the formation of a governing coalition, while major parties may be compelled to make political or programmatic concessions to maintain coalition cohesion. Accordingly, election results cannot be assessed solely by the number of votes or seats, but must also be examined in terms of each party’s position in government formation negotiations and its ability to influence the government’s program and policy orientations. While a multiparty coalition system allows for the representation of diverse political currents, it may also grant more hardline parties considerable bargaining power when their votes are decisive in securing a parliamentary majority. In such circumstances, a party’s weight within the coalition becomes a means of influencing fundamental issues, such as settlement expansion, annexation, security, and the future of a political settlement, even if that party does not command a popular majority.

Section Conclusion: Identifying the leading party is not sufficient to understand Israel’s future policies. The coalition partners it needs, their conditions, and the extent of their influence over decisions related to settlement expansion, annexation, and security are factors no less important than the election results themselves.

 

Government Formation Scenarios: Alternative Figures and the Limits of Change

Analytical assessments suggest the possibility of the emergence of an Israeli government capable of presenting itself internationally as more willing to pursue a political settlement, not necessarily as a result of a fundamental shift in the positions of its constituent parties, but rather in response to electoral and political calculations and Israel’s need to address the repercussions of its policies on its relations with international and regional powers. This assessment is based on the assumption that governments may, during periods of pressure, resort to reshaping their alliances or modifying their discourse in search of a balance between the requirements of domestic political survival and the need to improve their external image.

In this context, the name of Gadi Eisenkot emerges, given his military and security background and his experience in handling sensitive issues. However, military experience does not necessarily imply possession of a comprehensive political project. The transition from the security establishment to the leadership of a governing coalition requires the ability to build alliances, manage partisan contradictions, and formulate implementable policies in a highly polarized environment. As for Avigdor Lieberman, his name is raised in scenarios where forming a stable coalition proves impossible without additional political forces, given his political experience and ability to maneuver within the party system. Nevertheless, political experience does not necessarily imply the adoption of a more open approach toward Palestinian rights, which requires examining his actual positions rather than relying solely on his potential role in the government formation equation.

Other coalition scenarios are also associated with this context. The first involves a national unity government bringing together forces from different political orientations while excluding Arab parties and the most extreme right-wing currents, motivated by the need to ensure governmental stability and alleviate external pressures. The second involves a broader coalition that includes Arab political forces represented in the Knesset, allowing it to be presented to the international community as better positioned to engage in a political process. Both scenarios remain hypothetical, and their realization depends on election results, party positions, conditions for participation, and the extent of willingness to adopt a common program. Even if either scenario materializes, this would not automatically signify a change in policies toward the Palestinians, as the participation of any political actor must be measured by its actual ability to influence decisions, rather than by its symbolic significance alone.

A fundamental paradox emerges here: figures with security backgrounds may possess the ability to address the public on issues related to regional threats, yet they remain required to demonstrate their capacity to address political issues that go beyond managing immediate risks, foremost among them the future of the Palestinians, the boundaries of a political settlement, and the nature of relations with Arab states. Therefore, the seriousness of any transformation is determined by what is known as a change in appearance rather than substance, meaning the distinction between changing political discourse and changing policies. The presence of references to a Palestinian state in electoral discourse does not mean that its establishment has become an agreed-upon option. Rather, it may reflect an attempt to respond to external pressures or to use the issue in competition over government formation. There is a significant difference between placing the Palestinian question on the electoral agenda and adopting a clear vision regarding the borders of the state, its sovereignty, and the rights of its people.

 

 

Security and Religious Discourses: Narrowing the Space for a Political Settlement

Israeli security discourse is based on security necessity, while religious discourse is grounded in exclusive conceptions of land and history. The combination of these two discourses serves a function that goes beyond justifying existing policies, as it weakens the possibility of distinguishing between negotiable security demands and claims presented as absolute, non-negotiable rights. When land is presented as an exclusive religious entitlement, while Palestinian rights are portrayed as a security threat, the question of how much space remains for a political solution becomes fundamental.

A political settlement presupposes recognition of the existence of two parties with national rights and interests that cannot be disregarded, as well as the existence of political space that allows for negotiating arrangements that achieve both security and rights. However, if religious references or security considerations are used to close the door to recognition of Palestinian rights, the political process becomes a merely formal framework incapable of addressing the root causes of the conflict. This explains the concern arising from the absence of serious indicators of ending the conflict, in contrast to merely managing it, allowing crises to recur without reaching a sustainable settlement.

An accurate analysis also requires distinguishing between messages directed at the international community and those aimed at shaping Israeli public opinion. When political positions are formulated primarily to address the domestic audience, external influence remains limited unless diplomatic pressures are accompanied by political tools capable of changing calculations. Israeli political discourse thus becomes an indicator that must be analyzed within its context, rather than treated as media statements isolated from actual policies.

Third: The American Factor and the Regional Track — The Limits of External Leverage

To what extent can Washington reshape Israeli calculations, and what links normalization to a political settlement?

Washington: Domestic Considerations Determine the Limits of Pressure

The expectation of a fundamental shift in American policy toward Israel confronts domestic considerations that cannot be ignored. Conservative evangelical groups constitute part of President Donald Trump’s political support base, and religious considerations play a role in shaping the positions of segments of this base toward Israel. These considerations, alongside political and strategic interests, limit the likelihood of decisive American pressure that would push the Israeli government to change its course on fundamental issues.

Differences between Washington and Tel Aviv do not necessarily translate into the ability to exert actual pressure. Disagreements over details do not necessarily imply differences over the foundations of the relationship or the limits of pressure that can be exerted. The question also remains as to what might motivate the American administration to change its position as long as its domestic support base sees no need for such a change.

Furthermore, the rise of currents more critical of Israeli policies within certain American circles, along with the new calculations that a change of administration might impose, could influence the pace or limits of certain Israeli policy directions without making Washington capable, on its own, of changing the nature of the Israeli political project. The extent of this influence depends on the tools employed, the administration’s willingness to bear the cost of exerting pressure, and the ability of Israeli actors to maneuver or resist external demands.

Fourth: The Situation on the Ground — A Geography Being Reshaped

Have the realities on the ground moved beyond the stage of threats to the stage of dismantling the material foundations of a Palestinian state?

The West Bank: From Security Escalation to Undermining the Material Foundations of Statehood

An analysis of developments in the West Bank suggests that they go beyond being characterized as security escalation or a wave of settler violence, pointing instead to a broader process involving forced displacement and the de facto annexation of land, and the potential consequences of gradually undermining the geographical foundations necessary for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The importance of this distinction stems from the fact that treating settler violence as a series of isolated incidents may obscure its actual impact on the lives of Palestinians and their ability to remain on their land. Placing it within the broader context of control over land, settlement expansion, and restrictions on movement and geographical connectivity, however, allows for a more comprehensive understanding of its implications for the future of a political settlement. In this sense, developments are assessed according to their cumulative trajectory, rather than by examining each measure separately.

Area C occupies a central position in this discussion. The expansion of Israeli control over land, alongside the isolation of Palestinian communities from one another, may lead to a reality in which Palestinian areas become separate "islands," lacking the geographical contiguity necessary to exercise sovereignty and manage resources, movement, and economic development. The establishment of a state does not depend solely on political recognition or the existence of local institutions within population centers; rather, it requires a geographical territory that allows for the exercise of sovereignty, the connection of cities and towns, the management of resources, the development of infrastructure, and the movement of people and goods. If policies that deepen fragmentation and restrict Palestinians’ access to their land continue, the implementation gap between the legal recognition of the state and the possibility of its actual establishment will widen.

At the same time, the matter requires a degree of methodological caution. Figures circulated regarding the proportions of land that have been seized or are subject to expropriation measures require independent verification of their sources, as well as precise identification of the relevant time period and geographical scope. It is also necessary to distinguish between decisions and legislation concerning annexation and their actual implementation and scope of application, as each stage carries its own legal and political implications. As for the assertion that the establishment of a Palestinian state has become impossible as a result of current developments, this represents an extremely pessimistic strategic judgment rather than an established fact. The future depends on political, legal, and field developments, as well as the ability of the parties concerned to halt measures that undermine the prospects for a political settlement. This caution does not diminish the validity of the question being raised: What happens when international recognition of the Palestinian state continues alongside changes on the ground that diminish its geographical foundations?

Displacement: From Forced Displacement to "Creeping Displacement"

Displacement is not limited to the act of forcing populations to leave their areas under direct threat. Rather, it may take a gradual form by making life unsustainable, undermining the conditions necessary for remaining in place, and intensifying humanitarian, economic, and security pressures. This pattern can be described as "creeping displacement," which shifts the discussion from viewing displacement as an isolated event to considering it a possibility associated with a broader process of changes on the ground and in the political landscape. As control over land continues, the prospects for establishing a state diminish, and the ability to build a clear political horizon erodes, the need to monitor policies and realities that may lead to gradual demographic or geographical change becomes increasingly urgent.

However, describing any specific action as part of a displacement plan requires reliable evidence. It is not appropriate to assume that every instance of migration or individual departure carries the same significance or belongs to the same process. Moreover, the issue is not confined to the current Israeli government or the personality of its prime minister. Rather, it is linked to broader trends in Israeli policy and the absence of an internal consensus that would make the establishment of a Palestinian state an achievable objective. This trajectory may continue despite changes in leadership, as long as the underlying framework governing the approach to the Palestinian question does not undergo a fundamental transformation.

Jerusalem and the Hashemite Custodianship

Jerusalem occupies a central position in this equation due to its connection to the Hashemite Custodianship and the religious and historical significance of Islamic and Christian holy sites. The analysis establishes a link between the escalation of incursions and measures targeting the city and the diminishing prospects for political de-escalation, as the continuation of these developments places Jordan before a direct national and diplomatic responsibility. Within this framework, protecting the status quo at the holy sites cannot be separated from defending Palestinian rights or from efforts aimed at preventing unilateral measures from becoming irreversible realities that would be difficult to change at a later stage.

Southern Syria and Gaza: Extensions of Political Geography

The concerns raised regarding the directions of Israeli policy in the region are linked to the continued Israeli military presence in areas of southern Syria, the possibility of annexing parts of the West Bank, and the ongoing pressures associated with displacement. These developments are interpreted as potential indicators of an effort to expand geographical control and strengthen influence in the surrounding region. In southern Syria specifically, some analytical assessments point to the possibility that Israel may seek to establish a separate Druze entity, linked to its continued military presence and the expansion of its control in areas near Mount Hermon and Suwayda.

The significance of these developments for Jordan stems from the fact that any lasting transformation in the structure of control in southern Syria could create new security and political challenges and affect regional arrangements and the calculations of neighboring countries. Addressing these developments requires careful monitoring of political and on-the-ground developments, distinguishing between existing military movements and potential scenarios, and assessing their implications for border security and the future of Syrian stability. These concerns intersect with the issue of displacement in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as diminishing prospects for a political settlement, expanding control over land, and deteriorating living conditions may interact to produce a reality that places even greater pressure on Palestinians.

Section Conclusion: The trajectory of developments in the West Bank must be measured by their cumulative outcomes rather than by individual incidents. The decisive question is whether the accumulated realities on the ground preserve the material conditions necessary to make the establishment of a Palestinian state achievable.

Fifth: The International Legal Framework — From the Capital of Legitimacy to the Economics of Enforcement

Why have recognitions and resolutions not translated into effective pressure, and what is required to transform them into enforceable measures?

International Recognition: Legitimacy That Has Yet to Translate into Change on the Ground

What has actually changed on the ground following the recognition of Palestine by more than 140 countries? Have these recognitions succeeded in altering Israeli behavior or prompting the government to reconsider its policies toward the Palestinian territories, or have their effects remained limited in the face of continuing realities on the ground? This question does not seek to diminish the political and legal value of these recognitions. Rather, it highlights the gap between affirming rights in diplomatic discourse and possessing the tools capable of transforming them into a tangible political reality.

Recognition of statehood represents a political acknowledgment of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and the establishment of their own state, and strengthens the international standing of the Palestinian cause. However, it does not automatically lead to ending the occupation, halting settlement expansion, or imposing a political settlement on a party that rejects it. Hence, the need emerges for a phase that follows the mobilization of international recognition, in which states move from declaring positions to utilizing the economic, political, diplomatic, and legal tools at their disposal to influence Israeli policies. International recognitions acquire their full strategic value when integrated into a broader process that links international legitimacy to accountability and defines the consequences of violating international law. Accordingly, the accumulated diplomatic capital is measured by its impact on changing realities on the ground, rather than by the number of states that have announced their recognition.

International Law: Distinguishing Between Sources of Legal Obligations

The legal issue revolves around a gap rather than a vacuum. The crisis is not so much related to the absence of rules or the lack of clarity of all international obligations as it is to the distance separating the existence of these rules from the ability to ensure their respect and enforcement. Distinguishing between the sources of legal obligations allows for the construction of a more precise legal argument. United Nations Security Council resolutions vary in their nature and legal effects depending on their content and the legal basis under which they were adopted. United Nations General Assembly resolutions play important political and legal roles, although not all carry the same degree of binding force. Advisory opinions issued by the International Court of Justice provide legal interpretations of considerable importance, but they differ in their procedural nature from judgments issued in contentious cases between states.

The issue is also connected to the Charter of the United Nations and the measures it regulates for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 41 addresses measures that do not require the use of armed force, including the interruption of economic relations, means of communication, and diplomatic relations. Article 42, meanwhile, concerns measures that may include the use of force if the Security Council considers that the measures provided for under Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate. Other articles, including Articles 40, 43, and 44, address various aspects of the Council’s procedures and arrangements related to the implementation of its decisions. The inclusion of these articles does not mean that every state can independently undertake all the measures provided for therein, as their application depends on the nature of the measure, legal jurisdiction, and the context in which it is adopted.

Sanctions and Isolation: From General Calls to Specific Instruments

The Royal Address before the United Nations General Assembly addressed the tools available to the international community to compel Israel to accept a political settlement, including sanctions, asset freezes, the imposition of restrictions, and diplomatic isolation. The significance of this approach lies in its shift from general calls for respect for international law to a more specific level, as it raises the question of the extent to which states are prepared to use tools they have previously employed in other international crises when they considered that the conduct of a particular state warranted measures beyond political condemnation.

In this context, a distinction emerges between two levels: measures targeting specific activities associated with settlement expansion, and broader sanctions that may directly affect Israeli sectors, institutions, or interests. Each level has its own legal and political scope, costs, effects, and parties bearing its consequences, while the prospects for building international consensus around each also vary. Actions taken by a group of states have focused on goods and services associated with settlements, representing an initial step toward holding settlement activity accountable rather than treating it as an economic activity detached from its legal and political context. However, identifying the states concerned, the nature and scope of their measures, and their timing requires independent verification before adopting any list as a definitive description of official policies.

Although calls for sanctions have expanded, their effectiveness depends on the clarity of their legal basis, the identification of the authority empowered to adopt the measure, its scope, and its proportionality to the intended objective. Sanctions that are not linked to specific demands or that lack sufficient international consensus remain limited in impact, while measures based on a clear legal foundation, coordinated among influential actors, and accompanied by measurable indicators provide diplomacy with greater capacity to exert influence. These options may take various forms: national measures targeting specific activities, measures coordinated by a group of states, or processes pursued through competent international institutions. All of these differ in their legal basis, political and economic costs, and ability to produce tangible effects.

From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution: The Responsibility of the International Community

The central distinction here is between conflict management and conflict resolution. Conflict management involves containing escalation, preventing the expansion of confrontation, maintaining channels of communication, and mitigating humanitarian and security consequences, without necessarily addressing the underlying causes. Conflict resolution, by contrast, requires agreement on rights and obligations, addressing fundamental issues, and establishing political and legal arrangements that end the conflict on a sustainable basis. This distinction does not diminish the necessity of crisis management, as interventions aimed at stopping violence and protecting civilians may constitute indispensable urgent steps. However, the problem arises when temporary measures become a permanent substitute for a political solution, allowing diplomacy to succeed in containing a particular crisis while developments on the ground continue to make a political settlement increasingly difficult.

The international community possesses various tools to influence Israeli behavior, including diplomatic action, economic restrictions, political isolation, and international legal mechanisms. As the absence of change persists despite the availability of these tools, the question of political will governing their use arises, namely, the extent to which states are prepared to bear the political and economic costs associated with employing them. Major powers bear a particular responsibility due to their political, economic, and security influence and their ability to influence international institutions and their bilateral relations with Israel. However, this does not imply the existence of a unified position or identical interests among states, as political and strategic differences remain and constitute one of the reasons why certain pressure efforts have stalled.

Accordingly, practical options are directed toward building consensus among states whose positions converge regarding Palestinian rights and initiating joint measures in areas where cooperation is possible, rather than waiting for comprehensive consensus that may prove unattainable. This requires distinguishing between measures falling within national jurisdiction and those requiring broader decisions, particularly within the framework of the United Nations Security Council.

Section Conclusion: The international system does not lack rules, but rather enforcement mechanisms. The effectiveness of pressure is determined by the clarity of its objectives, the proportionality of its instruments to the behavior intended to be changed, and coordination among the actors capable of implementing them.

Sixth: The Arab and Palestinian Environment — Available Capabilities and Absent Coordination

Where does the Palestinian cause stand on the scale of Arab priorities, and what are the limits of the ability to build collective pressure?

Arab Divisions and Multiple Crises

Arab divisions affect the region’s ability to formulate a collective position toward current developments. Disagreements among states, accompanied by differences in their assessments of threats, alliances, and priorities, make it more difficult to build political blocs capable of exerting coherent pressure. These divisions have become increasingly complicated following the war involving Iran, limiting the prospects for developing a common Arab approach. In addition, the multiplicity of regional crises, the escalation of internal conflicts, and declining stability in several countries have dispersed Arab political attention and distributed resources and efforts across simultaneous issues. The crises in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, and elsewhere do not merely represent separate challenges; their effects intersect with the ability to build a collective position on shared strategic issues, foremost among them the Palestinian cause.

This does not mean that the Palestinian cause has lost its political and moral significance, nor that all Arab parties have abandoned it. Rather, the essence of the problem lies in the ability of Arab states to transform the centrality of the cause in political discourse into a joint program of action that defines priorities, instruments, and responsibilities. Possessing significant political, economic, and geographical resources does not automatically translate into collective influence without a degree of coordination regarding objectives and instruments. There are several possible areas of convergence, including rejecting displacement, supporting Palestinian rights, preserving holy sites, preventing the expansion of the conflict, and strengthening diplomatic processes that limit the imposition of unilateral realities. However, the success of such coordination remains dependent on clear political will and the ability of the parties to manage their disagreements so that they do not become a permanent obstacle to shared interests.

The effectiveness of sanctions and diplomatic isolation is closely linked to this coordination. The broader the scope of cooperation, the lower the cost of measures for each individual state and the greater the prospects for influencing the calculations of the targeted party. Conversely, unilateral action may remain limited in impact or impose burdens on the state undertaking it that exceed its capacity to bear. This raises a question about the nature of the Arab project itself: Is it based on managing existing crises and mitigating their consequences, or does it seek to build a relatively independent Arab capacity to influence regional and international decisions? At the same time, restoring Arab effectiveness does not mean overlooking internal crises or underestimating their complexity, as the weakness of the nation-state, the fragmentation of its institutions, and the expansion of internal conflicts are factors that reduce its ability to exert external influence. Accordingly, the stability of Arab states is directly linked to their ability to defend their common interests.

The Palestinian Predicament: The Authority, Leadership, and Instruments of Action

The establishment of the Palestinian Authority represented a transformation in the management of the Palestinian cause. It marked a transition from a phase in which the national movement was associated with political and resistance frameworks operating outside the occupied territory to a reality in which the Authority operates under constraints related to occupation and control over resources, movement, and revenues. According to this interpretation, within the process that emerged following the peace agreements, the Authority has been unable to build an independent political capacity that would enable it to impose a course leading to a sovereign state, while Israel has continued to expand its control over land and deepen realities that limit the possibilities of a solution. The Palestinian challenge has thus become twofold: continued pressures on the ground, on the one hand, and the decline of political and regional instruments capable of counterbalancing them, on the other.

In light of this, the question of Palestinian leadership and the renewal of instruments of political action acquires central importance. The continuation of the status quo, without renewal in leadership or mechanisms of influence, weakens the ability to generate a different political situation capable of exerting pressure to end the occupation and achieve national rights. Any Jordanian strategic vision regarding the Palestinian cause cannot be separated from the ability of Palestinians themselves to formulate an effective political project, nor from the existence of a regional and international environment that supports this project rather than merely managing the crisis and mitigating its consequences without addressing its structural causes.

Seventh: The Royal Address at the United Nations — An Analysis of Its Implications

Does King Abdullah II’s address lay the foundation for a new Jordanian approach, or does it merely raise the level of diagnosis?

The significance of His Majesty King Abdullah II’s address before the United Nations General Assembly extends beyond expressing Jordan’s position on Israeli policies to encompass the questions it raises regarding the responsibility of the international community, the effectiveness of merely managing the conflict, and the necessity of utilizing available political, legal, and economic instruments to bring about tangible change. The political value of any speech is generally measured by its ability to bring about changes in positions and policies, rather than by its eloquence or the extent to which it expresses anger and frustration. Hence, the discussion shifts from the content of the address to the potential implications it may have for reviewing diplomatic approaches, reassessing instruments of influence, and more clearly defining international responsibilities.

An analytical reading allows for the identification of three central messages that go beyond political condemnation and are interconnected:

- The nature of developments in the West Bank: Rejecting their reduction to security escalation or settler violence and viewing them instead as a process of forced displacement and de facto annexation that gradually undermines the geographical foundations of a Palestinian state.

- The limits of relying on changes of government: Shifting the diagnosis from attributing the failure of the peace process to the personality of the prime minister to questioning the absence of an Israeli government willing to accept a settlement based on Palestinian statehood. The approach that linked the deadlock to Benjamin Netanyahu and anticipated that his departure from power would pave the way for different leadership becomes less valid in light of the continuation of annexation and settlement policies and the decline of political forces historically supportive of the peace process.

- The responsibility of the international community: Moving from conflict management toward efforts to resolve the conflict, while possessing political, legal, and economic instruments that can be employed to achieve this objective.

The significance of these messages lies in their interconnection. Characterizing realities on the ground as annexation and displacement necessitates a reassessment of the assumptions underlying the prospects for a political settlement. Meanwhile, questioning the willingness of Israeli governments to accept a Palestinian state leads to reconsidering the usefulness of waiting for internal political change in Israel. Holding the international community responsible for the continued management of the conflict shifts the discussion toward the instruments available to international actors and the extent of their willingness to use them, rather than merely repeating calls for peace.

In this sense, the address can be understood as a shift from warning against Israeli policies to questioning the political and international environment that allows their continuation.

Translating the Implications into Potential Practical Courses of Action

If political developments and assessments of the national interest move toward formulating a new Jordanian approach, it may take four complementary courses of action:

- Linking diplomacy to measurable outcomes: Such as halting displacement, preventing annexation, protecting the Palestinian presence on their land, and preserving the geographical and political foundations for the establishment of a Palestinian state, while distinguishing between actions that yield symbolic gains and measures that effectively influence existing policies.

- Expanding international coordination on available instruments: By identifying possible measures at the national and collective levels, clarifying their legal basis, and building alliances capable of implementing and monitoring them. This may include reviewing certain aspects of bilateral cooperation, adopting specific measures concerning settlement-related activities, and intensifying diplomatic efforts within international institutions.

- Adopting clear indicators to assess Israeli transformations: Such as positions on annexation and settlement expansion, willingness to accept a Palestinian state, compliance with international law, and decisions implemented on the ground, thereby limiting confusion between changes in discourse and changes in behavior.

- Strengthening Arab coordination around shared interests: In a manner that distributes roles and burdens and reduces the likelihood that states acting individually will face pressures disproportionate to the possible outcomes.

Eighth: Jordan — The System of Risks and the Cost Equation

Why do the repercussions of the conflict extend beyond the borders of Palestine to affect Jordanian national security?

The Threefold Threat: Displacement, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian State

The Kingdom is linked to the Palestinian cause politically, geographically, and historically, and bears responsibilities related to protecting its national interests, the Hashemite Custodianship over the holy sites, and defending a political solution that guarantees Palestinian rights. From this perspective, Israeli developments cannot be viewed as external developments that affect national security only indirectly. Three issues emerge as the most closely connected to Jordanian interests, each reinforcing the others:

- Displacement: Its danger lies in the possibility that its consequences may extend to Jordan through pressures related to borders or attempts to redefine the Palestinian question at the expense of the Palestinians’ right to remain on their land and establish their state. Accordingly, rejecting displacement falls within the framework of protecting national stability and preventing the imposition of a new demographic and geographical reality that would change the nature of the conflict and place its consequences on Jordan.

- Jerusalem: The escalation of measures targeting the city and its holy sites places Jordan before a direct national and diplomatic responsibility and links the protection of the status quo to the defense of Palestinian rights.

- The Palestinian State: According to this perspective, it represents an essential element in any sustainable vision of regional stability and in protecting Jordan from attempts to transfer the consequences of the conflict onto its territory or reshape the Palestinian question in a manner that diminishes the rights of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, any decline in the prospects for a political solution makes Jordan’s position more sensitive, as the absence of a political horizon may open the door to approaches that seek to export the crisis rather than resolve it.

The Cost Equation: Between the Cost of Action and the Cost of Waiting

Jordan faces a delicate equation in assessing the costs of the available options. On the one hand, engaging in a more stringent approach toward Israel may impose political, economic, and diplomatic burdens that the Kingdom would find difficult to bear alone, given the disparities in capabilities among states, the complexity of international relations, and the Kingdom’s connections to a network of interests and alliances. On the other hand, continued reluctance to take effective steps may lead to greater costs in the long term if developments that threaten Jordanian interests and narrow the scope for a political solution persist.

Here, the issue goes beyond calculating immediate gains and losses to what may be termed the cumulative strategic cost. A state may avoid political or economic confrontation in the short term, only to find itself later facing a more difficult reality if concerning policies continue without effective instruments to influence them. Conversely, taking unilateral measures that do not account for the balance of power or the limits of national capacity may expose the state to burdens disproportionate to the possible outcomes.

For this reason, the essence of the equation is linked to burden-sharing: the broader the scope of coordination with Arab states and the international community, the greater the opportunities to reduce the cost borne by each party and to move from fragmented national reactions toward collective action based on clear objectives.

Strengthening the Domestic Front

Strengthening the domestic front is not limited to the security dimension. National capacity to confront risks is also linked to economic stability, institutional efficiency, clarity of public discourse, the availability of accurate information, and the ability to counter rumors and polarization, as well as building national consensus around strategic issues affecting Jordan’s future, foremost among them rejecting displacement, protecting Palestinian rights, and preserving national interests and sovereignty. A cohesive domestic front provides the state with greater capacity to manage pressures, reduces opportunities for external crises to be exploited to create internal divisions, and provides a foundation for maintaining foreign policy within clear priorities. At the same time, Jordan, regardless of the efficiency of its institutions, cannot address all potential repercussions alone, which closely links domestic resilience to Arab and international partnerships.

Strategic Realism: Firm Principles and Flexible Instruments

Realism, in its strategic sense, requires assessing the balance of power as it exists, understanding the factors driving the various actors, and identifying areas where influence can be exerted, without implying acceptance of existing policies or regarding them as an unchangeable destiny. This approach is embodied in combining firm principles (rejecting displacement, defending Jerusalem, and upholding the Palestinians’ right to their own state) with flexibility in instruments when selecting diplomatic and political courses of action that serve these objectives. It also requires distinguishing between what can be anticipated and what can be proven, as assessments concerning the outcomes of Israeli elections, Washington’s willingness to exert pressure, displacement trends, and the prospects for the formation of Arab blocs remain possibilities that require continuous monitoring.

Strategic analysis does not mean adopting the most pessimistic scenarios as inevitable outcomes. Overestimating risks may lead to inaccurate conclusions, just as underestimating them may result in delayed responses. Accordingly, the more balanced approach is based on periodic situation assessments grounded in reliable information, examining alternative scenarios and identifying indicators that necessitate reviewing policies or adjusting priorities. On this basis, Jordanian decision-making should not be held hostage to predictions regarding the outcomes of Israeli or American elections. These elections may create opportunities and may produce governments that are either less or more hardline, but they do not provide advance guarantees regarding the future of the conflict. The priority remains a policy grounded in established national interests, one that capitalizes on political changes when they present genuine opportunities and retains practical alternatives when expectations are not realized.

Section Conclusion: The strategic value of pessimism is determined by its ability to transform the most dangerous scenarios into practical questions about preparedness and available options, rather than into a definitive judgment that closes the door to analysis or eliminates the possibility of political and diplomatic action.

 

Ninth: Scenarios and Monitoring Indicators

The following table presents four analytical scenarios, which are not presented as predictions, nor are they assumed to be sequential or mutually exclusive, as more than one scenario may occur simultaneously or overlap with others. Their purpose is to enable decision-makers to link each possibility to observable indicators and its implications for Jordan.

Scenario	Description	Monitoring Indicators	Implications for Jordan
Change in Political Facade	Formation of a more broadly representative government or one less dependent on the most extreme political currents, adopting a more flexible discourse toward the international community, without a fundamental change in policies.	Absence of a clear commitment to a Palestinian state; continuation of settlement expansion and annexation; changes in discourse without corresponding decisions on the ground.	Superficial improvement in the diplomatic climate without addressing the root causes of the conflict; risk of confusing discourse with behavior.
Conditional Substantive Shift	Formation of a coalition that adopts a clear program regarding ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state, and is willing to bear the domestic political cost of doing so.	Declared position on annexation and settlement expansion; tangible decisions on the ground; monitoring mechanisms and commitment to international law.	A window for negotiations that requires linking it to specific objectives and measurable indicators, as well as Arab and international coordination to consolidate it.
Consolidation of the Right-Wing Trajectory	Continuation of hardline trends within political parties, institutions, and public opinion, even with changes in leadership.	New legislation and decisions; decline of political forces supporting a settlement; dominance of security and religious discourse in public debate.	Continued pressure on the West Bank and Jerusalem; accumulation of realities on the ground; increasing cost of waiting.
Acceleration of Developments on the Ground	Expansion of de facto annexation, escalation of creeping displacement, and changes in the structure of control in southern Syria.	Transition from legislation to implementation; restrictions on movement and geographical connectivity; pressures on living conditions; changes in control over southern Syria.	Potential border, demographic, and political pressures on Jordan, along with new security challenges along its northern borders.

 

Tenth: Strategic Conclusions

The preceding sections reveal a recurring strategic problem: the widening gap between international recognition of Palestinian rights and the ability to protect them on the ground, the continuation of calls for a political settlement alongside developments on the ground and in the political landscape that undermine its foundations, and the availability of international instruments of influence without their being employed to an extent sufficient to change the calculations of the parties concerned. From this interconnection, four main conclusions can be drawn:

- The shift from the test of legitimacy to the test of enforcement: The legitimacy of Palestinian demands is no longer the only issue being tested; rather, the test now concerns the international community’s ability to enforce them. The Palestinian cause has acquired significant diplomatic and legal capital, but its impact remains limited unless it is translated into measures that protect rights on the ground and curb annexation and settlement expansion.

- Distinguishing between the identity of the government and the future of a political settlement: Electoral change may open political opportunities, but it does not guarantee a shift in fundamental positions. Therefore, any government should be assessed on the basis of its decisions, practices, and willingness to pursue a genuine political settlement, rather than its discourse or expectations associated with the figures leading it.

- The cost of managing the conflict without addressing its causes: The continuation of this approach may consolidate realities that make a political settlement increasingly difficult. Geographical changes in the West Bank, pressures threatening the Palestinian presence, and declining geographical connectivity are factors that increase the cost of addressing the conflict the longer action is delayed.

- Combining diplomacy with the capacity to exert influence: Protecting Jordanian interests requires continuing international diplomatic efforts, strengthening Arab coordination, developing legal and political instruments, improving risk assessments, strengthening the domestic front, and maintaining clarity regarding national priorities.

These conclusions establish three priority directions for any future approach: building an international pressure strategy with clearly defined objectives that links diplomatic, economic, and legal measures to specific behaviors intended to be changed, supported by follow-up mechanisms and measurable indicators; developing a continuous Jordanian assessment of Israeli and regional transformations based on multiple scenarios and distinguishing between changes of government and changes in policy; and strengthening joint Arab action and domestic resilience in a manner that distributes burdens and links external action to a national and institutional foundation capable of managing pressures.

The conclusions drawn from the preceding analyses raise three questions that do not provide definitive answers about the future of the conflict, but necessitate a more rigorous reassessment of the policies, instruments, and assumptions that have governed approaches to it: What is the value of continuing with the same approaches if realities on the ground are changing in a direction contrary to the objectives of a political settlement? What is the value of international recognition if it is not accompanied by measures that protect the rights being recognized? And to what extent can reliance be placed on changes in Israeli governments if fundamental policies do not change to the required extent?

Ultimately, the future is not predetermined, and the most dangerous scenarios are not inevitable. However, avoiding them requires moving beyond merely diagnosing risks toward building an effective capacity to influence the course of events. The real test lies neither in the number of international recognitions, nor in the identity of the next Israeli government, nor in the level of statements issued by major powers, but rather in the ability to bring about change in the realities that govern the conflict. A political settlement cannot be achieved merely by declaring a desire for it; legitimacy does not automatically impose itself on realities on the ground; and pressure does not become effective unless it is linked to clear objectives and the political will to implement it. Between managing a recurring crisis and consolidating a reality that is difficult to change, the responsibility of the next phase is defined: moving from waiting for change to creating the conditions for it.

Final Conclusion: The difference between managing the conflict and working to end it is the difference between temporarily containing the repercussions of the crisis and building a political process capable of addressing its underlying causes. On this distinction depend the stability of the region, the preservation of Palestinian rights, and the protection of Jordanian interests.

Methodological Note and Verification Items

This paper is based on political, strategic, and legal contributions. Sections relating to individuals, scenarios, and assessments have been formulated as possibilities and analytical interpretations rather than established facts.

Issued by Jordanian Masarat for Development and progress

17 October 2026